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 Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper analyzes the policy impacts generated by three interconnected 
regulations that were authorized in the 2014-2015 period pertinent to Indonesian marine 
fisheries governance. In addition, it also develops policy alternatives and investigates 
the stakeholders’ attitudes towards these policies. 
Employing the mixed-method research approach with the case study research 
design, this paper explains the impacts caused by the increased fishing fee tariff on the 
national fisheries revenues, the composition of the Nationally Registered Fishing 
Vessels (NRFV), and the Fishing Operational Costs (FOC). The latter, the contribution 
of the increased fishing fee tariff to the FOC, was derived from an analysis conducted 
on 1,108 samples of medium-scale commercial fishing vessels (60-200 GT) based in 
the Nizam Zachman Oceanic Fishing Port, the largest industrial-scale fishing base in 
Indonesia.  
In regard to the revocation of regency/municipality authority and their maritime 
jurisdiction, several policy impacts are summarized, encompassing relicensing issues 
for the small-scale commercial fishing boats (5-30 GT), job reassignment, and 
irrelevancy of related existing law. This paper also conducts an assessment of the 
establishment of a Fisheries Management Commission in Indonesia Fisheries 
Management Areas (FMC-IFMA), a newly established regional fisheries institution. 
The assessment focuses on the legal basis, tasks and functions, and membership 
apportionment. 
 Investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes also employs a mixed-method 
research approach. Collected responses from a survey on 446 respondents of Indonesian 
marine fisheries stakeholders are merged with the summary of 19 in-depth interviews. 
In addition, the findings garnered from field observation are also included. As a result, 
the magnitude and distribution of attitudes from nine types of stakeholders are 
portrayed, including supporting arguments. 
In conclusion, this paper argues that the authorized policies generate various 
impacts and several potential problems. Several findings also emerge from the 
investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes regarding these policies. Finally, this paper 
proposes several recommendations. These encompass reinforcement of the legal basis 
for FMC-IFMA establishment, including more engagement of non-governmental 
stakeholders in the commission, and an amendment of the formula for the Revenue 
Sharing Fund (RSF) from the fisheries sector by implementing a proportional 
distribution based on exploitation levels and registered fishing fleet size in each IFMA. 
 
Keyword: commercial marine fisheries management, fishing licensing policy, regional 
fisheries governance, fisheries co-management 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Indonesian marine fisheries governance is undergoing significant 
transformations generated by the authorization of several national policies and 
regulations in recent years (2014-2015). Three of those policies/regulations, based on 
Indonesia’s law hierarchy, are Law Number 23 of 2014, Government Regulation 
Number 75 of 2015, and Presidential Regulation Number 2 of 2015. 
Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Local Government expands the authority 
of provincial governments in managing fisheries, from 4-12 nautical miles (nm) to 0-12 
nm, while at the same time this law revokes the authority of the regency and municipal 
governments within 0-4 nm (GOI 2014). Meanwhile, Government Regulation Number 
75 of 2015 significantly increases the fishing fees imposed on Nationally Registered 
Fishing Vessels (NRFV) operating in the 12-200 nm zone (GOI 2015). Lastly, 
Presidential Regulation no 2 of 2015 mandates the further implementation of fisheries 
co-management by encouraging stakeholder engagement in the decision-making 
process. 
Undoubtedly the authorization of these three regulations generates both direct 
and indirect problems. First, Law 23 of 2014 shifts Indonesia’s policy of decentralized 
fisheries management in the opposite direction. Referring to Sen and Nielsen (1996), 
fisheries decentralization is defined as an action to move some responsibilities to the 
lower level of government. Hypothetically, this alteration will evoke dissatisfaction 
from the affected regions-- the municipalities and the regencies. In addition, this law 
 
 
 2 
also has the potential to make some provisions of other related statutes irrelevant, for 
instance, Law Number 33 of 2004 concerning Fiscal Balance. 
Second, theoretically, the increased fishing fees directly affect fishing vessels’ 
operational costs, particularly the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV). 
Indirectly it will also have an impact on the livelihood of the crews working on those 
vessels.  A policy simulation on the Industrial scale of Hawaiian Longline fishery 
demonstrates that doubling the rate of auction fee, as another form of fishing fee, will 
significantly (18-21%) decrease the owner and crew incomes. (Chakravorty and 
Nemoto, 2000) 
Not surprisingly, this regulation has evoked strong resistance from fishermen 
and fishing company associations (Mongabay 2016; Tribun News 2016). Furthermore, 
this regulation contradicts, arguably, the efforts to increase production from the 
domestic fleet after the expulsion of (ex) foreign fishing vessels. 
Third, the establishment of a Fisheries Management Commission (FMC) in each 
Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (IFMA) as the final outcome of the policy 
mandated by the Presidential Regulation will, hypothetically, alter the governance of 
commercial marine fisheries in Indonesia. This paper argues that the formation of FMC-
IFMA can be considered as an attempt to implement federalism in Indonesian marine 
fisheries management. Sharing, not dividing, the authority and responsibility between 
the central and provincial governments is a relatively new experience for Indonesia. 
Prior to further discussion, it is crucial to have some understanding regarding 
the term ‘Federalism’ discussed in this paper. Here, federalism is not defined as the 
commonly used and known definition; as a mode or type of a state/nation’s political 
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system (Law 2013). As discussed in this paper, federalism refers to the sharing of 
jurisdictional and management responsibilities between the national and the sub-
national governments in managing natural resources located in a specific or designated 
geographical area (Juda 1993). In the context of Indonesia, the sharing of authority and 
responsibility occurs between the central government (the national level) and the 
provincial governments (the sub-national level). 
As a Unitarian state that does not implement federalism in her political system, 
another definition of federalism that is suitable with the Indonesian context is the one 
defined by Bauer et al. (2018) as natural resources federalism. It refers to a process of 
conferring or granting some responsibilities to the sub-national institution or 
administration, to some degree, in governing natural resources. At a glance, this 
definition is quite similar with the definition of decentralization proposed by Sen and 
Nielsen (1996); an action to move the responsibilities to the lower level of government. 
However, it is also necessary to notice that the marine fisheries resources that would be 
jointly managed by the central and the provincial governments are initially located in 
the national jurisdiction; 12 to 200 nautical miles (nm). This condition has several 
similarities with those underlying the establishment of the Regional Fishery 
Management Council (RFMC) system in the US (Rogalski 1980). Therefore, the term 
federalism is more appropriate than the term decentralization in the following 
discussion. Furthermore, it is the main argument of this paper that Indonesia is on the 
path to implement federalism in marine fisheries management. 
Referring to the potential problems mentioned earlier, several research questions 
emerge. First, how do the new policies/regulations affect marine fisheries management 
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in Indonesia? Second, what are the other potential impacts from the implementation of 
the new policies/regulations? Third, what are the available policy alternatives to cope 
with the potential problems? Fourth, will the FMC-IFMA meet the objectives mandated 
in the middle-term national development plan (Presidential Regulation) and Ministerial 
Strategic Plan? Fifth, to what extent will the commission perform fisheries co-
management? Lastly, what are the stakeholders’ perceptions (attitudes) toward both the 
policy impacts and the proposed policy alternatives? 
Regarding the research questions, this paper has four objectives. First, it 
analyzes the policy impacts generated by the implementation of the new regulations. 
Second, it develops policy alternatives related to these policy impacts. Third, it 
investigates stakeholder perceptions toward these policy impacts.  Lastly, my research 
also proposes some policy recommendations generated from the results of policy 
analysis and investigation of stakeholders’ perceptions. 
 
  
 
 
 5 
CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
II.1. Fisheries Management and Fisheries Governance 
As publicly owned resources, the management policies for fisheries resources 
have been developing dynamically covering a broad range of ecology, economics, 
socio-cultural, and political aspects. Yet, some failures still occur in spite of the 
significant improvements that have been made in fisheries policy and management. The 
reasons contributing to these failures are attributed to the failures in enforcing the 
management measures and institutional deficiencies (Macinko and Bromley 2002, Okey 
2003, Bromley 2009, Dell’Apa et al. 2012).  
The evolution of marine fisheries management has led to the adoption of limited 
entry regimes, encouragement of fisheries co-management, and some efforts focused on 
implementing the Ecosystem Approach to Fishery Management (EAFM) (Ginter and 
Rettig 1978, Pinkerton 1989, Schreiber 2001, Jentoft 2005, Zabel et al. 2003). 
Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009) summarized fisheries governance as a more 
complex and broader concept than fisheries management mostly dealing with the 
technical issues. While fisheries management employs a set of tools for solving concrete 
tasks with clearly defined goals and measurable outcomes, fisheries governance 
addresses interconnected and complex biological, economic and social issues having, 
sometimes, contradictory goals. In addition, governance is not exclusively exercised by 
the government, but it is a collective effort involving broader stakeholders that carry out 
not only vertical but also horizontal coordination. 
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II.2. Fishing Fees as a Type of Limited Entry Regime in Marine Fisheries 
Management 
 
A fishing fee or marine resource rent charge can be simply defined as a charge 
imposed on resource users for the privilege given to them in utilizing the public resource 
(Gylfason and Weitzman 2003, Bromley 2009). Charging the fee for fishing is an 
assertion and confirmation of public ownership as it would return the share of the 
harvested fish value to the public as the owner of the resources (Macinko and Bromley 
2002). In addition, Matthiasson (2001) argued that the fishing fee represents equity and 
justice as it works as another form of social contract between the industry as the resource 
users and the government as the representative of a publicly-owned resource. 
Weitzman (2002) argued that a price-based instrument like a fishing fee is more 
efficient than a quantity-based instrument such as an Individual Transferable Quota 
(ITQ), especially for multi-species marine fisheries (Gylfason and Weitzman 2003). 
Two primary topics commonly discussed in the implementation of fishing fees 
are the payment or charging mechanism and the mechanism for distributing the 
collected fund or state revenues. Regarding the charging mechanism, the Resource 
Depletion Charge (RDC) or Landing Fee is argued as the better market-based instrument 
for handling fisheries management issues related to equity or fairness (Gylfason and 
Weitzman 2003). Under this mechanism, the amount of charge imposed on the industry 
is set based on the percentages of raw wet fish catch value that is to be paid after the 
catch is landed.  
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II.3. Fishing Fee as a portion of the Operational Costs of Commercial Fishery 
Operational costs of commercial fishing are commonly classified into two types; 
the fixed costs (vessels and gear maintenance, mooring, and depreciation) which are 
commonly borne by the owner, and the variable costs; expenses incurred during the 
fishing trips (fuel, bait, ice etc.). The variable costs commonly are shared between the 
owner and the crews (Chakravorty and Nemoto, 2000). In addition, Fyson (1985) 
categorized the operating costs into 11 items; ranging from crew costs (salary/wages) 
and fuel consumption to the income tax. In this categorization scheme, the landing fee 
and license fee with unloading costs and watchman’s wages are classified as the harbor 
costs. Regarding the operational costs, Matthı́asson (2001) argued that a vessel owner 
will continue to run his business as long as the variable costs and the loan costs 
(including the interest rate of the invested capital) can be covered by revenues from the 
landed catch. 
Most fisheries economics literature addressing the economic performance of 
specific fishing operations focus on the contribution of fuel consumption to fishing 
operations. Drawing from that literature, particularly in the developed countries, it can 
be concluded that crews' salary/wages and fuel consumption are the primary 
contributors to commercial fishing expenses. Crews’ salary/wage contributes up to 40% 
of the annual operating/fishing costs (Fyson 1985, Daures et al. 2013), followed by fuel 
costs representing approximately 20% of the annual total fishing costs (Daures et al. 
2013). 
Increased world fuel price significantly escalates the contribution of fuel costs 
toward the total fishing costs. The contribution of fuel costs to the total fishing costs of 
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the European Union (EU) fishing fleets rose from 17% in 2002 to 29% in 2008 (Cheilari 
et al. 2013). Meanwhile, Abernethy et al. (2010) demonstrated that the increased fuel 
price escalates the portion of fuel costs toward the gross expenditures per trip of the UK 
trawl fishery from 20-35% in 2007 into 45-60% in 2008. In addition, compared to their 
income, the ratio of fuel costs ranged between 19% and 34% of the average income of 
the UK offshore fishing fleet (Curtis and Anderson 2012). 
Taxes as a percentage of the total revenue from a fishing trip (the total price of 
the landed catch) or the Landing Fees are part of the Variable Costs that are shared by 
the owner and crews. Therefore, supporting the classical fishery bioeconomic model 
(Gordon 1953, Gordon 1954, Schaefer 1957), an increased landing fee will affect both 
the owner's and the crews’ income. A policy simulation on the industrial scale Hawaiian 
Longline fishery demonstrated that doubling the rate of auction fee will significantly 
reduce the owner and crew incomes between 18% and 21% (Chakravorty and Nemoto, 
2000). 
In contrast, the contribution of any other type of fishing fee to the operational 
costs and size relative to vessels' revenues in developing countries is relatively small. 
The fishing taxes consisting of vessel registration fee and annual tax of Vietnam's 
offshore longline fishery operating in the South China Sea were only about 0.8% of the 
average annual vessel gross revenue (Flaaten and Anh 2008). 
 
II.4. Distributing the National Revenues from the Natural Resource Rent 
Several studies addressing the distribution of national revenues derived from 
natural resources rent favored a proportional distribution based on the derivation basis 
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(Alisjahbana 2005, Agustina et al. 2012). This means that the producer regions shall 
receive a larger amount of funds from the collected national revenues than the other 
regions located further from the location of the resources. The derivation basis is 
developed based on the assumption that producer regions suffer from the negative 
externalities generated by the natural resource’s extraction. Unfortunately, most of these 
studies in Indonesia discuss revenue distribution from other types of natural resources 
such as mining and forestry (Alisjahbana 2005, Agustina et al. 2012). These studies 
rarely analyze the formula for intergovernmental distribution of resource rent from the 
fishery sector.  
From the beginning of decentralization in Indonesia back in 1999, the Revenue 
Sharing Fund (RSF) derived from the royalty of the natural resources extraction has 
always been a sensitive issue, particularly from the oil and mining sector. The disparities 
of the RSF tend to ignite disappointment from the subnational governments 
(Brodjonegoro and Asanuma 2000, Alm et al. 2001, Alisjahbana 2005, Agustina et al. 
2012). 
Gylfason (2001) argued that the national revenues collected from natural 
resource extraction should be invested back into the education sector, particularly for 
the producer regions. In addition, Brodjonegoro and Asanuma (2000) argued that 
decentralization in Indonesia should have been implemented and limited at the 
provincial level, not on the municipal/regency level. The argument was made based on 
the institutional capacity and the availability of human resources. 
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II.5. Fisheries Co-Management  
Full-government intervention in managing the fisheries as a publicly-owned 
resource, either through direct or indirect regulations fails to cope with the complexity 
of fisheries problems. Eventually, the failure is attributed to the legitimacy of the 
enacted regulations. Two of four factors affecting the legitimacy of the regulatory 
scheme are the level of the user involvement in the decision-making process and in the 
implementation or the enforcement of the regulations (Jentoft 1989). These factors lead 
to the emergence of what is commonly known as fisheries co-management involving 
the resource users' participation in the decision-making process. 
Fisheries co-management can be understood as a sharing of power and 
responsibility between the government and the users (fishermen or fishing industry) in 
managing the (fisheries) resources (Sen and Nielsen 1996, Schreiber 2001, and Carlsson 
and Berkes 2005). However, the definition encompasses a much wider or broader 
spectrum of the collaborative decision-making process (Pinkerton 1989, Sen and 
Nielsen 1996).  
Types of collaborative management classified as fisheries co-management range 
from a local agreement in a fishing village or community (Pinkerton 1989) to the sharing 
of authority and responsibility involving intergovernmental agencies at the national 
level such as the US Regional Fishery Management Council system (Sen and Nielsen 
1996, Burroughs 2011). Furthermore, Carlsson and Berkes (2005) expanded the 
definition of fisheries co-management beyond a limited yet formalized power-sharing 
arrangement, envisioning a continuous logical approach to governance and to solve 
resource management problems through partnership. 
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As an effort to simplify assessment of arrangement types, Sen and Nielsen 
(1996) classify fisheries co-management into five types (typology); the Instructive 
(Type A), the Consultative (Type B), the Cooperative (Type C), the Advisory (Type D) 
and the Informative (Type E). This classification is made based upon the role taken by 
the government and the users. An arrangement dominated by the government role 
represents the instructive type of co-management, while the informative type represents 
the most opposite mechanism (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Spectrum of co-management arrangements) 
Source: Sen and Nielsen (1996), adapted from Mc Cay 1993 and Berkes 1994 
 
In summarizing the wide spectrum of possible collaborative management 
arrangements, Sen and Nielsen (1996) also differentiate the arrangement based on the 
role of the government and the user groups in the decision-making process, types of 
management tasks, and the stage of the management process. Referring to the type of 
management task, the decentralization (moving the responsibilities to the lower level of 
government) can be considered as another type of co-management. Furthermore, 
Carlsson and Berkes (2005) also describe co-management as a means of linking 
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different types of organizations. In this case, various types of organizations coming from 
the different levels are working together in a designated area or addressing a specific 
resource. 
 
II.6. Federalism as marine fisheries co-management 
Muawanah et al. (2017) argued that five main pillars of fishery management 
shall be enforced in order to promote a successful fisheries reform in Indonesia. One of 
these pillars is the reinforcement of regional governance in each Indonesia Fisheries 
Management Area (IFMA). Responding to the encouragement of stakeholders’ 
participation in managing Indonesian marine fisheries resources in the 12-200 nm zone 
as mandated by Presidential Regulation and MMAF’s National Strategic Plan (MMAF-
RI 2015), the Directorate General of Capture Fisheries (DGCF) as an agency under the 
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) that is responsible for marine 
fisheries governance in Indonesia, established the Indonesia Fisheries Management 
Commissions (FMCs) in each IFMA. Referring to the Directorate General’s Decree, 
each FMC consisting of stakeholders’ representatives from the constituent provinces 
and other institutions will be assigned to implement and evaluate marine fisheries 
management in their respective or assigned FMA (DGCF 2017). 
In the context of natural resource governance, federalism is defined as a concept 
of sharing jurisdictional and management responsibilities between the national and the 
subnational governments in managing natural resources located in a specific or a 
designated geographical area (Juda 1993). In addition, Bauer et al. (2018) defined 
natural resources federalism as a process of conferring or granting some responsibilities 
to the sub national institution or administration, to some degree, in governing the natural 
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resources. Drawing from these two definitions, my research argues that the 
establishment of FMC-IFMA signifies the implementation of marine fisheries 
federalism (Juda 1993, Oakey 2003), and to some extent represents fisheries co-
management (Sen and Nielsen 1996). 
Pinkerton (1989) summarized favorable conditions for developing co-
management regimes. Some of the conditions that are relevant to this study encompass 
the opportunity for the negotiation process, the existence of a long-term legally 
formalized arrangement, the availability of external support from other stakeholders 
(university, non-government scientists, and credible organization), the fishermen’s 
direct involvement, and the availability of experienced bureaucrats. Other related 
conditions encompass the size of managed areas, the size of the relevant population of 
fishermen, and the size of the relevant government bureaucracy 
Hanna (1996) proposed three main outcomes for evaluating co-management 
arrangements; sustainability, efficiency, and equity. The last one consists of four 
elements; representation, process clarity, homogenous expectation, and distributive 
effect. 
Stakeholders’ representation has always been the focus in assessing a fisheries 
co-management regime (Pinkerton 1989, Ostrom 1990, Hanna 1996, Schreiber 2001). 
Regarding the membership apportionment of the Regional Fishery Management 
Councils (RFMC) in the US, for example, several studies (Okey 2003, Eagle et al. 2003, 
Dell’Apa et al. 2012) proposed to reshape the existing institutional structure of the 
councils, particularly by diversifying the composition of the voting members. The 
arguments underlying the request for more balance and broader stakeholder 
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representation are attributed to the concerns over domination by specific stakeholders 
in the decision-making process (Dell’Apa et al. 2012) and to the failure in bringing 
diverse viewpoints into council discussions and decision-making (Eagle et al. 2003). 
 
II.7. Stakeholders’ Attitudes 
Marine fisheries stakeholders can be defined as those who have interests in and 
are impacted by the enactment of policies pertinent to fisheries management and the 
marine environment. While the term is thus quite broad, encompassing various ‘actors’ 
from society, the fishermen and their representative organizations are considered as the 
principal fisheries stakeholders. The other stakeholders encompass fishing 
communities, fishing-related industries such as fish processors and fish traders, 
management agencies, Non-Profit Organizations or Civil Society organizations such as 
environmental NGOs, and other citizens (Mackinson et al. 2011). 
Attitude can simply be defined as the extent of disfavor or favor toward an object 
or an issue. It has a broad range and contains a belief component (Fishbein and Ajzen 
in Perry et al. 2017). Measuring stakeholders’ attitudes is the most common type of 
study in investigating human dimensions of natural resource management (Manfredo, 
Teel, and Bright 2004 in Manfredo 2008). Studies about attitudes provides the most 
understandable way of explaining a group of stakeholders’ thoughts on a specific issue. 
Another reason underlying the popularity of attitude studies is their ability to provide 
useful information in predicting and influencing human behavior (Manfredo 2008).  
Restricted item, or closed-ended item, is the most common survey method used 
in quantitative research, and mostly employs rating scale known as a Likert-scale 
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varying between 5 and 7 points for measuring the level of agreement of the respondents 
(Privitera 2017). Pérez-Sánchez and Muir (2003) and Pont et al. (2016) are few 
examples of study employing close-ended questionnaires for assessing fishermen’s 
attitudes on issues related to their livelihood. In addition, Pont et al. (2016) 
demonstrated a significant positive correlation between fishermen attitude and their 
perception toward a specific issue. On the contrary, Knapp (1997) demonstrated the 
assessment of fishermen’s attitudes using open-ended, or short comments collected 
from the respondents. In other words, attitude can also be studied using a qualitative 
approach. 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Sabatier (1988) is 
built based on the assumption that the various stakeholders discussing substantive issues 
pertinent to a specific geographical area (Policy Subsystem) will create an advocacy 
coalition based on shared policy beliefs at the level of coordination (Weible 2005). 
Furthermore, this coalition will promote their beliefs into public policies (Sabatier 
1988). According to the ACF theory, stakeholders having similar beliefs will be easier 
to coordinate and to share information than those having different beliefs. Since belief 
is inherited in attitude, therefore investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes is expected 
to predict the coalition and the level of future coordination among Indonesia’s marine 
fisheries stakeholders engaged in FMC. 
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CHAPTER III  
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
III.1. Research Design 
The study consists of three stages of research activities. First, it analyzes the 
direct policy impacts resulting from the authorization of three new policies/regulations. 
Second, it investigates the stakeholders’ attitudes regarding the direct policy impacts 
and the proposed policy alternatives. Finally, it proposes some policy recommendations 
for the newly enacted policies/regulations. In presenting the results, the study follows 
the standard (i.e., non-manuscript) format for dissertations at the University of Rhode 
Island.  
 The study applies the mixed-method research approach using the case study 
research design/strategy (Robson 2000, Creswell 2014). The analysis of the policy 
impacts and the proposed policy alternatives is conducted based upon the detailed 
information derived from the literatures review, field observation, surveys, and 
interviews. 
 The second stage of the research activities, the investigation of the stakeholders’ 
attitudes, also employs a mixed-method research approach using a survey research 
strategy and the Convergence Parallel research design that merges the results of the 
quantitative and qualitative analyses (Creswell 2014). Qualitative analysis derived from 
the combination of the literature review, field observation, and interviews (the 
qualitative approach) supports the quantitative results from the questionnaires (the 
quantitative approach) analysis. Lastly, the results from each stage will be used to 
develop policy recommendations. 
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III.2. Location and Time of the Study 
The study was carried out in Jakarta, Indonesia over six months, from June to 
November 2018. It was concentrated in two specific locations; the Headquarters of the 
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) in Central Jakarta, and the Nizam 
Zachman Oceanic-class Fishing Port (NZOFP) in North Jakarta (Appendix I). Data 
collection conducted in HQ-MMAF was concentrated in two different places; the Mina 
Bahari Building II and the One-Stop Service Center (OSSC) located at the first floor of 
Mina Bahari Building IV. 
Mina Bahari Building II is the headquarters of Directorate General of Capture 
Fisheries (DGCF), an agency (echelon I) under MMAF responsible for marine fisheries 
governance in Indonesia. Meanwhile the OSSC is the venue specifically designed by 
MMAF to provide various services to the industry covering a broad range from 
aquaculture services to the certification of exported aquaculture/fisheries products. 
NZOFP, famously known as Muara Baru Fishing Port, is the largest fishing port 
in Indonesia covering 110 Ha area, including 40 Ha of Port Basin. NZOFP is the fishing 
base of 1,484 vessels, where 76% of those are larger than 30 GT or Nationally 
Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV). Total landed catch in 2016 was 92,472 ton or 
around 253 tons per day. This volume has declined 23% compared to the total landed 
catch in 2014 of 119,603 tons (PPSNZJ 2017). 
Fishing vessels based in NZOFP in 2016 were dominated by Bouke Ami (Stick-
Held Dip Net) vessels making up 37% of total vessels. These were followed by purse 
seine, tuna longline, oceanic drift gillnet, and squid jigging respectively (PPSNZJ 2017). 
Their fishing grounds cover six different Indonesia Fisheries Management Areas 
 
 
 18 
(IFMAs); IFMA 572 (Indonesia Exclusive Economic Zone/IEEZ of Indian Ocean-
Western part of Sumatra), IFMA 573 (IEEZ of Indian Ocean-Southern part of Java), 
IFMA 711 (IEEZ of South China Sea), IFMA 712 (Java Sea), IFMA 714 (Banda Sea), 
and IFMA 718 (Arafura Sea). Therefore, arguably, the study has already covered nearly 
half of the total IFMAs. 
In addition to the two primary locations, the study also took place in several 
locations nearby Jakarta such as Bogor, particularly for attending the national 
conventions and seminars related to the subject matter of this research. 
 
III.3. Data Collection 
III.3.1. Types of Data 
 Data collected for this study are classified into two types; the Primary Data and 
the Secondary Data. The first refers to data collected directly by the researcher from the 
subjects of study. This comprises data collected from field observation, respondent 
questionnaires, short-interviews, in-depth interviews, and other information garnered 
from informal discussions. Secondary Data, in contrast, is defined as any data retrieved 
from the official sources, either publicly published or unpublished ones. Following the 
guidelines from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval form, the use of 
unpublished data for the purpose of this study has been approved by the in-charge 
officials. 
 For the purposes of this study, Secondary Data is differentiated into two types; 
final secondary data and raw secondary data. The first refers to secondary data that can 
be used directly to support the policy analysis. Meanwhile, the raw secondary data 
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requires further data processing and analysis prior being used to support the study. The 
following diagram summarizes the data classification used in this study. 
 
Figure 2. Types of Data Collection 
 
III.3.2. Primary Data 
Field Observation 
Data collected during the field observation encompasses any findings and 
information from the field (locations of study) that can be used to analyze the policy 
impacts and to investigate the stakeholders’ attitudes. For example, the field observation 
in NZOFP that was focused on the impact of increased fishing fee and the possibility 
for implementing the landing fee mechanism.  
As the largest and the most modernized industrial-scale fishing port in 
Indonesia, NZOFP has always been the benchmark for its counterparts. Therefore, it is 
common that any new policy or regulation will be tested here before being enforced in 
other fishing ports. Similarly, any negative impacts experienced by NZOFP’s fishing 
fleet hypothetically also occur in other fishing ports’ fleets. 
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Field observation was also employed to analyze the future of the Fisheries 
Management Commission in Indonesia Fisheries Management Areas (FMC-IFMA). 
Findings and information gathered during the conventions and other meetings related to 
the establishment of FMC-IFMA support the analysis of this newly established regional 
fisheries governance institution. 
 
Survey 
In investigating stakeholders’ attitudes towards the policy impacts and the 
proposed policy alternatives, a small-scale survey applying a Non-Probability Sampling 
Approach (Robson 2000) was conducted. The survey employed a close-ended 
questionnaire in Bahasa Indonesian (Appendix 2) to the targeted respondents (Section 
III.5). 
Each questionnaire consisted of 10 close-ended questions divided into three 
sections. Each section discusses different policy impacts and policy alternatives 
analyzed by this study. The number of questions in each section was unequal and varied 
between three and four questions. For instance, Section (I) questioning the respondent’s 
attitude regarding the increased fishing fee consists of three questions. Meanwhile, 
Section (III) assessing the respondent’s attitude regarding the establishment of the 
FMC-IFMA comprises four questions. 
Each question has five possible answers as referred to in the Likert-Scale 
Response Anchor set by Vagias (2006).  The value of each answered question ranges 
from the extremely negative (score = 1) to the extremely positive attitude (score = 5). 
In addition to the attitude questions, the questionnaire also collects respondents’ 
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demographic information. These include the name of the represented institution (nine 
options), age, gender, ethnicity, and educational level. Except for the first one, the name 
of represented institution that defines the type of stakeholder, the other demographic 
questions are optional to afford the respondents confidentiality. 
 
Short-Interview 
 The study only distributed one-single type of questionnaire. Therefore, the 
academicians with the highest educational level and the fishing vessel skippers, who 
generally had the lowest educational level, had to answer the same set of questions. To 
assist the skippers in completing the questionnaires and to increase the accuracy of the 
collected responses, a short-interview was included during the face to face survey of the 
skippers in NZOFP. 
The comments collected from the skippers also function in reinforcing their 
previous answers. Like many other Indonesians, particularly when facing government 
officials, the skippers tend to give the non-straightforward answers, or to respond very 
cautiously. It often happens that the first answers given are not their real opinion.  
Therefore, similar to Knapp (1997), collecting the skippers’ comments in addition to 
the questionnaire responses is very helpful in investigating their attitudes.  
 
In-depth Interview 
 In-depth interviews were conducted with key informants selected for their 
expertise in the discussed issues. These key informants covered a broad range of 
stakeholders, from bureaucrats representing the central government (MMAF) to the 
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head of commercial fishing associations representing the industry. The study conducted 
19 in-depth interviews (Appendix 4). Unfortunately, the study failed to interview a few 
of the initially targeted key informants. 
In addition to the investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes, in-depth interviews 
were also conducted to garner any other information related to the analysis of the policy 
impacts. For instance, interviews with the boat caretaker and some fishing vessel owners 
were conducted to obtain information related to fishing operational costs. 
 
Informal Discussion 
 Informal discussions took place in between the formal meetings and on other 
occasions where the researcher garnered other information related to the study. This 
included discussions during coffee breaks, smoking sessions, or the moment while 
waiting for Friday’s prayer. Although ethical consideration related to privacy and 
confidentiality have been explained previously, many of the potential respondents, 
particularly those representing governments, were reluctant to respond to the questions. 
In contrast, valuable information was garnered during the relaxing informal discussions 
where the respondents have more liberty in conveying their opinions. 
 
III.3.3. Secondary Data 
Final Secondary Data 
 Final Secondary Data requires no or little refinement prior to be used in the 
policy analysis. This includes legal documents containing laws and other types of 
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government regulations, the statistic of annual marine fisheries production, the number 
of Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV), and other related data. 
 
Raw Secondary Data 
 Raw Secondary Data requires additional data processing in order to be employed 
in the policy analysis. The study uses two types of raw data; the Quarterly Fishing 
Report (QFR) and the Landing Report (LR). QFR is an obligatory report that must be 
submitted by the Fishing Permit (FP) holders to the Directorate General of Capture 
Fisheries (DGCF). This report is one of the requirements to extend the Fishing Permit 
(FP). In addition to the basic information regarding the fishing vessel and her designated 
fishing grounds, the report also comprises the total catch, catch composition, catch 
value, fishing days, and the amount of fuel expenditure. This study uses the 2017 
reviewed QFR retrieved from DGCF’s database.  
 Landing Report (LR) contains catch data from every vessel landing/unloading 
in NZOFP. The data are collected daily by the enumerators working in NZOFP. 
Information collected in LR is nearly similar to those submitted in QFR. Additional 
information provided by the LR includes the main engine dimension, fishing days, and 
number of crew. This study used the 2018 LR. Both QFR and LR were used to 
reconstruct the average fishing operational costs as the baseline in analyzing the impact 
of the increased fishing fee. 
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III.4. Sampling Design and Strategy 
The study combines Quota Sampling Methods and the Convenience Sampling 
Method (Robson 2000). The quota sampling method classifies the respondents into 
several categories or groups. Subsequently, a specific sampling quota is set for each 
group of respondents (Robson 2000). The amount of quota in nine categories of 
stakeholders is determined based on the combination of several factors; population size, 
their representativeness in the FMC-IFMA, and researcher personal judgment and 
experience. 
Convenience sampling methods were applied to sample the fishing vessel 
owners or the fishing companies’ representatives, and the fishing vessel crew/skippers. 
This sampling method randomly selects the nearest and the most convenient 
respondents (Robson 2000). In addition to two sampling designs and as an effort to 
increase the respondent participation, this study applied three sampling mechanisms; 
Conventional Survey, Online Survey (e-questionnaires), and Guided face-to-face survey 
 
Conventional Survey  
This survey distributed the paper questionnaires to the targeted respondents who 
are expected to complete it voluntarily. The conventional survey took place in three 
different locations; in the HQ of DGCF, in the One-Stop Service Centre (OSSC) of 
MMAF, and in the national meetings or conventions attended by representatives from 
the fishing port, provincial fisheries agency, and regency/municipality fisheries agency. 
The last sampling mechanism is similar to the one conducted by Gray and Campbell 
(2008). 
 
 
 25 
The targeted respondents of the conventional survey in the HQ of DGCF were 
the experienced staffs or officials having job descriptions pertinent with the investigated 
policy issues. Meanwhile, in the OSSC, the questionnaires were distributed to the 
nearest and the most convenient fishing vessels owners or company’s representatives 
extending their Fishing Permit (FP). The conventional survey was the major contributor 
for this study with 261 answered questionnaires, or 59% of the total collected 
questionnaires. 
 
Online Survey 
The Online Survey distributed the link of previously prepared paperless 
questionnaire by email and to WhatsApp Groups (WAGs). E-mailed questionnaires 
were sent to the previously contacted respondents who were willing to participate in the 
survey. Meanwhile, the link of the online questionnaire was distributed to several 
WAGs specially created for discussing fisheries management’s issues or consisting of 
Indonesia marine fisheries stakeholders as the groups’ members. Two examples of 
WAGs receiving the link of the online survey were the WAG of Indonesia EAFM and 
WAG of alumni of Faculty of Fisheries and Marine Science – Bogor Agricultural 
University.  
In addition, the link of the online survey was also published in the researcher’s 
social media account, Facebook. The online questionnaire distributed to WAGs was 
created using the Survey Gizmo application. In total, there were 70 completed e-
questionnaires or 16% of the total respondents. 
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Guided face-to-face survey  
This type of survey initially was applied to assist the fishing vessel skippers in 
completing the conventional or paper questionnaires. The skippers’ educational level 
gave rise to a concern for accuracy that provided the underlying reason for employing 
this procedure. The face-to-face survey was assisted by ten enumerators previously 
briefed and trained by the researcher. The briefing encompassed the purpose of study, 
the strategy to deliver the questions in a short and simple yet understandable way, and 
the way to measure respondents’ attitudes based on their short comments, intonation, 
and gestures.  
The enumerators are contracted employees hired by NZOFP. Their primary job 
is to collect the catch data from every fishing vessel landing in NZOFP. Therefore, the 
Guided Face-to-Face Survey was conducted during the landing inspection with the 
skippers who were willing to voluntarily participate. In addition to the previously 
prepared questionnaires, the enumerators also garnered information concerning fishing 
vessel dimension (size of the vessels in GT, type of fishing gear), the location of fishing 
grounds, and other related data required for further analysis. 
A guided face-to-face survey was also employed in sampling the fishing vessel 
owners. This strategy was applied to optimize the limited study time. The survey of the 
owners was conducted in the form of short-interviews while reviewing their submitted 
Quarterly Fishing Report (QFR). Similar to the one applied to the skippers; additional 
questions related to the fishing operation were also conveyed to the owners. This 
sampling mechanism collected 115 answered questionnaires, or 26% of the total 
collected respondents. 
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III.5. The Respondents 
The study focused on the industrial-scale marine fisheries in Indonesia that are 
geographically located from the baseline of the territorial waters to the outer limit of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a 12 – 200 nautical mile (nm) zone. The area covers 
the designated fishing grounds for commercial fishing vessels that are larger than 30 
Gross Tonnage (GT) and are holding the Fishing License (FL) and Fishing Permit (FP) 
issued by the MMAF-RI. The latest data show that there are 4,229 Fishing Licenses 
(FL) and 3,722 Fishing Permits (FP) issued by MMAF-RI by May 6, 2017 (MMAF 
2017). 
Following the definition of marine fisheries stakeholders (Mackinson et al. 
2011), this study limits and classifies the Indonesian marine fisheries stakeholders into 
nine categories/groups. These are: 1) central government officials; 2) heads of central 
government-managed fishing ports; 3) provincial fisheries agencies’ officials; 4) 
regency/municipality’s fisheries agencies officials; 5) fishing vessel owners and fishing 
companies’ representatives; 6) fishing vessel crews or skippers; 7) fishermen 
associations; 8) environmental NGOs; and 9) academicians. 
The Central Government officials are defined as the civil servants or government 
employees working in the HQ of DGCF and having job descriptions related to marine 
fisheries management. Total respondents from this type of stakeholders were 84 
persons, or 19% of the total respondents. 
Essentially, the heads of MMAF-managed fishing port are also central 
government officials, yet they are posted outside the HQ.  Along with the fishing ports’ 
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staffs (including the harbor master), they are the DGCF’s employees dealing with daily 
activities in the field. In other words, the HQ officials represent or are considered as the 
regulation drafters, while their counterparts posted in the fishing ports are the regulation 
executors or enforcers.  In several occasions, regulations or policy prepared by HQ 
personnel are difficult to enforce in the field. This clear differentiation between HQ and 
field staff is the reason for separating them into two categories. 
In principle, both the officials from the provincial and the regency/municipality 
fisheries agencies can be classified as the local governments’ representatives. Their 
authority only differs based on the jurisdiction of their respective regions. Although 
basically these four types of stakeholder are the representatives of the government’s side 
and contribute 52% of the total respondents, this study still differentiates them. The 
underlying reason is the hypothetical assumption that each of them will advocate their 
own interests, particularly when dealing with authority and responsibility issues. 
Most fishing vessel owners in Indonesia assign their employees or hire an 
independent middle-man to take care of their fishing licensing process. These 
representatives or the middle-man are considered as the vessel owners’ right-hand man 
or the spokesman when dealing with the government. Thus, for this study, they are 
considered the same type of stakeholders. By nature, the right-hand man or the 
spokesman has the same opinion as the owner they represent. 
Most of the skippers consider themselves as ordinary workers hired by the vessel 
owners. Therefore, they tend to follow any instructions from the owners and have little 
or no liberty in voicing their opinions. Nevertheless, this paper still classifies them as a 
different group from their employers due to the possibility of dissenting opinion. 
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The next group is the commercial fishing associations, the institution organizing 
and commonly representing the vessel owners in any discussion forum held by the 
government or other institutions like the NGOs. These three types of stakeholders can 
be classified as the representatives of the industry. Referring to Weible (2005), these 
groups are most likely to form an advocacy group where they closely interact with each 
other in opposing the government’s side, particularly on adverse regulations. 
Hypothetically, this study argues that these two groups, the government and the 
industry, will have opposite attitudes toward the increased fishing fee. 
Two other types of stakeholders hypothetically considered as neutral groups are 
the environmental Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and the 
academicians/researchers. Stakeholders representing the NGOs consist of any NGO 
working on or advocating issues related to marine fisheries management in Indonesia. 
This includes both the national and the international NGOs. 
This study classifies the researchers working in the MMAF Research Center into 
the same group with the academicians who are mostly comprised of faculty members 
from various universities having marine fisheries programs of study in Indonesia. 
Having slightly different perspectives on marine fisheries management than their 
counterparts working in the headquarters and fishing ports is the underlying reason to 
separate them, although essentially these researchers are also central government 
employees. The following table summarizes the number of respondents representing 
each type of stakeholders and the percentage (%) of the total pool of respondents they 
represent. 
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Table 1. Total Respondents 
No. Types of Stakeholders 
∑ 
Respondents 
 %  
1 DGCF-MMAF (Central Govt.) 86      19.28  
2 Fishing Port 87      19.51  
3 Provincial Government 42        9.42  
4 Municipality/Regency Government 17        3.81  
5 Skipper/Crews 79      17.71  
6 Industry (Owners) or Company Representatives 75      16.82  
7 Commercial Fishing Association 12        2.69  
8 NGO 20        4.48  
9 Academician/Researcher 28        6.28  
  Total 446    100.00  
 
 
III.6.   Data Processing and Data Analysis 
 
Data processing was conducted on two types of data requiring further actions 
before being used to support the policy analysis. These are the Quarterly Fishing Report 
(QFR) and the Landing Report (LR) for estimating the impact of the increased fishing 
fee on the fishing operational costs, and the collected responses from the distributed 
questionnaires for investigating the stakeholders’ attitudes.  
The first data processing consists of four stages; Data Classification, Data 
Verification, Data Reconstruction, and Data Analysis. The investigation of the 
stakeholders’ attitudes also consists of four stages; Data Compilation, Descriptive 
Statistics Analysis, Result Compilation, and Statistical Test. The following diagram 
summarizes the stages in data processing. 
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Figure 3. Stages in Data Processing 
 
 
III.6.1. Estimating the Impact of Increased Fishing Fee on the Fishing Operational 
Costs 
 
III.6.1.1. Data Classification  
This stage sorted out the retrieved raw secondary data, both the QFR and the 
LR, based on the type of fishing gear. The resulting data were grouped into six primary 
fishing gears based in the NZOFP. Those are the Big Pelagic Purse Seine, Small Pelagic 
Purse Seine, Tuna Long Line, Oceanic Drift Gillnet, Bouke Ami (Stick-Held Dip nets), 
and Squid Jigging. The type of targeted species and the mesh-size of the net differentiate 
Big Pelagic Purse Seine from the other type, the small pelagic purse seine. 
Subsequently, the data was sorted based on the size of the vessel in Gross Tonnage (GT) 
to facilitate the next stages. 
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III.6.1.2. Data Verification 
Essentially, this was the data elimination stage. Incomplete reports having little, 
or no information required for the next stage of data processing were deleted. The 
required information encompasses the total catch value, the length of fishing days, the 
number of fishing trips, number of crew, and the size of the main engine. In addition, 
this stage also eliminated inaccurate reports. An example of an inaccurate report is the 
incompatibility between the type of fishing gear and their landed catch, for instance, a 
squid jigging vessel that landed tuna. Regardless of verification stage conducted on the 
submitted reports, some errors related to the inaccuracy of the reports still occur. 
This stage also verified the report reliability. The simplest way to do it was by 
comparing the total reported landed catch with the length of fishing trip and the size of 
the vessels. Data verification was the most time-consuming stage of data processing as 
the verification was conducted manually and painstakingly on thousands of data entries. 
This stage significantly refined the retrieved data. The following table summarizes the 
final number of verified fishing vessel reports. 
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Table 2. Verified Fishing Vessels’ report 
No. 
Types of Fishing 
Gear 
2017 QFR 2018 LR 
S M Total  %  S M Total  %  
1 
Big Pelagic Purse 
Seine 0 82 82     19.81  0 78 78 
    
20.86  
2 
Small Pelagic 
Purse Seine 16 63 79     19.08  4 26 30 
      
8.02  
3 Tuna Longline 29 22 51     12.32  19 29 48 
    
12.83  
4 
Oceanic Drift 
Gillnet 18 40 58     14.01  5 12 17 
      
4.55  
5 Bouke Ami 42 24 66     15.94  66 74 140 
    
37.43  
6 Squid Jigging 4 74 78     18.84  2 59 61 
    
16.31  
 Total     414   100.00      374 
  
100.00  
*S = Small-scale Fishing Vessel (<60GT) 
**M = Medium-scale Fishing Vessel (60-200 GT 
 
 
III.6.1.3. Data Reconstruction 
The first step in data reconstruction was to set the components of fishing 
operational costs. Referring to literature review (Fyson 1985, Chakravorty and Nemoto, 
2000) and due to the limited data availability, this study classified the fishing operational 
costs into six categories; fuel consumption, provision, crew basic wage, crew incentives, 
charged fishing fee, and miscellaneous costs. Subsequently, expenditure in each 
category was calculated based on the formula retrieved from the literature review. 
Several assumptions obtained from field observation and interviews were incorporated 
into the formulas. 
 
Fuel Costs 
This component comprised the fuel consumption for the main engine and the 
auxiliary engine. In addition, lubricant consumption was also incorporated. Estimation 
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of the main and the auxiliary engine fuel consumption was calculated based on the 
following formula: 
C = 0.75 × P(max) × (S/d) × † × 0.001 (Prado and Dremiere 1990) 
Where; 
C  = Engine’s fuel consumption during a given period of time (Liter) 
Cf = Average Coefficient (during traversing = 0.7-0.8, during fishing operation = 0.5-0.8) 
P(max) = Maximum Power of Engine (Horsepower or HP) 
S = Special consumption of fuel (grams/HP/hour; 170-200 for diesel) 
D = Density of fuel (0.84 for diesel) 
t = Time of engine operation (hours) 
  
Referring to the formula, it is obvious that the information availability regarding 
the main engine size (Pmax) and fishing days (t) is crucial. Meanwhile the coefficient 
values (Cf and S) used in the formula were determined based on the information 
garnered from the interviews with the skippers, chief of the engine room, owners, and 
boat caretakers. In addition, the lubricant consumption was set as 1% of total fuel 
consumption. Subsequently these results were multiplied by the average price of fuel 
(diesel) and lubricants in the relevant year to calculate their nominal value. 
 
Provisions 
Provision expenditures covered food and other necessities for the crews during 
the fishing operation (Fyson 1985). The average daily expenditure for this component 
was set based on the interviews with the boat caretaker supplying these items to the 
fishing vessels. For instance, in 2017, the average nominal value of daily provisions for 
the crew was Rp. 25,000/day/person. Therefore, total provision costs per trip (PC) was 
calculated using the following formula: 
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PC = FD x  crew x ADPC 
Where; 
PC  = Provision Cost 
FD =  Fishing Days 
Crew =  of crew in the concerned trip 
ADPC = Average Daily Provision Cost  
 
Wage 
Basic wage for the crews varied depending on the type of fishing gear and their 
rank (working experience) on the vessels. Tuna Longline crews have the highest average 
basic daily wage at Rp. 65,000/day followed by Oceanic Drift Gillnet crew. In contrast, 
a purse seiner commonly applies a profit-sharing system between the owner, skipper 
and crew. Therefore, unlike other fishing gears, the purse seiner’s crew receive no basic 
wage. The purse seine crews’ income is determined by the net value of the landed catch. 
The estimation of the Wage Cost (WC) per trip was calculated based on the following 
formula:  
WC= Fishing Days FD x  crew x ACDW. 
Where; 
WC  = Wage Cost 
FD =  Fishing Days 
Crew =  of crew in the concerned trip 
ACDW = Average Crew Daily Wage 
 
Incentives 
Aside from the daily wages, the crews also received an incentive as additional 
income. The incentive was determined based on the total catch and their achievement 
during the fishing operation. For instance, each Squid Jigging crew receives additional 
Rp. 6,000/kg for squid caught. For purse seine crews, their additional income came from 
individual angling conducted while the vessel was drifting nearby a Fish Aggregating 
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Device (FAD). This individual catch will be bought by the owners as soon as the vessel 
returns to port. Most of this catch was not officially recorded and was separated from 
the total landing of a vessel, therefore it is excluded in the analysis of this study. The 
estimation on Crew Incentive Cost per trip (CIC) was calculated based on in the 
following formula: 
CIC = TLC x IR. 
Where; 
CIC  = Crews’ Incentive Cost per trip 
TLD = Total Landed Catch (kg) 
IR = Incentive Rate (Rp/kg) 
 
Charged Fishing Fee (CFF)  
For the purpose of this study, Charged Fishing Fee (CFF) is defined as a portion 
of annual fishing fee included into the fishing operational costs. This component was 
calculated based on the assumption that the real nominal value of a fishing fee charged 
to a vessel depends on the number of her fishing days in a year ( fishing days/365 
days). In other word, the CFF is a function of the vessel’s dimension, fishing days, and 
fishing fee rate. 
For example, if a purse seiner spends 150 days for one fishing trip, then the CFF 
is the result of multiplication of the vessel’s dimension (GT), the number fishing days 
in a year (150/365), and the Simplified Annual Fishing Fee Rate (Rp. 1,802,200/GT for 
Big Pelagic Purse Seine). Therefore, the estimation on the Fishing Fee Costs was 
calculated based on the following formula: 
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CFF = GT x ( FD/365) x SAFFR 
Where; 
CFF  = Charged Fishing Fee (Rp.) 
GT = Fishing Vessel’s dimension (Gross Tonnage or GT) 
FD =  Fishing Days (D  
SAFFR = Simplified Annual Fishing Fee Rate (Rp/GT) 
 
Miscellaneous Costs 
Miscellaneous Cost was the final component added into the estimation of the 
fishing operational costs. It covered any other unpredictable costs and was set as 5% of 
the accumulation of the previous five components. Therefore, the estimated Total 
Fishing Operational Costs (TFOC) was calculated based on the following formula. 
TFOC = (FC + PC +WC + CIC + CFF) x 105% 
Where: 
TFOC  = Total Fishing Operational Costs 
FC  = Fuel Costs 
PC = Provision Costs 
WC = Wage Costs 
CIC = Crews’ Incentive Cost 
CFF = Charged Fishing Fee 
 
III.6.1.4. Data Analysis 
The data analysis of the impact of the increased fishing fee over the fishing 
operational costs comprised another three stages. First, it calculated the portion, or the 
percentage of Charged Fishing Fee (CFF) from the Total Fishing Operational Costs 
(TFOC) for each vessel. The calculation was made based on the simple formula; The 
CFF Portion (%) = (CFF/TFOC) x 100% 
Second, it conducted the Descriptive Statistics Analysis of the CFF Portion (%) 
for each type of fishing gear. Referring to the description of the Descriptive Statistics 
Analysis (Walpole 1982, Privitera 2017), this stage calculated single values-summary 
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statistics. This encompasses the Mean, Median, Mode, Maximum and Minimum Value, 
Variance, Frequency, and the Standard Deviation. 
Hypothetically, an increased fishing fee tariff will escalate the portion of CFF in 
TFOC. Therefore, the last stage of data analysis calculated the magnitude of the 
increased CFF portion by comparing the contribution (percentage) of TFOC before and 
after the authorization of Government Regulation No.75 of 2015. Automatically, this 
stage also determined the most affected fishing gear due to the authorization of this 
policy. 
 
III.6.2. Investigating the stakeholders’ attitudes 
III.6.2.1. Data Compilation 
In this stage, the completed questionnaires, both the conventional (paper) and 
the electronic or the online questionnaires were compiled manually. This stage also 
sorted the questionnaires into nine groups of stakeholders. Subsequently, each response 
was quantified, with values ranging from the extremely negative (score = 1) to the 
extremely positive attitude (score = 5).  
This stage also summarized the qualitative data; the short comments from the 
skippers and the summaries from the in-depth interviews. As previously mentioned, in 
investigating the stakeholders’ attitudes, this study employed the Convergence Parallel 
research design (Creswell 2014). Consequently, this qualitative data will be merged 
with the quantitative results to form the outcome of the stakeholders' attitudes 
investigation. 
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III.6.2.2. Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
Since the collected data was ordinal data, the Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
focused on the median and mode as the measures of central tendency (Jamieson 2004). 
Initially, the expected result was 90 values of median and mode (10 questions x 9 
stakeholders). However, this study collected 83 values since several of the respondents 
were not willing to participate in answering Section II (Revocation of 
Municipality/Regency’ authority) and Section III (Establishment of FMC-IFMA). 
Most of these incomplete questionnaires were collected from respondents 
representing the industry interests (Fishing Vessel Owner and skipper). The primary 
reason for unwillingness to participate was the lack of interest in commenting on what 
they consider as the government’s internal problem. In addition, many of them were not 
completely familiar with the questioned issues. 
This stage also created the relative frequency histogram or the percentage 
histogram (Walpole 1982) mapping the distribution of the recorded answers (in 
percentages), a method similar to that applied by Perez-Sanchez (2003). The purpose of 
this action was to facilitate comprehension of the answered question, especially in 
measuring the magnitude and the direction of the stakeholders’ attitudes. 
 
III.6.2.3. Results Compilation 
 In this stage, the results from the Descriptive Statistics Analysis were compiled 
and summarized to facilitate the next stage, the statistical test. The compilation included   
median and mode values for each question from nine different stakeholder groups, the 
 
 
 40 
frequency distribution histograms (in percentages) of answered questions, and the 
summarized interviews. 
 
III.6.2.4. Statistical Test 
The Non-Parametric Statistical test employed to analyze questionnaire 
responses was the Kruskal-Wallis test.  The Null hypothesis was that the nine groups of 
respondents are identical populations having equal medians. Therefore, the Kruskal-
Wallis test aims to examine the null hypothesis, whether at least one group of 
stakeholders has different population median.  
If the Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the null hypothesis, the pairwise test will be 
carried out. Essentially the test was conducted on each group of stakeholders, by 
comparing head to head the median of their responses on each investigated aspect. The 
purpose of this test is to determine which medians differ (LeBlanc 2004). However, this 
study focuses on the two groups of stakeholders most affected by the authorized policy. 
The Pairwise test aims to see whether these two affected stakeholder groups have a 
significant difference in the median of their responses. The analysis was conducted 
using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24. 
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CHAPTER IV  
INDONESIA MARINE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
 
 
IV.1. Brief Overview on Indonesia Marine Fisheries 
As the 2nd largest world marine capture fisheries producer (FAO 2016), the 
fisheries sector has significant biological and socio-economic impacts on Indonesia’s 
national economic growth. The total national landing of capture fisheries in 2014 was 
over 6 million tons. The number increased by 7% from the previous year and by 27% 
from the 2003-2014 period (FAO 2016). Combined with the aquaculture sector, the 
fisheries sector contributed 2.3% to the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
2014. In terms of socio-economics, the fisheries sector contributes by providing jobs or 
livelihoods to over 2.7 million fishermen. Most of them work in small-scale fisheries 
(Pusdatin-MMAF 2016). 
Table 3. World’s Major Capture Fisheries Producers 
 
Source: FAO, 2016 
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Indonesia’s marine (capture) fisheries production grew over the years (2011-
2015). Yet, data indicates a declining growth in 2015, from 5.27% annual growth in 
2014 to 2.77% in 2015. The available on-line data on Indonesia’s marine fisheries 
statistics only classifies the catch landings into six categories; tunas (Thunnus sp), 
skipjack (Katsuwonus sp), eastern little tunas (Euthynnus sp), other fish (the small 
pelagic fish and demersal fish), shrimp, and other marine species. The group of species 
categorized as other fish contributes more than 67% of Indonesia’s marine fisheries 
annual production (table 4 and figure 5).  
Table 4. Indonesia Marine Fisheries Production (2001-2015) 
Source: MMAF-RI, 2017 http://sidatik.kkp.go.id/dynamic_report 
 
 
Figure 4. Indonesia Marine Fisheries Production (2011-2015) 
Source: MMAF-RI, 2017 http://sidatik.kkp.go.id/dynamic_report 
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Figure 5. The Composition of Indonesia Marine Fisheries Production (2011-2015) 
Source: MMAF-RI, 2017 http://sidatik.kkp.go.id/dynamic_report 
 
IV.2. Decentralized Marine Fisheries Management 
The authority for commercial fisheries management in Indonesia (to define 
policy and management of exploration, conservation, and utilization of marine fisheries 
resources) is divided between the central (MMAF-RI) and the local governments 
(provinces and regencies/municipalities). The MMAF’s authority is limited to waters 
beyond 12 nautical miles (12-200 nm) i.e., the Indonesia Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). The authority over the fisheries within 12 nm was initially divided between the 
provincial (4–12 nm) and the regency/municipal governments (0–4 nm), but the 
regency/municipal’s authority was revoked by an amendment of Law Number 23 of 
2014 expanding the province’s authority, from 0 nm (the baseline) to 12 nm (Satria and 
Matsuda 2004; GOI 2004; GOI 2014).  
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Sen and Nielsen (1996) differentiated fisheries co-management, based upon the 
division of management tasks, into 2 types; decentralization and delegation. 
Decentralization can simply be defined as shifting responsibilities to the lower level of 
government. In the case of Indonesia’s decentralized marine fisheries management, 
prior to 2014, enforcement of fishing licensing for the smaller industrial-scale 
commercial fisheries was delegated to the provincial (10-30 GT) and the 
regency/municipal (5-10 GT) administrations. Delegation of fisheries management, on 
the other hand, can be defined as the transfer of responsibilities from the government to 
the user groups. 
Decentralizing marine fisheries management was one of the impacts of 
implementing the decentralization system in Indonesia, which marks the beginning of 
the Reform-era, after the resignation of Indonesia’s military regime led by General 
Suharto that ruled Indonesia for 32 years (1966-1998). The decentralization system 
revised most of the distribution of authority among the administration levels in 
Indonesia (Satria and Matsuda 2004, Siddik 2007). 
 
IV.3. Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (IFMA) 
Indonesia’s Fisheries management is divided into 11 areas called Indonesia 
Fisheries Management Areas (IFMAs). IFMAs are designated management areas for 
capture fisheries, aquaculture, conservation, research and other fisheries development 
that encompass the inland waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial seas, the 
contiguous zone, and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Republic of Indonesia 
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(MMAF 2014a). The inclusion of Indonesia’s EEZ into IFMAs is an assertion of the 
country’s sovereign rights, as a coastal/archipelagic state, over its EEZ. 
Although essentially designated for general and broader fisheries management, 
IFMAs are mostly known and used in managing commercial fishing in Indonesia. The 
commercial fishing grounds, for instance, are designated based upon IFMAs. 
The division of IFMAs is based on geographical and natural characteristics of 
each area and following the international code set by the FAO (MMAF 2014a). In 
general, IFMAs can be categorized into two groups of World Fisheries Management 
Areas; the 57 areas of the Eastern Indian Ocean and the 71 areas of the Western-Central 
Pacific. 
The characteristics of each IFMA affect the type of catch landed and the fishing 
gear operating in the concerned area.  IFMA 718, for instance, encompasses the Arafura 
Sea, the Aru Sea, and the Timor Sea, and is part of the Sahul Continental Shelf, which 
shapes the eastern part of the Indonesia archipelago. Geographically, it is located 
between 6000’ – 10050’ South Latitude (SL) and 127027 – 141010’ East Longitude (EL). 
Northward it is bordered by the southern coast of Papua, westward and southwestward 
are bordered by the Banda and Timor Seas, and southward and southeastward by the 
Gulf of Carpentaria and the Torres Strait (Australia). It covers 650,000 km2, mostly a 
shallow sea floor consisting of a vast sand and mud bank with depths ranging from 50 
to 80 meters (Tomascik et al. 1997; MMAF 2014a; MMAF 2014b). 
The combination of shallow depth and a heavy load of nutrient-rich sediments 
flowing from the coastal mangrove forests and rivers along the south coast of Papua 
results in the Arafura Sea of IFMA 718 being one of Indonesia’s most productive fishing 
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grounds for small pelagic fish (Indian Mackerel, Mackerel, and Scads), demersal fish 
(Barramundi/Giant Sea Perch, Croakers, Red Snapper, Jack Trevallies and Giant 
Catfish), and Penaeid shrimps (Tiger Prawn, Banana Prawn/White Shrimp and Red 
Shrimp). Prior to the prohibition imposed on January 2, 2015, IFMA 718 had been the 
preferred fishing ground for mid-water trawlers and shrimp trawlers. Nowadays, small 
pelagic purse seiners, squid jigging, and oceanic drift gillnets dominate IFMA 718. 
Annually, IFMA 718 contributes up to 10% of the national fisheries production. 
Meanwhile, the neighboring IFMA 714 which encompasses the Gulf of Tolo 
and the Banda Sea, is categorized as deep-sea waters with an average depth of 5,400 m. 
The Banda Sea is one of the deepest seas in the Indonesia archipelago, and is a well-
known fishing ground for big pelagic species such as tuna and skipjack. 
From the brief description above, it can be concluded that the IFMA has some 
similarities with the US Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ, now EEZ). Yet, there is no 
semi-independent institution such as the US Regional Fishery Management Council 
(RFMC), which was established for semi-autonomous management of the fisheries in 
each designated management area. The commercial fishery in each IFMA, as mentioned 
earlier, is managed separately by the central (MMAF-RI) and the provincial 
governments based on the vessels’ size and the geographical jurisdiction. 
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Figure 6. Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (IFMA) 
Source: MMAF 2014a 
 
Being an archipelagic state, most of Indonesia’s provinces have jurisdiction over 
two or three IFMAs (table 5). For instance, the Central Java province has jurisdiction 
over IFMA 712 and IFMA 573. Another example is the South East Sulawesi province 
becoming the constituent province for three IFMAs; 713, 714 and 715. As there are no 
landlocked provinces in Indonesia, every province becomes the member of, at least, one 
IFMA. These facts contribute to the membership composition of Fisheries Management 
Commission in each IFMA. 
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Table 5. The Jurisdiction of Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (IFMA) 
 
Source: MMAF 2014a 
 
IV.4. Indonesia Marine Fisheries Management 
License limitation and fishing fees are the two primary management tools 
enforced in Indonesia’s industrial-scale marine fisheries. Other management measures 
include Total Allowable Catch (TAC), fishing gear restrictions, and fishing area 
closures. The number of Fishing Licenses (FL) and Fishing Permits (FP) allocated to 
commercial fishing is calculated based upon the TACs of primary fisheries in each 
IFMA. TAC is derived from the estimated Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), which 
is stipulated by the MMAF-RI through a ministerial decree. In consideration of the 
precautionary principle, each TAC has been set at 80% of the MSY (Mous et al. 2005; 
GOI 2006; MMAF 2006; MMAF 2011). 
Due to its high diversity of marine fish species - more than 120 recorded 
commercial fish species (DGCF 2014) - the MSY for each IFMA is grouped into seven 
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fisheries; the big pelagic fishery (Tuna, Swordfish, Marlin, Skipjack), the small pelagic 
fishery (Indian Mackerel, Mackerel, Trevallies, and Scads), the demersal/ground fish 
fishery (Barramundi/Giant Sea Perch, Croakers, Red Snapper, Jack Trevallies and Giant 
Catfish), the Shrimp fishery (Tiger Prawn, Banana Prawn/White Shrimp and Red 
Shrimp), the Reef fish fishery (Groupers), the Lobster fishery, and the Squid fishery.  
The estimated total MSY in 2011 was 6.5 million metric tons (MMAF 2011). 
The latest total MSY enacted by the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries’ decree 
No.50/KEPMEN-KP/2017 was 12.5 million metric tons (MMAF 2017).  The 2017 
MSY increased by 2.6 million MT or 26.3% compared to the 2016 MSY with 9.9 
million MT (MMAF 2016). The new MSY also adds two groups to the fishery: the crab 
fishery and the swimming crab fishery. 
Table 6. The dynamic of Indonesia’s MSY 
 
 
The allocated TAC for each fishery in each IFMA is the benchmark, or point of 
reference, for limiting the number of vessels allowed to fish in the concerned area. At 
maximum, each vessel is allowed to fish in the fishing grounds of two adjacent IFMAs. 
The location of the fishing ground is stated in the Fishing Permit (FP). A purse seiner 
based in the North Coast of Java, for example, is mostly permitted to have fishing 
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grounds in the adjacent IFMAs of the Java Sea (FMA 712) and the Natuna Sea or the 
Indonesia EEZ South China Sea (FMA 711), or the Java Sea (FMA 712) and the 
Makassar Straits (IFMA 713). This vessel may also be permitted to fish in further 
fishing grounds such as in the Arafura Sea (IFMA 718), or in the Indian Ocean (IFMA 
572). However, the fishing gear must not be operated when traversing to the designated 
fishing grounds. 
The Fishing License (FL/Surat Izin Usaha Penangkapan or SIUP) and the 
Fishing Permit (FP/Surat Izin Penangkapan Ikan or SIPI) for the industrial scale fishing 
vessels, larger than 30 Gross Tonnage (GT) and fishing beyond 12 nm, are issued by 
the MMAF (Satria and Matsuda 2004, GOI 2004; GOI 2014). In 2014, there were 3,483 
nationally registered fishing vessels (table 7 and figure 7).  
The Fishing License (FL) proclaims fishing allocation (number/type/size of 
vessels) of a fishing entity, either a firm or an individual, in designated IFMAs. The 
Fishing Permit (FP) conferred on a fishing vessel/boat describes the vessel’s technical 
characteristics (vessel and fishing gear dimensions) and it’s designated fishing grounds. 
In summary, an individual or a fishing company can only have one Fishing License 
(FL), while the number of Fishing Permits (FP) granted to them depends on the number 
of fishing vessels that they are operating. 
The compliance with technical requirements (fishing gear restriction, minimum 
mesh size of the operated net, and fishing gear dimension), the TAC’s availability in the 
desired fishing ground (IFMA), and payment of the fishing fees are the primary 
considerations in granting the license and the permit. In addition, the industry is also 
obliged to submit quarterly production/fishing reports to MMAF. The TAC availability 
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and amount of fishing fee imposed on the industry are the limiting factors for accessing 
the resources. 
Table 7. The Number of Nationally Registered Fishing Vessel (NRFV) in each IFMA 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Number of Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (2011-2014 
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IV.5. Indonesia’s Fishing Fees 
Indonesia’s fishing fees are classified into two types: The Access Fee 
(AF/Pungutan Pengusahaan Perikanan or PP) and the Harvest/Fishing Fee 
(HF/Pungutan Hasil Perikanan or PHP). The Access Fee is charged to a fishing entity, 
either individuals or firms, and is one of the requirements for obtaining the Fishing 
License (FL). The Access Fee is calculated based on input factors used to participate in 
fisheries. These comprise the number and the size of the vessels (in Gross Tonnage), 
and the type of fishing gear. A mobile or active fishing gear such as a Trawler and a 
Purse Seiner pay a higher tariff than the passive and less destructive gears like tuna 
longline, bottom-longline, or squid jigging.  
Unless there is a change or addition in the input factors, such as an addition of 
new fishing vessels or a fishing gear modification of the previously registered fishing 
vessels, the Access Fee is a one-time payment imposed on a commercial fishing entity 
that must be paid in advance. A fishing company adding a vessel to its fleet, for example, 
must pay an additional Access Fee. This obligation also occurs when the concerned 
fishing entity modifies, at least, one of its registered vessels.  
The Harvest/Fishing Fee (HF/PHP) is charged annually before the Fishing 
Permit (FP) is conferred on a fishing vessel for a one-year period. Based on this 
mechanism, a fishing company or individual operating 10 purse seiners, for example, 
has to pay a one-time payment for the Access Fee (AF) to obtain the Fishing License 
(FL), and an annual payment of the Harvest/Fishing Fee (HF/PHP) for each operated 
purse seine to obtain the Fishing Permit (FP). 
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In summary, the Harvest/Fishing Fee (HF/PHP) represents a charge for the 
resource rent, a charge imposed on the industry in exchange for the privilege given to 
them to utilize or exploit a public natural resource. Meanwhile, the Access Fee (AF) 
works merely as an administrative or registration fee for entering or participating in a 
certain fishery. It is similar to the Entrance Fee applied by the US National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS).  
The fishing fee (HF/PHP) charged to the industry is determined by the 
combination of input and output factors. In Indonesia, these factors consist of 4 
components; the Coefficient Factor (Y), the size of the vessel in Gross Tonnage (GT) 
unit, the Fishing Vessel’s Productivity (FVP) or the Catchability based on fishing gear 
types, and the Basic Fish Price (ex-vessel price/dockside price/landing price). Only the 
last component, the Basic Fish Price (BFP) represents the output factor. 
Both the Access Fee (AF) and the Harvest/Fishing Fee (HF/PHP) are charged to 
the industry as resource users prior to the Fishing License (FL) and the Fishing Permit 
(FL) being granted. It means that the privilege to fish is given after the industry fulfills 
its obligation to pay the resource rent to the State, through the MMAF-RI as the trustee 
of publicly-owned resources (GOI 2015).  
The Harvest/Fishing Fee (HF/PHP) is calculated based on the following 
formula: Fishing Fee (PHP) = Y (%) x GT x FVP x BFP (GOI 2015).  Essentially, the 
Coefficient Factor (Y) represents the percentage (the rate) of resource rent that must be 
paid by the industry. Table 8 illustrates a fishing fee calculation. 
Basically, the Fishing Fee is the sum of the multiplication of the components 
mentioned above. The vessel’s size in Gross Tonnage (GT) is multiplied by the Vessel’s 
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Productivity (Ton/GT/year) and the Basic Fish Price (BFP). Vessel Productivity is 
stipulated by a ministerial decree estimating the annual catch of the concerned vessel. It 
comprises the amount and composition of targeted species. Each type of fishing gear 
has different productivity level. After the prohibition of trawlers starting from January 
9, 2015, purse seines have the highest productivity with 1.5 ton/GT/year. This means 
that a 100 GT purse seine is predicted to catch 150 ton of fish annually.  
Meanwhile, the Basic Fish Price (BFP) is the lowest average of the ex-vessel 
price or dockside price. BFP is stipulated annually by the Ministry of Commerce. Lastly, 
this multiplication (Vessel Productivity x BFP) is multiplied by the Coefficient Factor 
(CF) of the concerned vessel. The CF depends on the size of the vessel. CF for large-
scale vessels (>200 GT) is 25% while for small-scale vessels (<60GT) it is 5%. 
Meantime, the CF for medium-scale vessels (60-200 GT), which dominate the 
Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV), is 10%. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that the Coefficient Factor (CF), as the percentage of charged resource rent, is the pivotal 
component in calculating the Fishing Fee. Further explanation regarding this statement 
will be discussed in Chapter V.2. 
Table 8. The simulation of Fishing Fee Calculation 
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CHAPTER V  
POLICY ANALYSIS ON THE INCREASED FISHING FEE 
 
Hypothetically, increased fishing fees, or any other forms of taxes/levies 
imposed on the fishing industry, generate both direct and indirect impacts on 
commercial fishing activities. Gylfasson (1992) argued that the fishing fee has a similar 
role as a pollution tax in discouraging commercial fishing efforts. Therefore, it is aimed 
at promoting conservation of fish stocks. On the other hand, as the amount charged by 
a tax/fee/levy correlates positively with the input factors used in resource extraction 
(such as vessel size and gear dimension), the fishing fee tends to increase the efficiency 
of a fishing operation. The additional burden caused by the fishing fee promotes the use 
of smaller vessels using more sophisticated yet compact technology. 
In addition, Chakravorty and Nemoto (2000) demonstrated that doubling the rate 
of auction fees (another form of fishing fee) in the Industrial Longline fishery of Hawaii 
reduced commercial fishing profitability. They argued that this kind of policy affected 
boat owner’s incomes the most. As profitability declines, so does fishing effort. 
Therefore, similar to Gylfasson’s argument (1992), the fishing fee can potentially 
preserve fish stocks while contributing to additional revenues for the State. Essentially, 
these two studies support the classic fishery bioeconomic model theory (Gordon 1954, 
Schaefer 1957) 
Drawing from those previous studies, this paper divides the analysis of policy 
impacts generated by increasing fishing fee rates into three sections. First, it analyzes 
policy impacts on the national revenues collected from the fishery sector. Second, it 
evaluates policy impacts on the number and composition of the Nationally Registered 
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Fishing Vessels (NRFV). Lastly, it estimates the impacts of increasing fishing fees on 
the fishing operational costs. 
Subsequently, the analysis is followed by an investigation of stakeholders’ 
attitudes towards increasing fishing fee tariffs. The investigation focuses on the level of 
agreement (agreeability), the level of acceptability, and the level of support or 
resistance. 
 
V.1. Impact on the National Revenues from the Fishery Sector 
The fishing fee is classified as a natural resource fee, as are the leasing and 
royalty fees collected from the Mining and the Forestry sector. In Indonesia’s tax 
system, natural resource fees are categorized as Non-Tax State Income (NTSI) from 
natural resource (Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak (PNBP) dari Sumberdaya Alam). 
The classification is based on the characteristics of the natural resource fee itself. These 
types of levies are imposed on the industry, both corporate and individual entities, as a 
compensation for the privilege given to them to extract or utilize public natural 
resources controlled by the state.  
According to Article 33 (3) of the Constitution Law 1945 (UUD 1945), the 
highest administrative law in Indonesia, all the natural resources located within the 
national jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia are owned and controlled by the State 
and shall be utilized for the greatest prosperity of the people. Therefore, any entity 
aiming to utilize the resources shall need to obtain approval from the State (the central 
government) and must pay a resource fee as a compensation fee for the privilege given 
to them. This is the primary reason for categorizing the resource fee as a Non-Tax State 
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Income, and to differentiate it from common taxes such as the annual income tax 
imposed on each citizen. 
Since 2002, the national revenue collected from the fishing fees has fluctuated 
(table 9 and figure 8). The gradual increase was caused by two factors: the addition of 
the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV) to the registration of newly built 
fishing vessels; and the adjustment of components used to calculate the fishing fee 
amount.  
Table 9. National Revenues from the Fisheries Sector (2002-2018) 
Year  National Fleet (IDR)   Foreign Fleet (IDR)  
 Total Revenues 
(IDR)  
2002   150,021,491,558.51      44,163,372,355.36    194,184,863,913.87  
2003     60,766,040,148.37    153,371,860,433.63    214,137,900,582.00  
2004     58,573,212,101.70    223,794,750,329.93    282,367,962,431.63  
2005     74,365,362,857.55    197,037,546,170.93    271,402,909,028.48  
2006     81,787,280,296.00    116,361,267,799.79    198,148,548,095.79  
2007   102,698,968,325.00      12,384,976,879.60    115,083,945,204.60  
2008     77,404,162,800.00                                 -        77,404,162,800.00  
2009     91,743,434,620.00                                 -        91,743,434,620.00  
2010     91,816,661,810.00                                 -        91,816,661,810.00  
2011   183,423,043,800.00                                 -      183,423,043,800.00  
2012   215,489,127,500.00                                 -      215,489,127,500.00  
2013   227,561,090,600.00                                 -      227,561,090,600.00  
2014   214,445,203,505.00                                 -      214,445,203,505.00  
2015     77,476,601,001.00                                 -        77,476,601,001.00  
2016   357,880,000,000.00                                 -      357,880,000,000.00  
2017   491,080,000,000.00                                 -      491,080,000,000.00  
2018*   281,240,000,000.00                                 -      281,240,000,000.00  
*until August 31, 2018 
 
 
As briefly explained in Chapter IV.5, the amount of the fishing fee charged to a 
vessel is the result of a multiplication of four components: the vessel size in Gross 
Tonnage (GT), the Vessel Productivity (Ton/GT/year), the Basic Fish Price (in IDR) 
 
 
 58 
and the Coefficient Factor (in percentage). Prior to 2015, these factors, except for the 
Coefficient Factor, were reviewed and adjusted periodically, particularly the Basic Fish 
Price (BFP) which was always renewed annually by the Ministry of Trade. This 
annually revised BFP contributes to the slight increase of fishing fee rates.  
Consequently, this adjustment also slightly raises the national revenues from the fishery 
sector.  
 
     *the 2018 data per August 31, 
 
Figure 8. The Dynamic of the National Revenues from the Fisheries Sector (2002-2018) 
 
The national revenues plunged in 2007, 2008, and 2015 (figure 8). These 
significant declines were caused by policies authorized in the concerned years. Between 
2007 and 2008, Indonesia ended the Bilateral Arrangement with three distant-water 
fishing nations; the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the Kingdom of Thailand, and 
the Republic of the Philippines. Previously (2002-2007), Indonesia permitted fishing 
vessels from those countries to fish in Indonesia’s Economic Exclusive Zone (IEEZ), 
mostly in the eastern part of the country: the FMA 718 (the Arafura Sea). These 
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arrangements were made under the implementation of Article 56 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) promoting the accessibility to the 
untapped resources of coastal States, by allowing other States to utilize it under foreign 
fishing licensing policies.  
During that period, approximately 700 licensed foreign fishing vessels operated 
in the IEEZ and contributed significantly to the national revenues from the fisheries 
sector.  In the 2002-2006 period, the percentage of the foreign fishing vessel revenue 
over the total fisheries revenues varied between 23% and 79% (figure 9). Not 
surprisingly, the revocation of foreign fishing licenses affected the national revenues 
from the fisheries sector significantly, with a 42% decline in 2007 and a 33% decline in 
2008.  
 
Figure 9. The Composition of the National Revenues from the Fisheries Sector (2002-2018) 
 
The 2007 and 2008 drops were relatively smaller than the one that occurred in 
2015. By the end of 2015, the national revenues had declined by 64%, from IDR 214.44 
billion (December 31, 2014) to IDR 77.47 billion (December 31, 2015). However, it is 
important to underline that the decline was not caused by the increased fishing fee 
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authorized by the 2015 Government Regulation No.75. Although the regulation was 
signed on October 7, 2015, it was only effectively enforced 60 days later, in 2016. 
Therefore, any vessels extending their permit at the end of 2015 were still charged using 
the old tariff. 
The 2015 drop was primarily caused by other policies regulating commercial 
marine fisheries licensing in Indonesia: the expulsion of (ex) foreign fishing vessels, 
and the trawler prohibition in all waters of Indonesia Fisheries Management Areas 
(IFMA). On November 3, 2014, a Ministerial Decree No.56/Permen-KP/2014 
temporarily halted the fishing licensing process for any vessels built overseas. These 
kinds of vessels are categorized as ex-foreign vessels, including domestic vessels 
previously re-flagged from other nationalities. This policy was followed by Ministerial 
Decree No.2/Permen-KP/2015 prohibiting the operation of any type of trawler in all 
Indonesian waters, including the IEEZ, starting from January 9, 2015. To this date, these 
two crucial regulations have not been repealed.  
The enforcement of these regulations denied all ex-foreign vessels and trawlers 
extensions of their Fishing Permits (FP). Consequently, these policies greatly reduced 
national revenues. Prior to 2015, ex-foreign vessels and trawlers were the primary 
contributors to national revenues due to the high fishing fees imposed on them. Trawlers 
operating in the IEEZ of the Arafura Sea were charged with the highest fishing fees. 
On the contrary, as predicted, implementation of the new fishing fee tariffs as 
authorized by Government Regulation No.75 of 2015 led to a sharp increase in national 
revenues the following year. By the end of 2016, national revenues collected from the 
fisheries sector had increased by 362%, to IDR 357.88 billion. 
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This positive trend continued the following year. By the end of 2017, revenues 
reached IDR 491 billion or US$ 3.4 million, the highest record so far. It can be 
concluded, not surprisingly, that increasing the fishing fees had a positive impact on 
national revenues. Furthermore, this policy successfully liberated Indonesia from its 
dependency on foreign fishing vessels and destructive fishing gears as the main source 
of national revenues from the fishery sector. 
 
V.2. Impact on Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV) 
National revenues from the fisheries sector stem from fishing fees paid by 
Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV). These vessels are conferred Fishing 
Permits (FP) by the central government, the Directorate General of Capture Fisheries-
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (DGCF-MMAF). Referring to the fishery 
bioeconomic model (Gordon 1954, Schaefer 1957), it is hypothesized that the number 
of NRFV will decrease as the fishing fee tariff escalates. 
Chapter IV.5 briefly describes the four factors determining the amount of the 
fishing fee charged on a vessel. Out of these four factors, the vessel size and the type of 
fishing gear represent the input factors in a fishing operation, while the Basic Fish Price 
(BFP), which sets the average floor price of the landed catch, represents the output 
factor. The Coefficient Factor determines the percentage of the estimated annual catch 
that must be paid to the government in the form of the fishing fee. 
Essentially, the 2015 Government Regulation No.75 only altered the Coefficient 
Factor’s values, from 1.5% to 5% for small-scale vessels (<60GT), and from 2.5% to 
10% for middle-scale vessels (60-200 GT). Meanwhile, for large-scale vessels (>200 
GT), the coefficient factor was steeply increased from 2.5% to 25%. Not surprisingly, 
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these alterations significantly affected the annual fishing fee tariff per gross tonnage of 
the NRFV, with an increase ranging from 233% to 2,785 % and averaging 613% 
(Appendix 5). 
Given the new Coefficient Factor’s structure, it was easy to predict that small-
scale vessels would be less impacted by the fishing fee increase than large-scale ones. 
For middle-scale vessels, which dominated the NRFV, the fishing fee increase ranged 
from 300% to 1,054%.  
Among the six types of dominant fishing gears, the small-scale (<60 GT) 
oceanic drift gillnet vessels experienced the lowest increase (233%), while the largest 
increases impacted squid jigging vessels, with a 2,785% increase for the large-scale 
vessels (>200 GT) and a 1,054% increase for the middle-scale vessels, followed by Tuna 
Longline and Stick Held Dip Net with respective increases by 488.03% and 370.51% 
(Table 10). 
Table 10. Fishing Fee Tariff Escalation (%) 
No.   Fishing Gear  
 Small Scale 
(<60 GT)  
(%) 
 Medium Scale  
(60-200 GT) 
(%) 
 Large Scale 
(>200 GT) 
(%) 
      1   Stick Held Dip Net (Bouke Ami)            292.09             370.51          1,076.27  
      2   Oceanic Drift Gillnet            233.32             299.99             899.97  
      3   Squid Jigging            861.54          1,053.85          2,784.62  
      4   Small Pelagic Purse Seiner            238.45             306.14             915.34  
      5  
 Big Pelagic Purse Seine - IEEZ 
(Single Vessel)            258.56             299.92             899.80  
      6   Tuna Longline            390.03             488.03          1,370.08  
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Figure 10. Fishing Fee Tariff Escalation (%) 
 
It was hypothesized that, by generating additional costs for fishing operations, 
skyrocketing fishing fees would have diminished the demand for Fishing Permit (FP) 
extensions and decreased the number of NRFV (Gylfasson, 1992), Once again, this 
hypothesis was also based on the classical fishery bioeconomic model (Gordon 1954, 
Schaefer 1957). 
The number of NRFV did plunge in 2015, by 26.97%, from 4,490 units to 3,279 
units, but for the same reasons national revenues did (the expulsion of (ex) foreign 
fishing vessels, and the trawler prohibition in IFMA,) not because of the fishing fee 
increase authorized by Government Regulation No.75 of 2015, which was only enforced 
in 2016. 
Interestingly, the number of NRFV bounced back slightly during 2016, returning 
to 3,980 units (+21%). Similar to the changes in national revenues, the positive trend 
persisted the following year: by the end of 2017, NRFV counted 4,913 units (+23.44%). 
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Interestingly, this number is also higher by 9.42% than the number of NRFV at the end 
of 2014. This means that despite skyrocketing tariffs, 423 vessels were added to the fleet 
(figure 11). Reasons contributing to this ‘anti-theory’ phenomenon will be discussed in 
the next section. 
 
Figure 11. The Dynamic of Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV) 
 
The composition of the NRFV is also interesting. Notwithstanding being 
submitted to the highest fishing fee raise, squid jigging vessel numbers in the NRFV 
segment kept rising and almost doubled during 2016-2017. Other types of fishing gear 
also increased in numbers, except for the tuna longline, which has continuously declined 
since 2010 (figure 12). 
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Figure 12. The Dynamic of 6 dominant NRFV Composition 
 
According to data gathered from the various stakeholders, this phenomenon was 
caused by several factors: the re-registration of previously downsized fishing vessels, 
the expulsion of (ex) foreign fishing vessels, and a higher selling price of the landed 
catch. 
For years many of the boat owners took advantage of the shortcomings of the 
management division between the MMAF and the local governments. In order to avoid 
the MMAF licensing process, with higher fishing fees imposed on the NRFV, vessel 
owners downsized their boats, registering them as vessels smaller than 30 GT, which 
only needed to apply for a Fishing Permit (FP) from the provincial fisheries agency, 
with much lower fishing fees. At the beginning of 2016, DGCF-MMAF started 
enforcing the re-measurement of every industrial-scale vessel, particularly those 
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registered with the provincial fisheries agencies, forcing previously downsized vessels 
to re-register with the MMAF, turning them from “provincial’ vessels” into NRFV.  
Adding to this, the expulsion of (ex) foreign fishing vessels opened ‘new fishing 
grounds’ to domestic vessels, particularly in the IEEZ Arafura Sea, the most productive 
fishing ground in IFMAs. This situation created an incentive for the industry to expand 
their armada. Hundreds of the NRFV, including newly built vessels and transformed 
fishing gears, were relocated to the IEEZ Arafura Sea.  
Lastly, higher market prices for the landed catch also contributed to the NRFV 
increase. The selling price is much higher than the Basic Fish Price (BFP) enacted by 
the Ministry of Trade, particularly for exported fish. Squid (Loligo sp) BFP, for 
example, is set at IDR 16,000/kg while the market price can reach IDR 80,000/kg. The 
lowest average price for skipjack (Katsuwonus sp) in Nizam Zachman Oceanic Fishing 
Port (NZOFP) is IDR 18,000/kg, twice the BFP at IDR.8,800/kg. This situation is 
acknowledged by fishing vessel owners. 
At that time, we were saved by two things; decreasing oil (fuel 
*ed) price and increasing fish price. 
(Anonymous, Director of a fishing company with 73 registered 
fishing vessels) 
 
Regarding the NRFV composition dynamics (figure 12), this paper argues that 
it was caused by two reasons: the declining catch of longline tuna, and the characteristics 
of the other fishing gears, particularly squid jigging. 
Longline tuna catch worldwide had been declining since 2004 (Clarke et al. 
2014). In Indonesia’s context, the situation was worsening because of fishing gear 
conflicts between tuna longlines and purse seiners. During interviews, neither 
representatives from the Indonesia Purse Seine Association (Himpunan Nelayan Purse 
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Seine Nusantara/HNPN) nor the Indonesia Tuna Longline Association (Asosiasi Tuna 
Indonesia/ASTUIN) denied this situation. However, both agreed that the conflict was 
not as bad it was believed to be. They claimed that frictions at sea could be minimized 
using ‘Indonesia’s way’, to put a compromise before a confrontation. Some owners from 
these two types of gear are relatives or have, to some degree, business agreements. Some 
even have both types of gears simultaneously. 
There was a time when the conflict escalated, the longliners’ 
crews burnt the Fish Aggregating Device (FAD) set by the (Big 
Pelagic) Purse Seine. It costed the purse seine owner a lot. For 
your information, one FAD may cost at least IDR 80 million ( 
US 6,000). 
(Anonymous, a fishing company owner operating Big Pelagic 
Purse Seine) 
 
Despite claims from fishing association representatives, skippers and owners 
have different opinions. Some of them openly blamed their declining catch on the 
existence of Big Pelagic Purse Seine (BPPS) fishing on the same fishing ground in 
IFMA 572 (Western Indian Ocean of western Sumatra) and IFMA 573 (Part of Indian 
Ocean in Southern Java). Their disappointment can be perceived from the following 
excerpts gathered during the short interviews. 
It is much more difficult to catch the fish (tuna) now, we (the 
long liners *ed) are outcompeted by the purse seiners.  
(Anonymous, 36 years old, Javanese, Longline skipper) 
 
Our business (Long Line’s tuna fishing *ed) is dying; harsh 
competition with the (big pelagic *ed) purse seiner, long and 
complicated bureaucracy for a very limited period of Fishing 
Permit (FP/SIPI), increased fishing fee rate, and not to 
mention, other expenses generated by the various ‘unofficial 
fees’ (bribe, graft *ed) 
(Anonymous, 56 years old, Javanese, Longline skipper) 
 
We can’t compete with the (Big Pelagic *ed) Purse Seine 
(operating *ed) in (FMA *ed) 572 and 573. 
(Anonymous, 39 years old, Indonesian-Chinese, Tuna 
Longline owner) 
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Actually, the Indonesia Tuna Longliners have access to larger and wider fishing 
grounds as they are also permitted to fish in the High Seas (the International Waters). 
However, the potential catch is limited by the fishing quota allocation given by the 
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), a Regional Fisheries Management 
Organization (RFMO) in the Indian Ocean. So is the number of permitted tuna longline 
that was limited and was monitored both by DGCF-MMAF and the RFMO. In addition, 
distant fishing grounds require extra costs for additional fuel. Despite these factors, 
longline skippers are still convinced that the declining catch, both in quantity and size, 
is caused by the heavy exploitation of juvenile tuna by the Big Pelagic Purse Seine.  
Theoretically, the targeted species for the Big Pelagic Purse Seine (BPPS) is 
skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis). However, during the fishing season, juvenile tunas 
swimming along with skipjack schools are also caught. In fact, this situation has 
motivated the increase in BPPS number, as the landing price of juvenile tuna contributes 
considerably to its profitability, making it more a lucrative business than the tuna 
longline. 
The steady decline of longline tuna, as well as structural boat similarities, lower 
investment barriers and high exporting squid prices, prompted many of the NRFV 
longline vessels to transform into squid jigging vessels and move their fishing grounds 
to the IEEZ Arafura Sea. Being a less active fishing gear, squid jigging consumes less 
fuel than tuna longline (Sainsbury 1986). Also, the simpler technique involved in squid 
fishing requires less skilled labor and lower wages than tuna crews (Ben-Yami 1976). 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the disappearance of the (ex) foreign fishing 
vessels, mostly mid-water trawlers, left an abundant stock of squid and small pelagic 
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species in the Arafura IEEZ. Nowadays this fishing ground is occupied by small pelagic 
purse seiners relocated from the fully exploited IFMA 712 (the Java Sea), and the – 
previously tuna longline – squid jigging vessels. Another excerpt from the short 
interviews portrays this situation. 
The increased fishing fee may be suitable for the purse seine 
fishery as they catch much more than us, but it is very hard for 
us (the tuna longline fishery *ed). Perhaps, my boss is the only 
remaining owner who still running the fresh tuna business, the 
others have transformed their vessels into squid vessels (Squid 
Jigging and Cast Net *ed). I’m afraid that soon we will have to 
do the same thing. 
(Anonymous, 56, Javanese, Elementary School, Longline 
skipper) 
 
The analysis above shows that increasing fishing fees does not instantly reduce 
the number of operating fishing vessels, especially when the profit gained from a fishing 
operation outweighs the additional costs generated by a higher fishing fee. In this case, 
the findings support Matthiasson’s (2001) argument that the vessel owner will continue 
his fishing business as long as the variable costs and the interests of the invested capital 
can be covered by the yielded profit. In addition, it can be concluded that several internal 
and external factors generated by other related policies also affect both the total number 
and the composition of the registered fishing vessels. 
 
V.3. Impact on Fishing Operation Costs 
 To estimate the impact of the increased fishing fee tariff on the fishing 
operational costs, this paper reconstructs the variable costs of a fishing operation for six 
dominant fishing gears. Following the operating cost categories (Fyson 1985) and due 
to the limitations of the available data, this paper only incorporates six components into 
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the analysis. Those encompass the fuel consumption, provision, crew basic wage, crew 
incentives, charged fishing fee, and miscellaneous costs. Subsequently each component 
is calculated using the formulas described in Section III.6.1.3. 
 Not all data related to fishing operation expenditures are available to be 
calculated. For instance, this analysis excludes the cost for bait in tuna longline. In 
addition, the analysis exclusively focused on the middle-scale fishing vessels (60-200 
GT) dominating the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV). 
 The number of samples from each type of fishing gear varies greatly. Big Pelagic 
Purse Seine (BPPS) has the highest number with 394 (in 2014), 82 (in 2017), and 72 (in 
2018) vessels. This was caused primarily by two factors; the average length of fishing 
trips, and the requirement from the Regional Fisheries Management Organization 
(RFMO). These two factors are the underlying reason for the incompleteness of the 
available data, data accuracy, and data reliability. 
On average, a BPPS spends 3-4 months per fishing trip, a similar period with 
Bouke Ami. This fishing trip period is relatively shorter than the other types of fishing 
gear based in Nizam Zachman Oceanic Fishing Port (NZOFP) - Jakarta. 
Basically, the Oceanic Gillnet (OGN) and the Squid Jigging (SJ) operating in 
the FMA 718 (IEEZ Arafura Sea) also spend a similar amount of time per fishing 
operation, or even less with 2-3 months per trip. However, those vessels will only return 
to their fishing base in NZOFP Jakarta after spending 8-9 months on the fishing grounds.  
During their fishing operations in the Arafura Sea, these vessels are back and 
forth to the nearest fishing ports either in Dobo or in Tual (Maluku province), or even 
in Merauke (Papua province). There the vessels unload their catch and refill with fuel 
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and provisions before returning to the fishing grounds. Later, the landed catch is 
transported using a fish carrier vessel operated by the same fishing company or by the 
same owner. Consequently, the OGN and SJ only carry home the catch from their last 
fishing operation, the last 2-3 months, before returning to NZOFP-Jakarta and ending 
their fishing trip. Unfortunately, most of the landed catch records including the fishing 
logbook reported in their previous fishing ports are incomplete and unreliable. 
 Meanwhile, the tuna longliners operating in the FMA 572 and 573 (the IEEZ of 
the Indian Ocean) have the longest fishing trips, particularly those permitted to fish on 
the high seas (international waters). On average, the longliners spend 5-9 months per 
trip before returning to the fishing base. During that period, those vessels may have 
anchored in the other ports outside Indonesia for refueling and refilling their provisions, 
or even for landing their catch. In addition, the tuna longliners also carry home the catch 
from other vessels owned by the same fishing company or owner. Similar to the OGN 
and SJ, this situation not only affects the number of available vessels to be sampled but 
also the data accuracy and data reliability.  
 There is yet another reason attributed to the requirement from the RFMO.  As 
the participating member of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), Indonesia is 
obliged to submit an annual report of tuna and tuna-like species caught in the IOTC 
convention area. The data is required to determine the amount of catch quota for each 
participating member. Accordingly, some enumerators in NZOFP are deployed to 
specifically record the landed catch from tuna longline and BPPS operating in FMA 572 
and 573. This situation contributes to the number of qualified samples from BPPS; much 
higher than the other types of fishing gears based in NZOFP. 
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 Using the verified data and the formulas described in Chapter III.6.1.3., the 
operating costs of six types of fishing gears in three different years (2014, 2017, and 
2018) were calculated. The 2014 data is used to estimate the percentage of the charged 
fishing fee in a fishing operational cost (FOC) before the authorization of the new 
fishing fee tariff. Later the results are compared with the 2017 and the 2018 data 
representing the period after the enforcement of the new tariff. 
 Basically, the portion of the fishing fee component in the fishing operational 
costs (FOC) is relatively small (Table 11). The value (in percentages) is insignificant 
compared to the largest component; the expenditures for fuel (including the lubricant) 
consumption. In 2014, the highest fishing fee contribution in the FOC occurred in BPPS. 
Nevertheless, the value ranged only between 1.6% and 4.7%. On average, the charged 
fishing fee was only 2.7% of BPPS total variable costs. For comparison, the fuel 
consumption expenditure for BPPS at the same year ranged from 46.1% to 66%. On 
average, the fuel expenditure contributed 54.9% to the total FOC of BPPS in 2014. 
 Squid jigging, as the least active fishing gear, had the smallest percentage of 
fishing fee component in their FOC in 2014. The value ranged between 0.4% and 0.85%. 
On average, the variable cost for the fishing fee was only 0.7% of the total FOC of squid 
jigging. 
 After the authorization of Government Regulation No.75 of 2015 in 2016 
dramatically increased the annual fishing fee tariff, the magnitude of the fishing fee 
component in the FOC escalated. Similar to the situation in 2014, the highest fishing 
fee contribution (in percentage) in the FOC also occurred in BPPS. This time the value 
escalated and ranged between 4.7% and 11.4%. On average in 2017, the fishing fee 
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component was 8.1% of the FOC of BPPS; escalating 199.1% from the value in 2014 
(Table 11). 
 Squid jigging had the smallest percentage of the fishing fee component in the 
FOC of 2014 but underwent the most significant escalation in 2017. It ranked as the 
fishing gear with the second highest percentage of fishing fee contribution in the FOC. 
The value ranged between 4.15% and 9.15% (Table 11 and Figure 13). On average, the 
fishing fee component in the FOC for Squid Jigging was 5.9%; skyrocketing 767.5 % 
from the value in 2014 (Table 11 and Figure 14). Meanwhile, the smallest contribution 
of the fishing fee expenditure in the FOC of 2017 was experienced by Bouke Ami (Stick-
Held Dip Net), a fishing gear targeting smaller squid operating mostly in FMA 711 
(Natuna Sea) and 712 (Java Sea). 
Table 11. Fishing Fee Contribution in Fishing Operational Cost (%) 
 
 The increased fishing fee contribution to the FOC for squid jigging was mainly 
caused by the significant increase of the annual fishing fee tariff for this gear. As 
discussed in Section V.2., squid jigging experienced the largest tariff escalation for the 
middle-scale and the large-scale of NRFV with 1,053.85% and 2,784.6% respectively 
(Table 10). 
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Figure 13. Fishing Fee Contribution in Fishing Operational Cost 
 
While Table 11 summarizes the percentage of the fishing fee component in the 
FOC of six primary fishing gears, it also demonstrates the magnitude of their escalation 
(in percentage terms). As already mentioned, Squid Jigging experienced the largest 
increase in comparison with the value in 2014. It was followed by the tuna longline with 
437.3% and 320.2% for 2017 and 2018 respectively (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14. The Escalation of Fishing Fee Contribution in Fishing Operational Cost 
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 Based on the magnitude of the observed increase, one can conclude that squid 
jigging is the fishing gear that was most affected as a result of the authorization of the 
new annual fishing fee tariff. However, it is crucial to consider the size of FOC spent 
by each type of fishing gear. 
Using the same analyzed data, Table 12 summarizes the descriptive statistics of 
the FOC from three fishing gears; Big Pelagic Purse Seine, Tuna Longline, and Squid 
Jigging. Generally, the total variable costs of a fishing operation (FOC) in 2018 
escalates nearly 1.5 – 2 times from the values in 2014. Mostly this was caused by fuel 
prices that increased by 16.7%.  Both in 2014 and in 2018, tuna longliners had the largest 
FOC among the NRFV based in the NZOFP, two times greater than Squid Jigging’s 
FOC. Therefore, 3.85% of increase in Tuna Longline FOC has a larger impact than 
5.73% of increase in Squid Jigging FOC. A similar situation occurs when comparing 
the impact based on the magnitude of the percentage escalation. In addition, as 
previously mentioned, the analysis, due to the data unavailability, has already excluded 
the expenditure for the bait in the tuna longline FOC. Inclusion of bait expenditure will 
increase the tuna longline FOC 
Summarizing from the analysis above, it can be concluded that the increased 
annual fishing fee tariff affects the variable cost of fishing operation (FOC). The relative 
increase of the fishing fee in the FOC escalates as high as 767.5% which is experienced 
by squid jigging. However, this paper argues that tuna longline becomes the most 
affected fishing gear. In the long run, it may also affect the number of tuna long line 
vessels in NRFV. In addition, regardless of the significant escalation, the fishing fee 
contribution in the FOC is still smaller than the fuel consumption expenditure. 
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Therefore, it has much less impact on the fishing operational costs than the increasing 
fuel price. 
Table 12. Descriptive Statistics of the Fishing Operational Costs (FOC) 
*Note: 
BPS  = Big Pelagic Purse Seine 
LL  = Tuna Longline 
SJ  = Squid Jigging 
Mean  = Average Fishing Operational Cost (FOC) 
Minimum = the smallest amount of FOC 
Maximum = the largest amount of FOC 
Count  = number of samples 
 
V.4. The Stakeholders Attitudes on the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff 
 The investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes toward the increased fishing fee 
tariff focuses on three aspects; the agreement level, the acceptability level, and the 
support or the resistance level. The first question measures to what extent that the 
stakeholders can agree with the tariff escalation. Meanwhile, the second question 
measures to what extent that the stakeholders can accept the tariff escalation. The last 
2018 BPS LL SJ
Mean 936,186,268.96         2,148,150,865.88    946,741,247.28     
Standard Error 31,609,317.85           245,086,995.55       45,353,201.41       
Standard Deviation 279,165,936.37         1,319,833,863.11    348,364,550.16     
Minimum 549,784,340.96         645,957,424.06       376,531,610.96     
Maximum 1,633,393,455.82      5,383,783,210.27    2,907,248,479.11  
Count 78.00                         29.00                       59.00                     
Confidence Level(95.0%) 62,942,193.10           502,037,952.04       90,784,296.22       
2014 BPS LL SJ
Mean 707,768,226.60         1,041,720,003.90    558,436,607.68     
Standard Error 7,607,473.56             47,439,906.07         28,046,925.07       
Standard Deviation 151,004,038.60         217,396,960.54       79,328,683.65       
Minimum 519,556,083.52         612,565,159.93       419,204,437.65     
Maximum 1,724,228,418.38      1,419,069,269.20    657,068,741.82     
Sum 278,860,681,279.58  21,876,120,081.86  4,467,492,861.47  
Count 394.00                       21.00                       8.00                       
Confidence Level(95.0%) 14,956,434.63           98,957,910.01         66,320,439.21       
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one investigates the level of support, or resistance toward the new tariff. The 
stakeholders are categorized into nine groups as described in Chapter III.5. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test for three questions related to the increased 
fishing fee tariff reject the Null Hypothesis (Table 13 and Appendix 7). This means that 
all the samples are not from an identical population. The test also demonstrates that at 
least one group of stakeholders has a different median score for their answers. The 
results of the median also indicate the dynamic of the central tendency of the collected 
answers (Table 14). 
Table 13. The Kruskal-Wallis test for the collected samples related to the increased fishing fee tariff 
  
Q1 
Agreement 
Level 
Q2 
Acceptability 
Level 
Q3 
Support 
Level 
Chi-Square 177.714 161.069 183.090 
Df 8 8 8 
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 14. The Median of the collected samples related to the increased fishing fee tariff 
Stakeholders 
Q1 
Agreement Level 
Q2 
Acceptability Level 
Q3 
Support Level 
∑ Resp. Median ∑ Resp. Median ∑ Resp. Median 
Central Govt. 85 5.0 85 5.0 85 5.0 
Fishing Port 87 5.0 86 5.0 87 5.0 
Provincial Govt. 42 4.0 42 4.0 42 4.0 
Regency Govt. 17 4.0 17 4.0 17 4.0 
Crews/Skippers 76 1.0 76 2.0 76 2.0 
Industry (Owners) 74 2.0 74 2.0 74 2.0 
Commercial Fishing 
Association 
12 3.0 12 4.0 12 2.5 
NGO 20 4.0 20 3.0 20 3.0 
Academia/Researchers 28 4.0 27 4.0 28 4.0 
Total 441 4.0 439 4.0 441 4.0 
Notes: 
Likert Score Q1 
Agreement Level 
Q2 
Acceptability Level 
Q3 
Support Level 
1 Disagree Unacceptable Strongly Oppose 
2 Somewhat Disagree Slightly Unacceptable Somewhat Oppose 
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree Neutral Neutral 
4 Somewhat Agree Slightly Acceptable Somewhat Favor 
5 Agree Acceptable Strongly Favor 
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V.4.1. Level of Agreement 
The boxplot (Figure 15) portrays the distribution of answers from 9 groups of 
stakeholders for question number 1; the agreement level. Not surprisingly, the 
stakeholders representing the industry, the crews/skipper (Group 5) and the owners 
(Group 6) have a negative attitude toward the increased fishing fee tariff. Their collected 
answers range between 1 and 3 on the 5-point scale of the Likert test. The crews/skippers 
have a stronger negative attitude than the owners. The median (bold line in each bar) of 
their collected answer (1) is lower than the median from the owners’ answers (2). In 
addition, small circles in this boxplot denote the outliers, while the numbers represent 
the respondents’ numbers. 
 
*Notes: 
Y-axis  = Likert Scale (1 to 5) 
X-axis  = Types of Respondents 
Number   = Outliers (marked by respondent number) 
Bold line in bar = Median 
 
Figure 15. Boxplot of the Agreement Level for the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff 
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The negative attitude is understandable as the increased fishing fee tariff, as 
discussed in Chapter V.3., escalates the fishing operational costs (FOC). Like the rest 
of the world, most of the Indonesian commercial fisheries also apply the profit-sharing 
system between the owner and the skipper. For the purse seine fishery, the profit-sharing 
system also includes the crews with various levels of sharing. The owners may have 
other income from the other vessels to compensate for their declining profit, but for the 
skipper (and the crews), the vessel is their only source of income. In addition, the 
samples from group 6 (the industry) also incorporate the responses collected from 
company representatives and the independent middle-men (Chapter III.5). Although 
they can be regarded as the owners’ right-hand man, these professionals might have 
dissenting opinions as they receive less direct impact from the increased tariff. 
Therefore, it is unsurprising when the skippers have stronger negative attitude than the 
owners regarding the agreement level on the increased tariff. 
I strongly disagree with the increased fishing fee; we go fishing 
further and longer but the catch is declining and smaller. 
Nowadays everything is expensive that raise the operational 
costs, it takes ages to get the Fishing Permit (FP/SIPI) but the 
landing price (the dock price *ed) remains the same. Since the 
fishing fee is incorporated into the operational costs, it is 
diminishing our income.  
(Anonymous, 50 years old, Javanese, Elementary School, 
Purse Seine) 
 
In contrast, the stakeholders from the government representatives (MMAF, 
Fishing Port, Provincial, and Regency/Municipality) have a positive attitude. The 
median values range between 4 and 5 in the 5-point scale of the Likert test (Table 14). 
The reasons supporting their answer are attributed to the national revenues from the 
fisheries sector and an awareness of guarding the publicly-owned property.  
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One of the prominent arguments for strongly agreeing with the increased tariff 
is the time period for the tariff stagnancy. Although the tariff has been increased 
gradually to a slight extent, it has small impact on national revenues. Furthermore, the 
previous government regulation concerning the fishing fee tariff was enacted 12 years 
ago in 2006. It is also argued that it is necessary to consider the national annual inflation 
rate for adjusting the fishing fee tariff as the compensation for the privilege conferred 
on the industry. In addition, the government representatives, particularly from the 
central government (MMAF and the Fishing Port), believe that the industry is still able 
to pay the escalated fishing fee tariff. 
The median of the samples from the fishing association (Group 7) shows a 
neutral attitude. Their collected answers range from 1 to 5. This paper argues that there 
are two reasons underlying this result. First, some of the respondents from this group 
are professionals, not the vessel owner, hired to run the association. Therefore, they 
experience less direct impact from the increased fishing fee tariff. Second, the 
association representatives have a better understanding regarding the need for 
preserving the resources through the entrance fee escalation. The combination of these 
reasons with the negative attitude expressed by representatives of other types of 
associations results in varied answers covering the whole length of the Likert-scale. 
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Group 
Stakeholders 
Group 
Stakeholders 
Group 
Stakeholders 
1. Central Govt 4. Regency Govt 7. Association 
2. Fishing Port 5. Crews/Skippers 8. NGO 
3. Provincial Govt 6. Industry (Owners) 9. Academia Research 
Notes 
Scale Color Color Interpretation 
1  Blue Disagree 
2  Green Somewhat Disagree 
3  Grey Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4  Purple Somewhat Agree 
5  Yellow Agree 
 
Figure 16. Sample Distribution of Agreement Level on the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff 
 
The other types of stakeholders, the NGOs and Academia also demonstrate a 
positive attitude regarding agreement with the increased tariff. The median of the 
collected answers both from NGOs and academia range between 3 and 4 (Table 14). 
This means that both of them are divided between the neutral and the slightly positive 
attitude on their level of agreement regarding the increased tariff. Mostly they believe 
that the escalated tariff has a positive impact in preserving the resource, however they 
also comprehend the difficulties that may be faced by the industry due to the increasing 
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fishing operational costs. This can be seen from the distribution of their answers (Figure 
16). 
Figure 16 also demonstrates that the number of strong positive attitudes (score 
5) collected from the government representatives decline as they are located further 
from the central government. For instance, the percentage of score 5 collected from the 
fishing port officials (63.22%) is slightly lower than the samples collected from their 
counterparts working in headquarters of the MMAF (69.41%). Subsequently, the 
collected answers having score 5 from the regency/municipality’s officials are slightly 
lower than their counterparts working for the provincial fisheries agencies. This paper 
argues that this result is caused by their familiarity with the national fisheries revenues. 
Furthermore, these revenues are collected from the fishing fees payment of the NRFV 
that were exclusively managed by the MMAF. As predicted, the strongest disagreement 
comes from the skippers. 
Essentially the national revenues from the fisheries sector have no direct impact 
on the income of the officials working in MMAF’s headquarter. As Non-Tax State 
Income from the natural resources’ utilization, the national fisheries revenues will be 
distributed in form of the Inter-Governmental Transfer Fund. According to Law number 
33 of 2004 concerning Fiscal Balance, the distribution composition is 20% for the 
central government (MMAF) and 80% for the local governments (the regency and the 
municipality, excluding the provincial government. Subsequently, all the funds received 
by the MMAF must be allocated for fisheries resource conservation and development. 
However, national fisheries revenue has always been used as one of the indicators for 
assessing the MMAF annual performance. Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) as 
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Indonesia’s legislative branch has always raised this issue during the annual budgeting 
meeting with the Minister. Therefore, the MMAF officials have more concern than other 
governmental representatives regarding the increased fishing fee tariff. 
 
V.4.2. Level of Acceptability 
 Hypothetically, the stakeholders’ attitudes regarding their acceptance level of 
the increased fishing fee tariff correlates positively with their level of agreement and 
support. Those who strongly disagree with the new escalated tariff, hypothetically will 
very reluctant to accept and support it. The results from the collected samples support 
this hypothesis. 
 The median of the collected answers for the agreement level and the 
acceptability level are almost identical. The only differences occur in 3 groups of 
stakeholders; the crews/skippers, the commercial fishing associations, and the NGOs 
(Table 14). Skippers’ strong negative attitude (score 1) in the agreement level is 
softening in their level of acceptability (score 2). This means that regardless of their 
strong disagreement with the escalated tariff, eventually they can accept it somewhat. 
Most likely this result is caused by very limited availability of options for them. The 
following excerpt from one of the short interviews portrays their opinion. 
Honestly, I disagree with the increased fishing fee and cannot 
accept it, but we have no choice. We still have to pay it in order 
to get the Fishing Permit, right?  
(Anonymous, 38 years old, Javanese, Elementary School, 
Longline skipper) 
 
What can we do? What can we say? Do we have a choice?  
(Anonymous, Javanese-Chinese, a fishing company owner 
operating Squid Jigging and Purse Seine) 
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A similar situation exists in the group of vessel owners. Their attitude on the 
acceptability level softens. In addition to the limited available options, the less 
significant impact generated by the new fishing fee tariff on the fishing operational costs 
(FOC) also affects their softened negative attitude. As discussed in Chapter V.3., despite 
its significant escalation, the contribution of the fishing fee expenditure to the FOC is 
much smaller than fuel expenditures. 
Fishing fee is nothing compared to the total operational costs.  
(Anonymous, a fishing company owner operating tuna 
longline). 
 
We don’t have problem with the increased tariff, our business 
is still profitable. 
(Anonymous, a fishing company owner operating purse seine) 
 
 The group of stakeholders representing the commercial fishing associations also 
shifts their attitude towards a more positive score; from the neutral attitude (score 3) to 
the slightly positive attitude (score 4). On the contrary, the NGOs demonstrate the 
opposite direction; shifting to the neutral attitude (score 3) from a slightly positive one 
(score 4). Most likely it was caused by the minimum or no direct impact experienced by 
the NGOs regarding the escalated fishing fee tariff. In addition, some of the respondents 
from NGOs argued that the new tariff was too high and may negatively affect crews’ 
livelihood. 
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*Notes: 
Y-axis  = Likert Scale (1 to 5) 
X-axis  = Types of Respondents 
Number   = Outliers (marked by respondent number) 
Bold line in bar = Median 
 
Figure 17. Boxplot of the Acceptability Level for the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff 
 
The range of the attitudes on the acceptability level from nine types of 
stakeholders (Figure 17) is almost identical to the previous boxplot illustrating their 
agreement level (Figure 15). However, the range of attitudes from the fishing ports 
officials is notable. The range of their acceptability level is slightly wider than their 
level of agreement, with a slight movement toward to the neutral attitude. This paper 
argues that it was caused by their workplace location. As the central government 
officials (DGCF-MMAF) working in the field and interacting intensively with the 
skippers and the owners of NRFV berthing in their ports, these officials have more 
concern for and empathy with the industry than their counterparts working in the 
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headquarters of MMAF. The distribution of the answers (Figure 18) reinforces this 
argument. On the other hand, similar to the agreement level, the skippers are the most 
reluctant stakeholders in accepting the new tariff authorization.  
 
Group 
Stakeholders 
Group 
Stakeholders 
Group 
Stakeholders 
1. Central Govt 4. Regency Govt 7. Association 
2. Fishing Port 5. Crews/Skippers 8. NGO 
3. Provincial Govt 6. Industry (Owners) 9. Academia Research 
Notes 
Scale Color Color Interpretation 
1  Blue Unacceptable 
2  Green Slightly Unacceptable 
3  Grey Neutral 
4  Purple Slightly Acceptable 
5  Yellow Acceptable 
 
Figure 18. Sample Distribution of Acceptability Level on the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff 
 
V.4.3. Level of Support 
 The third question investigates the stakeholders’ level of support for or 
resistance to the new fishing fee tariff. As predicted, the results are identical with their 
level of acceptability. The median of the attitudes for the level of support from each 
stakeholder is exactly the same with their median of attitude for the acceptability level 
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except for the commercial fishing associations (Table 14). In this case, the associations 
have the neutral attitude (score 3), the same with the median for their agreement level. 
 These identical values indicate a very strong positive correlation between the 
acceptability level and the level of support. Those who can accept the new tariff 
authorization, ultimately will support it, and the other way around. For instance, the 
skippers and the owners who strongly disagree and having low acceptability on the new 
tariff will definitely resist it. 
 
*Notes: 
Y-axis  = Likert Scale (1 to 5) 
X-axis  = Types of Respondents 
Number   = Outliers (marked by respondent number) 
Bold line in bar = Median 
 
Figure 19. Boxplot of the Support Level for the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff 
 
 A similar situation also occurs in the range of the stakeholders’ attitudes as 
portrayed by the boxplot in figure 19 with high support for increased fishing fee tariff 
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indicated by score 5. Here the range of the answers from the skippers and the owners 
becomes narrower than the range of their answers on the agreement level and the 
acceptability level. This indicates the accumulation of their opinion in a specific scale 
of the attitude measurement. Although the skippers and the owners have slightly 
dissenting attitudes on the agreement level and acceptability level (Figure 15 and 17), 
ultimately, they reach a consensus regarding their level of support, or resistance level, 
on the escalated fishing fee tariff. 
This paper argues that the identical level of resistance measured by the median 
values was also caused by the profit-sharing system mostly applied in Indonesia’s 
commercial fisheries. The system means they bear together the escalated fishing fee as 
one of the components in fishing operational costs. 
Our catch is unpredictable, but the operational costs are already 
fixed (permanent). Since the fishing fee is part of the 
operational costs, automatically it will affect our income, and 
certainly it diminishes our income.  
(Anonymous, 34 years old, Javanese, High School, Longline 
skipper) 
 
The increased fishing fee hits us hard. The captain’s income is 
the most affected one.  
(Anonymous, a fishing company owner operating 10 Squid 
Jiggings) 
 
In contrast, the governmental stakeholders have an exactly identical range of 
attitude for the agreement level and the support level. Only a slight difference occurs 
with the fishing ports officials and their acceptability level as previously discussed in 
Chapter V.4.2. For the level of support, both representatives from the central 
government, the MMAF and the fishing ports officials, have exactly the same range of 
answers for the highest positive score (Figure 20). However, most likely due to their 
workplace location (placing them closer to the industry), the fishing ports officials also 
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have slightly larger samples opposing the new tariff authorization. Meanwhile, both 
provincial and regency/municipality representatives have wider neutral attitudes for 
their collected answers than their counterparts working for the central government. 
Presumably this was caused by less impact on them due to the authorization of the new 
tariff, particularly for the provincial government receiving no funds from the distributed 
national revenues from the fisheries sector 
 
Group 
Stakeholders 
Group 
Stakeholders 
Group 
Stakeholders 
1. Central Govt 4. Regency Govt 7. Association 
2. Fishing Port 5. Crews/Skippers 8. NGO 
3. Provincial Govt 6. Industry (Owners) 9. Academia Research 
Notes 
Scale Color Color Interpretation 
1  Blue Strongly Oppose 
2  Green Somewhat Oppose 
3  Grey Neutral 
4  Purple Somewhat Favor 
5  Yellow Strongly Favor 
 
Figure 20. Sample Distribution of Support Level on the Increased Fishing Fee Tariff 
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 The distribution of the answers collected from the industry representatives 
should also be noted. From the skippers to the commercial fishing associations, the 
frequency of the resistance attitudes (blue and green colors) is slightly declining (Figure 
20). In addition to the label as the most affected stakeholders, they (the skippers, owners, 
and the commercial fishing associations) have different ways to convey their opinions. 
Consequently, this nature affects their level of support, or resistance. 
Another factor contributing to this result is the data collection mechanism. 
Skippers interviewed in the field mostly by the field enumerators have more liberty in 
delivering their opinion than the owners and the association representatives interviewed 
during the submission of their quarterly fishing report. However, generally, these three 
representatives of the industry have resistance attitudes on the escalated fishing fee 
tariff. The composition of the negative attitudes (score 1 and 2) varies between 50% (the 
associations) and 62.16% (the skippers). Meanwhile, the NGOs slightly shift their 
attitude to the neutral position (score 3). Once again, this paper argues that it was caused 
by the minimum direct impact experienced by the NGOs. 
The Pairwise test was conducted on two most affected stakeholders, the 
crews/skippers (Group 5) and the vessel owners (Group 6). The test aims to compare 
whether these two groups of stakeholders have a median that is significantly different 
(Chapter III.6.2.4). The result indicates that there is no significant difference in the 
median between the skippers and the owners for three investigated aspects of the 
increased fishing fee tariff (Appendix 9). Regardless of variance on their distribution 
range of answer (the boxplots) and composition of responses (histograms), eventually 
the skippers and the owners have the same attitude on the increased fishing fee tariff. 
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CHAPTER VI  
POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE AUTHORITY REVOCATION 
 
Except for the special affairs that are still exclusively governed by the central 
government, Law No.23 of 2014 concerning the Local Governments comprehensively 
re-organizes the authority and the jurisdiction of the three administration levels in 
Indonesia: the central, the provincial, and the municipality/regency governments. The 
law itself consists of 411 articles described in 212 pages, excluding the explanation 
section and the tables summarizing the distribution of authority and jurisdiction for each 
aspect discussed. 
The special matters classified as being an absolute (central) government 
prerogative encompass foreign affairs, national defense, national security, the judicial 
system, the national monetary and fiscal affairs, and religious affairs. Meanwhile 
government affairs distributed between the central and the local governments 
(provincial and municipality/regency) are classified as concurrent government affairs. 
Furthermore, these affairs are categorized into three types: the basic service mandatory 
government affairs, the non-basic services mandatory government affairs, and the 
optional government affairs.  
Education, Health, and Public Works are examples of the mandatory 
government affairs providing basic services. Meanwhile, marine affairs and the fisheries 
sector fall into the category of optional government affairs. Other sectors grouped into 
this category are tourism, agriculture, forestry, energy and mineral resource, trading, 
industry, and transmigration. 
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Article 27 of the law specifically designates the authority and the jurisdiction of 
the provincial governments pertinent to marine affairs. Hereby, the provinces are 
conferred the authority to manage natural resources located within their marine 
jurisdiction. The term ‘manage’ includes the authority to explore, exploit, conserve, and 
manage marine natural resources in their jurisdiction with the exception of exploration 
and exploitation of offshore oil and liquid gas, which are exclusively managed by the 
central government (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources). Other authorities 
conferred to the provincial governments include administrative arrangement and marine 
spatial planning. In addition, provinces are also obliged to participate in preserving the 
national maritime security and sovereignty.  
Subsequently, article 27 (3) designates the maritime jurisdiction of provincial 
governments, measured from the baseline (0 nautical miles) to 12 nautical miles. Thus, 
their jurisdictions essentially cover the territorial waters of the Republic of Indonesia. 
For overlapping maritime jurisdictions, the law applies a method similar to the one 
described by article 15 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), according to which the maritime jurisdiction area is divided equidistantly 
between concerned provinces. 
The law does not specifically revoke municipality/regency authority and 
maritime jurisdiction. However, the designation of the provincial maritime jurisdiction, 
as stated in article 27 (3), automatically annuls the jurisdiction stipulated by Law No.32 
of 2004, except for what concerns small-scale coastal fisheries, which, as stated by 
Article 27 (5), are excluded from the provincial authority to manage marine natural 
resources. The small-scale sector is composed of boats under 5 Gross Tonnage (GT) 
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that are exempted from the obligation to hold the Fishing Permit (FP/SIPI) for their 
fishing operation.  
The authority and jurisdiction of the marine affairs and fisheries sector, 
distributed over three levels of administrations, consists of 7 sub-sectors. These are the 
marine, coastal, and small islands affairs, marine fisheries management, aquaculture, 
marine and fisheries monitoring and surveillance, processing and marketing of the fish 
products, fish quarantine, seafood quality control and safety, and human resources 
development.  
It is important to note that the term ‘fisheries’ in Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesia 
Language) literally covers both fisheries and aquaculture, while the terms ‘capture 
fisheries’ or marine fisheries would be used to refer to what ‘fisheries’ usually means in 
academic or international circles. For the purpose of this study, this paper limits the 
analysis of the policy impact generated by the revocation of the municipality/regency 
authority on the marine fisheries sub-sector, and more specifically on boats (5-30 GT) 
operating within the 12 nautical miles. 
This chapter consists of three sections. First, it describes problems that emerged 
during the implementation of the previous regulation of decentralized management 
involving municipality/regency administrations. The second section focuses on the 
direct impacts generated by the authorization of Law No.23 of 2014 regarding fisheries 
management and fishing licensing procedures for fishing boats (5-30 GT) operating 
within 12 nautical miles. The last section analyzes the results of the investigation of the 
stakeholders’ attitudes toward the revocation of municipality/regency authority. 
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VI.1. Emerging Problems in Fisheries Decentralization 
In addition to classical problems of Indonesia’s marine fisheries management, 
poor quality of data collection (Yuniarta et al. 2017; Muawanah et al. 2018) and weak 
law enforcement (Heazle and Butcher 2007; Resosudarmo et al. 2009), which fostered 
Illegal, Unreported, and Undocumented (IUU) fishing activities, this paper argues that 
at least four other specific problems plagued the decentralized system: rent-seeking 
behavior, horizontal conflict, slow response due to long and complicated bureaucratic 
procedures, and economic inefficiency. 
First, this paper supports the argument on local governments’ rent-seeking 
behavior (Satria and Matsuda 2004). The ‘freedom’ conferred to them after decades of 
centralized administration (New Order Regime, 1966-1998 period), prompted the local 
governments (municipalities and regencies) to behave in a slightly ‘uncontrolled’ way. 
Most of them focused on achieving local economic growth.  
One of the common practices was to freely give concessions for the exploitation 
of natural resources located within their jurisdiction, including fishing permits. In other 
words, the system endorsed the race to increase local income while, unfortunately, 
mostly ignoring the carrying capacity and the catch limitations set by the higher-level 
administration. At the beginning of local autonomy implementation, it was common to 
see regents or mayors disobeying the governors of their provinces. In other words, as 
stated by Muawanah et al. (2018), the national and provincial governments lacked 
control over the utilization of fisheries resources under municipality/regency 
jurisdictions. 
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Prior to Law No.23 of 2014, municipalities and regencies had the authority to 
confer the Fishing Permit (FP or SIPI) to boats sized between 5 and 10 GT (Table 15). 
While larger boats/vessels (10-30 GT and >30 GT) are forbidden to fish in coastal 
waters (0-4 nm), there is no fishing zone limitation for the smaller boats. For instance, 
a 9 GT purse seiner is allowed to fish beyond the municipality/regency jurisdiction (>4 
nautical miles) where it obtained the Fishing Permit. Consequently, as discussed in the 
Chapter V.2., many of the boat owners took advantage of this situation by downsizing 
their vessels. With a 'smaller' boat size, they did not need to apply for their Fishing 
Permit (FP) to the higher administrations (the province or the central government) 
wielding the right authority for their boats, and which commonly charged higher tariffs 
for fishing permits. Yet, the concerned boat is still permitted to fish on wider fishing 
grounds, beyond the 4 nautical miles. 
The inaccuracy of collected data regarding the size and the productivity 
(catchability) of registered fishing boats led to overfishing and to underestimating 
exploitation levels. The calculation of the Catch per Unit Effort (CPUE) required to 
estimate Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) is an example of how the practice of 
downsizing negatively affected data collection. In the last 3 years (2014-2017), the 
MMAF had to revise the national MSY. 
In addition, many of these boats also held a Fishing Permit (FP) from 
neighboring municipalities/regencies as migrant fishers (nelayan andon). This double 
permit system ignited a horizontal conflict among fishermen. For instance, fishing boat 
‘A’ originally from Regency ‘R’ also holds the Fishing Permit (FP) from the 
Municipality ‘M’ as a migrant fisher. This means that in addition to their local fishing 
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ground located in the Regency ‘R’ jurisdiction, the fishing boat ‘A’ also has the privilege 
to fish temporarily in the jurisdiction of the Municipality ‘M’. This temporary permit 
may last for months and may be conferred by other municipalities/regencies located in 
different provinces, far from the original residence of the migrant fishers. Not 
surprisingly, this ignited feelings of displeasure of local fishermen residing in the 
Municipality ‘M’. This situation frequently led to physically violent disputes among 
them, particularly at sea. The situation got even worse when fishing gear conflict was 
involved. The simple illustration above briefly describes the Muawanah et al. (2018) 
argument on horizontal conflict caused by migrant fishers.  
Lack of control from the higher administration and the need to reduce horizontal 
conflicts were the underlying reasons to re-arrange the distribution of governmental 
authority in fisheries management, resulting in the revocation of municipality/regency 
authority and jurisdiction by Law No.23 of 2014. 
This paper also argues that the previous system generated two additional 
problems: slow responses due to long and complicated bureaucratic procedures, and 
economic inefficiency. 
Despite the decentralized system dividing the authority based on vessel size and 
maritime jurisdiction, this paper argues that Indonesia was conducting a top-down 
approach in managing marine fisheries. Through the MMAF-RI, the central government 
dominates regulation of management measures in each Fisheries Management Area 
(FMA). Those include the enactment of the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) and 
the Total Allowable Catch (TAC), the prohibition of specific fishing gears (mid-water 
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trawler and Danish seine), the fishing zones designation, and the calculation of fishing 
fee tariffs for the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV). 
The MMAF-RI determines the TAC allocation for groups of fish stocks that will 
be distributed to the provincial administrations in an intergovernmental annual forum 
(Forum Komunikasi Pengelolaan dan Pemanfaatan Sumberdaya Ikan/FKPPS, or the 
Communication Forum for Fisheries Resources Management and Utilization). 
Subsequently, the provincial governments use the given TAC to set the number of 
allocated fishing vessels/boats in their jurisdiction (<12 nm). A similar mechanism 
occurs at the regency/municipal level to receive the TAC from their provincial 
administration.  
The top-down approach asserts the central government’s full authority as the 
resource owner. It involves only a few representatives of stakeholders in the decision-
making process. Feedback mostly occurs through various forms of reports, or through 
representatives of the commercial fishing associations in a dissemination forum. 
Consequently, some of the regulations and policies produced by this approach are 
unsuitable to the dynamic conditions of the concerned regions. This often ignites 
displeasure, or even rejection from stakeholders, particularly from the industry.  
The complicated bureaucracy of decentralized fisheries management also 
decelerated decision-making processes and led to overlooking local conditions. The 
generalization of the Basic Fish Price (BFC) or the ex-vessel price as factors entering 
the fishing fee calculation is one of the examples of overlooked local characteristics. 
Decentralized marine fisheries management also induces economic inefficiency 
caused by emerging additional costs, both for the government and the industry. All the 
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procedures necessary to extend the Fishing Permit (FP) for Nationally Registered 
Fishing Vessels (NRFV), for example, are mostly performed by the DGCF of the 
MMAF-RI. They encompass the annual vessel inspection, administrative verification, 
and the Fishing Fee calculation. The industry must front the additional costs to travel to 
or to operate their representative offices in Jakarta, while the MMAF also has to fund 
officials to carry out management functions. As an illustration, the distance between 
Bitung-North Sulawesi as the fishing base for tuna longline fishing in Indonesia EEZ 
Pacific Ocean (IFMA 717), and the MMAF’s headquarter in Jakarta is approximately 
equal to the distance between Denver and Washington D.C. 
Recently, some procedures have been delegated to the MMAF’s fishing ports 
and to the provincial agencies, and an online service has been employed to minimize 
costs, yet the final decision is still exclusively determined by central offices of MMAF-
RI. This mechanism is time-consuming as well as creating economic inefficiency. 
 
VI.2. Direct Policy Impact 
The primary direct policy impact of Law No. 23 of 2014 was the transfer of 
authority regarding commercial fishing licensing services to provincial governments. 
Having their maritime jurisdiction revoked took away the municipalities’ and regencies’ 
authority to issue Fishing Permits for boats with sizes ranging between 5 and 10 Gross 
Tonnage (GT). This implied that boats previously holding Fishing Permits (FP) issued 
by the municipality/regency had to apply or to extend their permit with the provincial 
governments after Law No. 23 of 2014 was authorized. According to Law No.45 of 
2009 concerning Fisheries, any commercial boat fishing in Indonesian waters must hold 
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a Fishing Permit, except for boats smaller than 5 Gross Tons. According to the Indonesia 
Fisheries Statistics, fishing boats sized between 5 and 10 GT represent 65.21% (2015) 
and 64.34% (2016) of the total registered inboard engine fleet obliged to hold Fishing 
Permits (FP). Consequently, on average, the total number of fishing boats managed by 
the provinces was doubled since it increased by more than 117% (Table 15).  
Table 15. Authority and Jurisdiction Distribution based on the Law No.14 of 2014 
 
* 2013 
**2016 
 
The fishing fleet expansion (Table 15) after relicensing had different impacts on 
provinces. For some of them, particularly in the eastern part of Indonesia, where 
municipalities/regencies managed a small number of boats, the impact was low. For 
instance, the province of Papua and West Papua only received 58 and 255 additional 
fishing boats, respectively, a small number in comparison with the fishing fleet of boats 
sized between 10 and 30 GT (Appendix 8) that they previously managed.  
In other provinces, the high number of additional boats potentially posed a 
problem as it heavily outnumbered the existing fleet. West Java Provinces, for example, 
the most populated province in Indonesia, received 4,913 additional boats with sizes 
ranging between 5-10 GT. This number is 77 times higher than the fleet of boats with 
sizes ranging between 10 and 30 GT that they previously managed. Another less 
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extreme example is the East Kalimantan Province with additional 1,751 boats, or more 
than triple their previously managed fishing fleet.  
This situation led to the pessimistic scenario conveyed by opponents of the 
revocation, which had warned that provinces would be overwhelmed by additional 
jurisdiction added to additional tasks, particularly concerning the fishing licensing 
services. Interestingly, provincial government officials also expressed this concern. 
Definitely the provinces cannot cover the additional authority 
over 0-4 mile. Unless there are representatives posted in their 
regencies, or branches of offices, the provinces will not be able 
to perform well the (fishing *ed) licensing services to the 
industry. 
(Anonymous A., 44 years old, Buginese, Deputy Director for 
Fisheries Management Evaluation, DGCF-MMAF) 
 
Our province has vast areas, we can’t control the entire area. 
We need the municipality and regency. They know their local 
conditions better  
(Anonymous, 45 years old, Banjarnese, East Kalimantan 
Province) 
 
The second direct impact of Law No. 23 of 2014, economic inefficiency, was 
caused by emerging additional costs for fishing licensing services, both for the industry 
and the provinces. A “regency fishing boat” based in Tegal, a primary fishing base for 
small-scale industrial fishing boats (5-30 GT) of the North Coast of Java, now must 
apply for or extend its Fishing Permit (FP) in Semarang, the capital city of Central Java 
Provinces. For Tegal fishermen, this may not cause a significant problem as Semarang 
is only 160 km (99 miles) away from their base, but the same situation for a Cilacap 
fishermen, another fishing base in Central Java Province located in the South Coast of 
Java facing the Indian Ocean and distant 274 km (170 miles) from Semarang (more than 
5 hours of driving), would bear higher costs. This short description illustrates the 
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diversity of impacts experienced by two different groups of fishermen living in the same 
province. 
So now they (5-10 GT boat owners *ed) have to go to 
Semarang to extend their (fishing *ed) Permit? Hmm, it’s 
costly 
(Anonymous, 39 years old, Javanese, Purse Seine owner based 
in Juwana, Central Java) 
 
Additional costs and time-consuming procedures may have a less significant 
impact on fishermen residing in Java than on their compatriots living in other islands. 
The primary island in the Indonesian archipelago, Java is the smallest of five big islands 
and has better infrastructure to support business. It has a much better transportation 
system and internet connections than the others, crucial to speed up the licensing 
process.  
Unfortunately, provinces located outside Java, particularly in less developed 
eastern Indonesia, do not benefit from similar conditions. For instance, the archipelagic 
province of Maluku has widespread locations of regencies/municipalities under her 
administration. It takes a one-hour flight from Dobo, one of the fishing bases located 
nearby the Arafura Sea, to Ambon, the capital of Maluku. To overcome this issue, the 
Maluku provincial government plans to establish several representative offices in their 
archipelago. Undoubtedly this will escalate management costs a direct impact that will 
be similar to the emerging additional cost of fishing licensing services for the Nationally 
Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV). 
Remember, we’re an archipelagic state with numerous islands 
occupying a vast area. The online system has not worked 
smoothly. The (regency/municipality authority *ed) 
revocation tends to generate higher costs for (licensing *ed) 
administration. 
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(Anonymous, Chairman, of Indonesia Purse Seine 
Association/Himpunan Nelayan Purse Seine Nusantara 
(HNPN)) 
 
The third direct impact is caused by the task adjustment for municipality/regency 
officials. Theoretically, by losing their authority and jurisdiction, the 
municipality/regency governments are regarded as the stakeholders most negatively 
affected. The impact weighs on their daily working activities, particularly those of 
officials of the fishing licensing services and other pertinent affairs. They no longer have 
the authority to issue or extend fishing permits, or to manage small-scale fishing ports. 
Regarding fisheries management, the law limits the municipality/regency authority by 
focusing on empowering local-small fishers and management of the local fish landing 
sites. 
To overcome this situation, most municipality/regency fisheries agencies 
restructured their institution and re-assigned their staff to other sections or divisions, 
such as aquaculture or empowerment of traditional fish processing. The ‘jobless’ staffs 
were rarely transferred to provincial governments because transferring government 
employees is a complicated administrative process, not to mention that concerned 
employees were not always willing to join the new institution located far away from 
their home. On the other side, provincial governments seemed reluctant to accept staff 
transfers, and tended to hire new staff to fill the openings in their representative offices. 
The Maluku Province is a good example. 
Everything is handed over to the province (provincial 
government *ed) including the fish landing sites. We have no 
activities, no work, and no revenues related to fisheries 
management. That’s why we altered our program, expanding 
empowerment. 
(Anonymous, 40 years old, Palembang Municipality officials, 
South Sumatra Province) 
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All my friends were transferred to different sections. We no 
longer deal with (fishing *ed) licensing and (fishing *ed) port 
management. The provincial government will open a new 
office here with their own people (staff *ed). 
(Anonymous, 35 years old, Central Maluku Regency officials, 
Maluku Province) 
 
The last direct impact concerns the irrelevance of a few existing marine fisheries 
management regulations, particularly concerning the fishing fee implementation. 
According to Law Number 33 of 2004 concerning Fiscal Balance, national revenues 
collected from the fisheries sector had to be redistributed as an Inter-governmental 
Transfer Fund, namely the Revenue Sharing Fund (RSF) from the fishery sector.  The 
RSF was to be shared between the central and local governments, with 20% for the 
central government (MMAF) and 80% for local governments, to be equally distributed 
to all regencies and municipalities in Indonesia.  Provincial governments were excluded 
from this redistribution (GOI 2004, Siddik 2007).  
 This paper argues that the distribution formula stipulated by Article 14 d of Law 
Number 33 of 2004 is no longer relevant in the new regulatory framework. National 
fisheries revenues stem from fishing fees paid by Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels 
(NRFV), which are operating in the national maritime jurisdiction, beyond 12 nautical 
miles, and are registered with the central government (MMAF). These vessels mainly 
exploit resources located beyond the local governments’ jurisdiction.  
Also, referring to Law No.23 of 2014 concerning Local Governments, 
municipalities/regencies no longer have authority and jurisdiction over small-scale 
industrial fishing fleet (5-10 GT) management. These boats are now under the 
management of provincial governments, which, most likely, have insufficient funds to 
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manage extra boats. It is, therefore, necessary to amend the law, particularly regarding 
the distribution formula, by including provincial governments in the redistribution of 
fisheries based national revenues.  
Lastly, the existing formula also does not promote equity. Based on the 
aforementioned “equal” RSF distribution formula, landlocked municipalities/regencies 
having no jurisdiction over fisheries resources, such as Depok, Cimahi, and Bekasi, 
receive the same amount of funds as others located in coastal areas adjacent to 
productive fishing grounds, such as Ambon, Bitung, Tual, and Pekalongan. Yet, equity 
does not mean equality, it refers to the fair distribution of overall benefits and costs of 
natural resources’ utilization among sub-groups of the total population (Field 2008). 
Shaffer et al. (2004) define equality as a situation in which everyone has shoes, while 
equity refers to a situation where everyone’s shoes fit. This paper argues that the equal 
distribution of RSF to all municipalities and regencies all over Indonesia is not 
equitable. Moreover, the growing number of municipalities/regencies (457 in 2018 and 
511 in 2014) negatively affects the amounts of annual RSF redistribution.  
Alternatively, regencies and municipalities could be still included in the sharing 
mechanism with a smaller portion than the fund distributed to provinces. However, this 
paper argues that it will complicate the sharing mechanism and will diminish the amount 
of fund shared. First, it is important to notice that the more recipients of the sharing fund 
will lessen the fund that will be distributed. Second, referring to the existing condition, 
some of these municipalities/regencies did not allocate the distributed fund for the initial 
purposes; fisheries resources conservation and fisheries development. This was 
attributed to the small amount of fund distributed. Lastly, as previously explained, an 
 
 
 105 
equal sharing does not represent equity where the landlocked regions receive the same 
amount of fund with the coastal regency/municipality. 
Because natural resources are unequally scattered within a country, assigning a 
proper distribution formula for national revenue collected from natural resources fees is 
harder than stipulating a sharing formula for property-based taxes or personal income 
tax. Even more so when it comes to the marine fisheries sector as the resource is located 
beyond the authority of local governments (12-200 nm). This was the primary reason 
underlying the equal sharing implementation. Another reason came from national 
perception. As an archipelagic country, Indonesia perceives her seas as one entity 
unifying the nation. Therefore, all economic benefits derived from her seas belong to 
the nation as a whole and shall be enjoyed equally by the entire citizenry. 
Several studies analyzing distribution of national revenues deriving from natural 
resources rent favor a proportional distribution based on the derivation basis. This 
means that producer regions shall receive a larger amount of funds than other regions 
located further from the location of the resources. The derivation basis assumes that 
producer regions suffer from the negative externalities generated by natural resource 
extraction. Most of these studies in Indonesia focus on revenue distribution from other 
types of natural resources such as mining and forestry (Alisjahbana 2005, Agustina et 
al. 2012), and they rarely analyze the formula for intergovernmental distribution of 
resource rent from the fisheries sector. 
To determine which regions are impacted by offshore fisheries exploitation 
(beyond 12 nautical miles), it is necessary to perceive the marine fisheries resources as 
one interconnected ecosystem. Although offshore fishing exists beyond the jurisdiction 
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of the local governments, it has economic, biological and social impacts on coastal 
regions. The exploitation of targeted species offshore, to some extent, affects coastal 
species and habitats. Ultimately it has biological impacts on artisanal and small-scale 
coastal fisheries. In addition, offshore fishing also contributes to the local economy 
growth of coastal regions by providing fishing bases (fishing ports, fish processing 
units, and fishermen communities) for the large-scale industrial fishing vessels. In 
summary, coastal regions adjacent to the exploited fishing grounds must be considered 
as the ones impacted. 
This paper argues that the derivation basis implemented in the fisheries sector 
should refer to the exploitation level, or fishing intensity in each Fisheries Management 
Area (FMA). The simplest way is by referring to the number of permitted vessels in 
each FMA, particularly the number of Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV). 
Consequently, the national revenue should be shared proportionally among each FMA, 
based on the exploitation level represented by the number of NRFV in those FMAs 
(Appendix 10). Subsequently, the fund distributed to each FMA will be distributed to 
the constituent provinces located adjacent to them. At this advanced stage, the 
proportional distribution is made based on the number of registered fishing boats (5-30 
GT) managed by each province.  
For instance, the fund attributed to FMA 712 (Java Sea) will be distributed 
proportionally to 8 constituent provinces; Lampung, Jakarta, Banten, West Java, Central 
Java, East Java, Central Kalimantan, and South Kalimantan. The proportional 
distribution depends on the number of fishing boats between 5 and 30 GT managed by 
the concerned provinces. Similar to the FMA 712, the fund attributed to FMA 718 (Aru 
 
 
 107 
Sea, Arafura Sea, and Eastern Timor Sea) will also be distributed proportionally based 
on the number of managed vessels by Maluku, West Papua, and Papua provinces, the 
three constituent provinces of FMA 718. Therefore, although the Arafura Sea is 
predominantly exploited by vessels from Jakarta and other fishing bases in Java, the 
adjacent provinces would be the ones receiving the biggest part of the national fisheries 
revenues stemming from the fishing fees under a proportional allocation. This can be 
considered as a compensation fee for the externalities suffered by the adjacent regions 
of highly exploited fishing grounds.  
With additional funds from the central government, it is expected that provinces 
will abandon the rent-seeking race to increase their local income that was happening 
when the three-level decentralization system was being implemented (Section VI.1). In 
addition, it is also expected that proportional distribution can function as an incentive 
for provincial governments to improve their fisheries statistics, particularly regarding 
registered fishing boat data. In summary, the proportional distribution has the potential 
to contribute to improving the Indonesian marine fisheries management. However, more 
thorough and deeper study is required to assess the possible implementation of this 
proposed formula, particularly in comparing monetary value with the existing one. This 
paper limits itself to delivering the general idea. 
On the other side, proponents of the authority revocation argue that eliminating 
municipality/regency authority would smooth the multi-level governmental 
coordination, while at the same time potentially minimizing the horizontal conflict 
among their regencies. The lack of human resources of municipality/regency 
governments is one reason put forward. Brodjonegoro and Asanuma (2000), also argued 
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that decentralization in Indonesia should be implemented and limited to the provincial 
level, not the municipal/regency level, for reasons of institutional and human resources 
capacity.  
The existing (previous *ed) system is complicated. The 
revocation simplifies the system. 
(Anonymous, 44 years old, Sundanese, Deputy Director for 
Fisheries Management in IEEZ, DGCF-MMAF) 
 
Municipality/Regency infrastructures are not ready yet, and 
the provinces manage the (fisheries *ed) resource better. 
Regencies mostly focus on increasing their local income, 
neglecting the quality of service. 
(Anonymous., 41 years old, Javanese, Researcher at MMAF 
Research Center) 
 
It’s better to hand over the authority to the higher 
administration. Provinces have the potential to minimize the 
horizontal conflict among the regencies, particularly in regard 
to the overlapped fishing grounds in 0-4 miles. 
(Anonymous, 30 years old, Sundanese, Staff at Nizam 
Zachman Oceanic Fishing Port, Jakarta) 
 
The absence of municipal/regency interventions provides more liberty to 
provincial governments in managing the fisheries. Moreover, not only does their 
jurisdiction expand, but also their authority due to the inclusion of 5-10 GT boats. 
Therefore, theoretically, provincial governments have sufficient power to minimize 
potential horizontal conflicts among their regencies. 
The revocation of municipality/regency jurisdiction automatically eliminates the 
overlapped maritime jurisdiction in 0-4 nautical miles. Now all waters within 12 nm are 
controlled by provincial governments. Thus, theoretically it becomes easier for them to 
manage fishing allocations, including for migrant fishers from adjacent 
municipalities/regencies Furthermore, since all fishing licensing procedures for small-
scale industrial fishing boats (5-30 GT) are performed by them, provincial governments 
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have full authority to set the number of fishing permits in their maritime jurisdiction. 
This includes the number of fishing boats for each type of fishing gear. Therefore, it 
also has the potential to minimize fishing gear conflicts. Concentrated public services 
also tend to minimize ‘additional’ costs for the industry. 
The revocation (of municipality/regency authority *ed) 
eliminates the uncertainty in fisheries management. It has the 
potential to reinforce more coordinated (fisheries *ed) 
management. 
(Anonymous, 43 years old, an international NGO, Marine 
Stewardship Council-Indonesia) 
 
I favor the integrated (fishing licensing *ed) services at the 
provincial level. 
(Anonymous, 55 years old, Balinese, Benoa (Bali)-based Tuna 
Longline Fishing Company) 
  
VI.3. Stakeholders Attitude on revoking municipality/regency authority 
Similar to the analysis of increasing fishing fees, the investigation of 
stakeholders’ attitudes about the revocation of municipal/regency authority also focuses 
on three aspects: the agreement level, the acceptability level, and the support level 
(Appendix 2 and 3). However, this investigation excludes the samples collected from 
skippers and crews. Most of them are unwilling to answer questions that, in their 
opinion, are beyond their knowledge and capacity. In fact, most of them have no idea 
about the subject matter behind such questions.  
This condition is attributed to the education level of skippers/crews, half of 
which have only completed elementary school, while only 13% of them completed high 
school. Moreover, they argue that revoking municipality/regency authority in governing 
commercial fisheries in 0-4 nautical miles is a government internal problem that has 
nothing to do with them. 
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Also, as Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV), these skippers mostly 
deal with the central government agency, particularly regarding their Fishing Permit 
(FP) and other pertinent administrative matters, such as submitting fishing logbooks and 
port clearance. In addition, they mostly assume the government to be a single entity and 
not a multi-level administration, so the authority revocation of one level hardly has any 
significant impact on their daily activities. Consequently, the attitude investigation on 
the authority revocation was only conducted on 8 types of stakeholders. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test for three questions investigating the authority 
revocation rejects the null hypothesis. This means that at least one group of stakeholders 
has a different mean value for their answers, and the collected samples are not from an 
identical population (Table 16). Meanwhile, since collected samples are classified as 
ordinal data, the central tendency of the stakeholders’ responses is measured by their 
median (Table 17). 
Table 16. The Kruskal-Wallis test for the collected samples related to the revocation of the 
municipality/regency authority 
  
Q4 
Agreement 
Level 
Q5 
Acceptability 
Level 
Q6 
Support 
Level 
Chi-Square 16.279 20.715 15.156 
df 7 7 7 
Asymp. Sig. 0.023 0.004 0.034 
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Table 17. The Median of the collected samples related to the revocation of the municipality/regency 
authority 
Stakeholders 
Q4 
Agreement Level 
Q5 
Acceptability Level 
Q6 
Support Level 
∑ Resp. Median ∑ Resp. Median ∑ Resp. Median 
Central Govt. 86 3.0 86 3.0 86 3.0 
Fishing Port 87 4.0 86 4.0 86 3.0 
Provincial Govt. 42 3.0 42 3.0 41 3.0 
Regency Govt. 17 2.0 17 2.0 17 2.0 
Crews          
Industry 37 3.0 37 4.0 37 3.0 
Association 12 3.0 12 3.0 12 3.0 
NGO 20 3.5 20 4.0 20 3.0 
Academia 
Research 
28 2.5 28 3.0 28 3.0 
Total 329 3.0 328 3.0 327 3.0 
Notes: 
Likert Score Q4 
Agreement Level 
Q5 
Acceptability Level 
Q6 
Support Level 
1 Disagree Unacceptable Strongly Oppose 
2 Somewhat Disagree Slightly Unacceptable Somewhat Oppose 
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree Neutral Neutral 
4 Somewhat Agree Slightly Acceptable Somewhat Favor 
5 Agree Acceptable Strongly Favor 
 
VI.4.1. Level of Agreement 
For the level of agreement, five of eight groups of stakeholders have neutral 
attitudes. Their median values are 3 on the 5-scale Likert type measurement. Those are 
the central government (MMAF), the provincial government, the Commercial Fishing 
Associations, the NGOs, and academia (Table 17). Predictably, stakeholders 
representing municipal/regency governments, hypothetically the most negatively 
affected stakeholder by Law No.23 of 2014, are the only group with a negative attitude 
(score 2). 
Interestingly, although hypothetically the most benefitted stakeholder, 
provincial representatives also show a neutral attitude. Apparently, additional 
jurisdiction and larger authority does not instantly lead to a strong positive attitude, 
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probably because stakeholders are aware that additional tasks will not come with 
additional supporting budget.  
 
*Notes: 
Y-axis  = Likert Scale (1 to 5) 
X-axis  = Types of Respondents 
Number   = Outliers (marked by respondent number) 
Bold line in bar = Median 
 
Figure 21. Boxplot of the Agreement Level for the Authority Revocation 
 
In addition to the central tendency of the attitudes of each type of stakeholders, 
it is also necessary to notice the range of their responses as portrayed by the boxplot 
(Figure 21). Except for the municipality/regency, each type of stakeholder has a 
dispersed range of answers. The range of the responses collected from central 
government representatives has similar width to the one collected from NGOs, with 
values ranging between 2 and 5, slightly wider than those of fishing port representatives. 
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In contrast, the answers collected from municipality/regency representatives 
cover a shorter range, between 1 and 2. These values are categorized as the 
representation of negative attitudes, or the disagreement about eliminating their 
authority. Another group of stakeholders showing a negative attitude is Academia. 
Meanwhile, the responses collected from provincial representatives have the 
widest range covering the whole spectrum of the Likert-scale. This means that 
provincial stakeholders have a divided and widely distributed attitudes in regard to their 
agreement level on revoking municipal/regency authority. 
Academia’s negative attitude is notable. They strongly disagree with revoking 
the authority, arguing that, due to the jurisdictional area’s characteristics, provincial 
governments will be overwhelmed. They believe provinces will not be able to cover it 
optimally, particularly in regard to the governance of 5-10 GT fishing boats. 
In contrast, the range of vessel owners’ responses indicates a positive attitude. 
They believe accumulating authority at the provincial level is an effort to reduce 
bureaucratic complexity. Although their vessels are registered nationally with the 
central government institution (DGCF-MMAF), these vessels occasionally have to 
moor in fishing ports previously managed by the municipality/regency. Dobo is an 
example of fishing port managed by the regency. This port becomes a temporary fishing 
base for squid jigging vessels from the Nizam Zachman Oceanic Fishing Port (NZOFP) 
during their fishing operations in the Arafura Sea. Authority accumulation at the 
provincial level will liberate the industry from dealing with the multi-level 
administrations regarding their business activities. 
Actually, we don’t have a problem with it (the authority 
revocation *ed), but it seems that it will make things simpler 
and more efficient 
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(Anonymous, Balinese, Indonesia Tuna Longline Association 
(Asosiasi Tuna Longline Indonesia/ATLI)) 
 
It (the authority revocation *ed) accelerates the (fishing *ed) 
licensing process. The provinces have better human resources 
than regencies 
(Anonymous, 29 years old, Javanese, a Fishing Company 
Manager) 
 
In spite of slight differences in their central tendency, the responses collected 
from the central government representatives (MMAF) have a similar range of 
distribution as those of NGOs. Those agreeing to the revocation of municipality/regency 
authority believe that it will smooth governmental coordination, accelerating both top-
down dissemination and bottom-up feedback. On the other hand, similar to academia’s 
argument, those who disagree are also unsure about the provincial governments’ 
capacity to cover additional jurisdiction and authority conferred on them. 
In addition to the central tendency (the median) and the distribution of answers 
portrayed by the boxplot, the composition of the responses is notable. The percentage 
of positive attitudes from central government representatives is identical with those 
from provincial representatives. Meanwhile, although also representing the central 
government, fishing port officials have higher positive attitude (score 4 and 5) 
percentages than their counterparts working in MMAF headquarters. This was prompted 
by the direct impact experienced by those working in the field. 
The revocation (of regency/municipality authority *ed) is 
good. Now the regents and the mayors cannot disobey their 
governor anymore. It eliminates the existence of ‘small kings’ 
in the regencies. 
(Anonymous, 43 years old, Javanese, Head of Fishing Port 
Deputy for Port Development, Nizam Zachman Oceanic 
Fishing Port, Jakarta) 
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Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders 
1. Central Govt 4. Regency Govt 7. Association 
2. Fishing Port 5. Crews/Skippers 8. NGO 
3. Provincial Govt 6. Industry (Owners) 9. Academia Research 
Notes 
Scale Color Color Interpretation 
1  Blue Disagree 
2  Green Somewhat Disagree 
3  Grey Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4  Purple Somewhat Agree 
5  Yellow Agree 
 
Figure 22. Sample Distribution of Agreement Level on the Authority Revocation 
 
Meanwhile the sum of negative attitudes from municipality/regency 
stakeholders, marked by score of 1 (disagree) and 2 (somewhat disagree), reached 
76.5%, the highest among all stakeholders. The distribution of answers from provincial 
representatives is interesting as well. Those having a positive attitude (agree and 
somewhat agree) and those opposing it (disagree and somewhat disagree) are nearly 
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equal with 40% and 43% respectively. As previously mentioned, provincial 
representatives have a divided attitude on the revocation supposed to benefit them. 
Figure 22 shows the balanced frequency of their responses underpinning the previous 
statement derived from the boxplot (Figure 21). 
 
VI.4.2. Level of Acceptability 
 The central tendency of stakeholders’ acceptability level is no different than the 
central tendency of their agreement level. The median values are almost exactly the 
same except for the industry and NGOs (Table 17). Along with fishing port 
stakeholders, both the industry and NGOs indicate positive attitudes (score 4). Other 
types of the stakeholders remain neutral (score 3). Meanwhile, the municipality/regency 
remains the only type of stakeholder with a negative attitude regarding their level of 
acceptability. 
The neutral acceptability level most likely was caused by the minimum or no 
impact that will be experienced by the concerned stakeholders. For instance, revocation 
of municipal/regency authority does not add or eliminate existing jurisdiction or 
authority to central governments.  
Meanwhile, the positive attitude manifested by the (strong) acceptability is owed 
to the belief that eliminating municipality/regency authority simplifies bureaucratic 
procedures. As central government employees posted in the field, most fishing port 
officials must coordinate with two levels of administration in their daily activities. 
Therefore, the authority revocation of one administrative level leads to a reduction of 
their tasks. 
The authority revocation simplifies the bureaucracy, and it 
accelerates the dissemination of regulations and policies. 
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(Anonymous, 56 years old, Javanese, Head of harbor master in 
Nizam Zachman Oceanic Fishing Port, Jakarta) 
  
A similar situation occurs with the industry stakeholders, who trust that 
simplified bureaucracy has a positive impact on commercial fishing businesses, 
resulting in slightly positive attitudes in regard to their acceptability level. 
It (the revocation of regency/municipality authority *ed) 
makes the (fishing *ed) licensing process simpler, more 
efficient. 
(Anonymous, Balinese, a Benoa Port (Bali)-based fishing 
company owner) 
 
 The ranges of responses from each type of stakeholders in regard to their 
acceptability level (Figure 23) are also almost identical with their agreement level 
(Figure 21). It is important to notice that the range of the answers from provincial 
stakeholders previously covering the whole spectrum of the Likert-scale on their 
agreement level is reduced. Here their values range between 3 and 5, indicating positive 
attitudes.  
In contrast, the range of responses from the municipality/regency stakeholders 
widens. Their answers are not exclusively concentrated in the negative attitude spectrum 
(score 1 and 2 on the 5-point scale of the Likert-type measurement) but widen slightly 
to the neutral spectrum (score 3). This means that, regardless of their (strong) 
disagreement, the attitude of municipality/regency stakeholders softens in regard to their 
acceptability level. Arguably this is the result of the binding power of the authorizing 
regulation. As the second highest regulation in Indonesia’s law hierarchy, it would 
require a long effort to amend Law No.23 of 2014, and the amendment also would have 
to be approved by the DPR, Indonesia’s legislative branch. Therefore, these 
stakeholders might have limited options other than acceptance. However, the mean 
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value of their attitudes remains in the negative zone (score 2) and can be considered 
their true opinion regarding their acceptability level. 
 
*Notes: 
Y-axis  = Likert Scale (1 to 5) 
X-axis  = Types of Respondents 
Number   = Outliers (marked by respondent number) 
Bold line in bar = Median 
 
Figure 23. Boxplot of the Acceptability Level for the Authority Revocation 
 
Similar to their median value, the range of responses from vessel owners stays 
in the positive range. It has exactly the same range of answers as NGOs. Meanwhile, 
the distribution width of academia’s answers, previously in (strong) disagreement on 
authority revocation, slightly reduces. None of their responses fall into the weakest 
acceptability. Their softening attitude is presumably caused by the absence of impact 
they will experience. 
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Central government representatives, MMAF and fishing ports, have slightly 
different ranges of distribution. The fishing port representatives have a narrower 
distribution of responses, leaning more towards a positive attitude, than their 
headquarters counterparts. 
 
Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders 
1. Central Govt 4. Regency Govt 7. Association 
2. Fishing Port 5. Crews/Skippers 8. NGO 
3. Provincial Govt 6. Industry (Owners) 9. Academia Research 
Notes 
Scale Color Color Interpretation 
1  Blue Unacceptable 
2  Green Slightly Unacceptable 
3  Grey Neutral 
4  Purple Slightly Acceptable 
5  Yellow Acceptable 
 
Figure 24. Sample Distribution of the Acceptability Level on the Authority Revocation 
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The sum of negative attitudes from municipality/regency representatives for 
their acceptability level is lower than their agreement level, declining from 76 % to 70% 
(Figure 24). The graphic portraying the composition of the answers illustrates the 
softening negative attitudes of municipality/regency stakeholders. 
Figure 24 also illustrates the divided attitudes of provincial representatives 
towards acceptability. As with their agreement level, opposing attitudes have similar 
values. This time, the positive attitudes (score 4 and 5) slightly outweigh the negative 
ones by 45% compared to 43%. There is an approximate 5% increase of positive 
attitudes, due to the slight reduction of the distribution range. The result also indicates 
that provincial representatives have a balanced attitude regarding their level of 
acceptability, the same as MMAF representatives, whose positive attitudes only 
outweigh the negative ones by a very small margin: 42% against 38%. These divided 
attitudes are due to opposing predictions about the future impact of this revocation, 
which oscillate between increased coordination of multi-level administrations and 
provincial governments (in) capability to address it. 
Regardless their revoked authority, we still should involve the 
municipality/regency. Otherwise, they will ‘clean their hands 
up’, ignoring every program we make. 
(Anonymous, 41 years old, Assistant Deputy Director for 
fishing licensing services, MMAF) 
 
 
VI.4.3. Level of Support 
 The central tendency of stakeholders’ level of support indicates almost identical 
values. The median values from each type of stakeholder is uniformly neutral (score 3), 
except for municipality/regency stakeholders (Table 17). Not surprisingly, as the most 
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negatively affected stakeholders, municipality/regency representatives consistently 
retain their negative attitudes. 
 The range of responses from each type of stakeholder becomes smaller 
compared to the range of response from previously investigated attitudes (level of 
agreement and level of acceptability), slightly accumulating in a specific area of the 
Likert-scale spectrum (Figure 25). The attitudes of central government representatives 
are still divided between the revocation supporters and those opposing it with their 
respective arguments. Meanwhile, the fishing port officials remain in a positive attitude. 
The workplace location apparently also affects their favorability in regard to specific 
matters. Presumably this was resulted from perceived task reductions. 
Provincial representatives’ divided attitude is also reflected in their level of 
support. This time, the range of their answers is identical to that of their counterparts 
from the MMAF headquarters and academia. The values cover both the negative attitude 
(score 2) and the positive one (score 4).  
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*Notes: 
Y-axis  = Likert Scale (1 to 5) 
X-axis  = Types of Respondents 
Number   = Outliers (marked by respondent number) 
Bold line in bar = Median 
 
Figure 25. Boxplot of the Support Level for the Authority Revocation 
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In addition to the distribution of these answers, the supporting reasons are 
noteworthy. Those with a positive attitude can be considered satisfied with the 
additional jurisdiction and authorities (for the provincial representatives), or with the 
small reduction of tasks (for the central government representatives including the 
fishing port officials), while the negative attitude mostly stems from the awareness of 
the challenges that provincial governments might face in order to handle their new 
jurisdiction, and the added complexity. This includes a limited available budget for 
workload increases. For instance, the East Kalimantan province previously managed 
approximately 544 fishing vessels ranging between 10 GT and 30 GT, and now has to 
manage 2,295 fishing boats, including 5-10 GT boats. Similarly, with fishing port 
management, provincial governments now have to allocate a budget to insure small-
scale fishing ports and landing sites operability which was previously managed and 
funded by municipal/regency governments. 
The sum of negative attitudes from municipality/regency stakeholders towards 
support is lower than their agreement and acceptability level, at only 65% (Figure 25). 
At the beginning, the municipality/regency representatives strongly disagree about the 
revocation of their authority and jurisdiction. Their negative attitude softens at the 
acceptability level and softens even more when it comes to their support, or resistance 
level. This indicates that regardless of their strong initial rejection, the 
municipality/regency representatives gradually soften their ‘resistance’. 
 
Of course, I strongly disagree and cannot accept it. If 
everything is handed over to the province, what are our jobs 
then? But if it has already been decided, what can I do? 
(Anonymous, 38 years old, Javanese, Pekalongan Regency, 
Central Java) 
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 Provincial representatives continue to show divided attitudes in regard to their 
level of support, with identical 41% and 41% for negative and positive attitudes 
respectively, reflecting once again the undecided attitude of the group, regardless of the 
narrowing range of responses.  
 
Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders 
1. Central Govt 4. Regency Govt 7. Association 
2. Fishing Port 5. Crews/Skippers 8. NGO 
3. Provincial Govt 6. Industry (Owners) 9. Academia Research 
Notes 
Scale Color Color Interpretation 
1  Blue Strongly Oppose 
2  Green Somewhat Oppose 
3  Grey Neutral 
4  Purple Somewhat Favor 
5  Yellow Strongly Favor 
 
Figure 26. Sample Distribution of the Support Level on the Authority Revocation 
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Meanwhile, the sum of positive attitudes (score 4 and 5) from central 
government representatives, including fishing port officials, slightly outweighs their 
neutral attitudes. Despite an initial neutral position, central government stakeholders 
eventually manifest a slight support for the revocation of the municipal/regency 
authority. Also, those believing in the simplification of bureaucratic procedures 
outnumber the pessimist group.  
NGO and academia responses provide interesting findings. These two groups of 
stakeholders, regarded as highly educated, have opposite responses in regard to the three 
investigated aspects. The sum of the positive attitudes from NGOs always decisively 
outnumbers the negative attitudes, indicating higher agreeability, acceptability, and 
support of the revocation of municipal/regency authority. Academia, on the other hand, 
leans toward the opposite direction. Regardless of the neutral tendency indicated by the 
median measurement, academia’s negative attitudes are always higher than the positive 
ones, yet with margins of differences smaller than those of NGOs, indicating a slight 
disagreeability, less acceptability, and a slight resistance towards the revoked authority. 
Presumably, they believe that small-scale coastal fisheries (5-10 GT) should be 
managed by the local or the nearest administration. 
In summary, municipality/regency representatives retain as the only stakeholder 
conveying a negative attitude towards the revocation of their authority and maritime 
jurisdiction. Interestingly, although regarded as the most benefitted stakeholder, 
provincial representatives indicate diverse and balance responses, resulting in a neutral 
attitude. 
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The Pairwise test was conducted on median values of governmental 
respondents; central government (Group 1) vs provincial government (Group 3), and 
provincial government (Group 3) vs municipality/regency governments (Group 4). As 
mentioned in Chapter III.6.2.4., this test aims to compare whether these groups of 
stakeholders have a median that is different significantly. 
The result indicates that there is no significant difference of median between the 
central government and provincial governments, neither is between provincial and 
regency/municipality for three investigated aspects on the authority revocation 
(Appendix 9). This means that the attitudes of governmental representatives toward the 
authority revocation are not significantly different. 
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CHAPTER VII  
POLICY ANALYSIS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT COMMISSION IN INDONESIA 
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AREA (FMC-IFMA) 
 
 
 
VII.1. Background 
On January 2015, the president of the Republic of Indonesia issued Presidential 
Regulation No.2 of 2015 concerning the Middle-Term National Development Plan. The 
plan specifies the national guidelines for Indonesia’s development policy for the 2015-
2019 period. One of the policies pertinent to the fisheries sector is the mandate to 
develop the institutional framework and cooperation scheme for managing 11 Indonesia 
Fisheries Management Areas (IFMAs). Furthermore, the plan also mandates that the 
future regulation and institutional framework of marine fisheries management shall 
directly involve all stakeholders in each IFMA for sharing the responsibility in 
conserving and managing fisheries resources located across the administrative 
jurisdiction. 
Responding to the Presidential Regulation mentioned above, the Ministry of 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries Republic of Indonesia (MMAF-RI) issued the Ministerial 
Strategic Plan for the 2015-2019 period as enacted by Ministerial Decree 
No.25/PERMEN-KP/2015. This decree assigns the policies and actions that shall be 
taken by the MMAF-RI to execute the national development plan stipulated by the 
president.  One of the highlighted actions mandated in the Strategic Plan is the 
establishment and operationalization of the regional management institution in all 
IFMAs. 
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Following those regulations, the Directorate General of Capture Fisheries 
(DGCF) as the agency (echelon 1) under the MMAF-RI that is responsible for marine 
fisheries governance in Indonesia has been convening several national level meetings 
since 2015. The purpose of these meetings is to finalize the establishment of the regional 
marine fisheries institutions. The discussions involved representation from nearly all the 
Indonesia marine fisheries stakeholders such as the representatives from the provincial 
governments, industry representatives (Commercial Fishing Associations), the 
Indonesian Navy, academicians, independent research centers, universities, and 
environmental NGOs. Eventually, on June 22, 2017, the Fisheries Management 
Commission in Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (FMC-IFMA) was established 
based upon the Director General’s (DG)’s decree No.47/KEP-DJPT/2017. The decree 
assigns the tasks and functions, and the membership apportionment of the FMC-IFMA. 
As previously mentioned in Chapter I, this paper argues that the formation of 
FMC-IFMA can be considered as an attempt to implement federalism in Indonesian 
marine fisheries management. Referring to Juda (1993) and Bauer et al. (2018), the 
designated geographical areas are initially located in the national jurisdiction; 12 to 200 
nautical miles (nm). Meanwhile, the two level of administration are represented by the 
central government (the national level) and the provincial governments (the sub-
national level). 
In addition to the general research question discussed in each chapter-- the 
impacts on the existing marine fisheries management in Indonesia-- two questions also 
emerge from the establishment of this commission. First, does the FMC-IFMA meet the 
objectives mandated in the middle-term national development plan (Presidential 
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Regulation) and the Ministerial Strategic Plan? Second, to what extent will the 
commission perform fisheries co-management? 
This chapter assesses the establishment of the FMC-IFMA focusing on the legal 
basis, the tasks and functions, and the apportionment of the commission’s membership. 
Subsequently, this chapter also examines the characteristics of fisheries co-management 
that most likely will be performed by FMC-IFMA based upon the typology proposed 
by Sen and Nielsen (1996). To support the policy analysis, this chapter also portrays the 
results from the investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes concerning the establishment 
of the FMC-IFMA. Finally, based on the results of the policy analysis, this chapter 
proposes some recommendations for the FMC-IFMA. 
 
VII.2. Brief Description of FMC-IFMA 
The official name, as stated in the DG Decree No.47/KEP-DJPT/2017, is the 
Fisheries Managers in the Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (IFMA). The decree 
specifically establishes a Fisheries Management Commission (FMC) in each IFMA. 
The commission (FMC-IFMA) consists of representatives from the central government 
(MMAF-RI), representatives from each adjacent or constituent provinces, the 
coordinator of the secretariat in each IFMA, the scientific panel coordinator, and the 
consultative panel coordinator. The existence of this commission is regarded as the new 
model for Indonesia and becomes the main feature from the newly established regional 
fisheries management institution.  
The decree established eleven commissions based upon the amount of FMA. 
Similar to the US Regional Fishery Management Council (RFMC) system, each 
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commission bears the name of their concerned management area. FMC-IFMA 718, for 
example, will be responsible for IFMA 718 encompassing the Aru Sea, the Arafura Sea, 
and the Eastern Timor Sea. 
Initially, the commission will be established gradually starting from the FMC-
IFMA 718. Afterward, all commissions are expected to be fully operationalized in 2020 
(Fig.27). However, the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Republic of Indonesia 
demanded an acceleration on their establishment to meet the national development plan 
enacted by the president; direct involvement of all stakeholders in each IFMA for 
sharing responsibility in conserving and managing fisheries resources located across the 
administrative jurisdictions 
 
Figure 27. The Roadmap for the establishment of FMC 
Source: National Meeting for the Initiation of FMC 2016 
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Table 18 summarizes the jurisdictional areas and the constituent provinces in 
each IFMA, complemented by their annual production and estimated Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY) in 2016 and 2017. The IFMA 712 encompassing the Java Sea 
that has been the primary fishing ground in Indonesia for years becomes the largest 
producer. Furthermore, along with IFMA 571 (Malacca Straits and the Andaman Sea), 
the 712 is also the most exploited IFMA. Meanwhile, IFMA 713 covering Makassar 
Strait, Gulf of Bone, Flores Sea, and the Bali Sea is the FMC having the largest number 
of the constituent provinces (10 provinces). Conversely, the IFMA 571, 717 and 718 
have the smallest members with only three constituent provinces each. 
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Table 18. The Summary of the FMC-IFMA 
 
Source: MMAF (2013), MMAF (2016), MMAF (2017) 
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VII.3. Legal Basis 
 
 Although essentially the establishment of the FMC-IFMA was mandated by the 
higher laws. Eventually, it is the DG’s decree No.47/KEP-DJPT/2017 that legally assign 
the tasks, the functions, and the apportionment of commission’s membership. The 
decree assigns the composition of fisheries managers in each IFMA supplemented by a 
long list of names and/or positions for the scientific panel, the consultative panel, three 
working groups, and the supporting team. The decree only assigns the tasks and the 
functions of the commission in general, without specifying it in detail (Chapter VII.4).  
 According to Law No. 12 of 2011, the hierarchy of the Indonesia’s laws consists 
of 7 tiers/levels. The 1945 Constitutional Law, as the fundamental law, is the highest 
level (1st tier) of the laws. It is followed by the MPR (People Consultative Assembly)’s 
Decree, the National Laws (Undang-undang), the (Central) Government Regulations, 
and the Presidential Regulation respectively. Along with the Provincial Government 
Regulations, the Ministerial Decree is in the lower level than the laws or statutes 
mentioned previously; the 6th tier.  Meanwhile the Regency/Municipality Regulation is 
the lowest level, the 7th tier (Fig.28). 
 Although it regulates the general affairs such as education or public health, the 
authority of the Local Government Regulations (the provincial and the 
regency/municipality regulations) is limited by the administrative jurisdiction of the 
concerned regions issuing the laws/regulations. Conversely, the authority of the 
Ministerial decrees encompasses the national jurisdiction but is limited to specific 
technical matter regulated by the concerned ministries. To address more specific and 
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technical issues, most of the ministry also assigns some regulations based upon the 
Director General (DG) Decree, the highest bureaucratic position under the minister. 
 
Figure 28. Indonesia Law Hierarchy 
 
 Referring to this brief explanation of the Indonesia law hierarchy, this paper 
argues that the establishment of FMC-IFMA has a weak legally binding power. 
Consequently, this condition will affect the future performance of the concerned 
institution. 
Most of the personnel commissioned in the FMC-IFMA are provincial 
government employees. On average, 57% of each FMC-IFMA is officials from the 
provincial fisheries agencies (Chapter VII.5). The number is almost double the central 
government (MMAF-RI) representatives (table 21). Similar to the composition of the 
commission membership, the provincial agency officials also dominate the composition 
of the three working groups in each FMC-IFMA. 
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In the decentralized governmental system, the provincial government employees 
are hired and paid using the annual fiscal budget of the concerned provinces. Moreover, 
the officials are also commissioned based upon the provincial regulation or the 
Governor’s decree. Therefore, it is likely that these officials tend to put their loyalty to 
the regulations, or the assignment issued by their own offices. In contrast, the DG decree 
as the more specific and technical regulation has much less legally binding power over 
the officials working outside the concerned institution; the Directorate General of 
Capture Fisheries (DGCF). Therefore, it is hard to expect that the representatives from 
the constituent provinces will work optimally in the commission and its supporting 
bodies such as the working groups.  
Although it has been disputed by the official responsible for the establishment 
of the commissions, this paper argues that the FMC-IFMA is the Indonesian version of 
the US Regional Fishery Management Council (RFMC) system. Therefore, it is 
necessary to take the lesson learned from the existence of the RFMC in regard to the 
legal basis underlying its establishment. 
The formation of the RFMC was mandated by the Magnusson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (generally known as the Magnusson-Stevens Act 
(MSA)), the highest public law after the constitutional law in the US law hierarchy. 
Certainly, it has very powerful legal base in binding the council’s elements. The 
constituent states have no reason to refuse to participate in the council process. In fact, 
most likely these states are delighted for the privilege conferred to them to participate 
in managing the natural resources that intrinsically are located in the federal 
government’s jurisdiction (3-200 nautical miles). Subsequently, a similar situation 
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occurs in the other elements of the council; the industry and the other interests’ 
representatives. They are conferred, by strong legally binding power, the opportunity to 
participate in conserving and managing the publicly-owned resources. 
The DG decree also has a bright side. As a regulation stipulating the more 
specific and technical matters, it has more flexibility than the higher laws. The Director 
General has more liberty in amending or altering his/her own decree. As long as the 
decree does not violate the higher statutes or regulations, and is officially reported to 
the minister, an amendment of the DG’s decree may proceed. 
In order to adjust to a situation in which the provincial governments 
representatives dominate the commission (will also be discussed in Chapter VII.5), it is 
necessary to strengthen the legally binding power of the regulation mandating the 
formation of the FMC-IFMA. Not only is it for the effectiveness of commission’s 
function but also for its sustainability. A weak legal binding power has a potency to 
make the provincial representatives to disregard the tasks assigned to them. As a result, 
this potential situation affects negatively the futures performance of the newly 
established institution. 
In regard to strengthening the legal base, this paper partially supports Muawanah 
et al’s (2017) recommendation for a gradual reinforcement; from the issuance of the 
ministerial decree to the inclusion of the FMC-IFMA into the proposed national 
fisheries law amendment. However, this paper argues that reinforcement of the legal 
base should be executed as soon as possible without waiting until the commission runs 
smoothly. Without a stronger legally binding power, these newly established 
commissions will most likely not be able to be operationalized. Indonesia fisheries 
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stakeholders should have taken faster actions in gaining the momentum. 2019, as the 
political year in Indonesia (the presidential and the legislative elections), provides a 
great opportunity for them to propose a national fisheries law amendment.  
In the short term, it is necessary to upgrade the underlying legal base to a slightly 
higher level of the Indonesia law hierarchy. A ministerial decree as a statute having 
national jurisdiction concerning technical matters is sufficient to act as the legal base 
for the formation of FMC-IFMA. Furthermore, a ministerial decree must also assign 
more specific rules stipulating all aspects related to the commission, similar to what had 
been stipulated by the MSA for the US RFMC system. These specific rules should 
encompass detailed tasks and functions of the commissions (including the supporting 
bodies; scientific panel, consultative panel, and working groups), source of funding for 
operational costs, benchmarks for setting up fisheries management plans, and the 
decision-making procedures An exemption may occur for the list of the assigned 
members of the scientific panels, the consultative panel, and the three working groups. 
Preferably, it is better to keep the list under the DG’s decree that will leave more space 
for future adjustment  
In summary, national fisheries law needs only to stipulate the principles and 
framework. Meanwhile, the operational details will be regulated by the ministerial 
decree and director general’s decree. The last one should only focus on the list of 
commission’s members. 
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VII.4. Tasks and Functions 
The DG’s decree only states the tasks and the functions of the commission 
generally and briefly as follows: 
To coordinate the implementation and evaluation of 
fisheries management, and to prepare the 
recommendations for fisheries management in Indonesia 
Fisheries Management Area (IFMA) based on their 
jurisdiction. 
 
From the excerpt above, it can be assumed that the decree emphasizes the task 
and function of the commission to be the implementation and evaluation of fisheries 
management. Presumably, this is related to the newly authorized Fisheries Management 
Plan (FMP) for each IFMA in recent years. Therefore, the development of FMPs is not 
prioritized. The next assigned task is to prepare recommendations for fisheries 
management. However, there is no further explanation regarding the definition and the 
types of recommendations that must be prepared and be submitted to the minister. 
In addition to the FMC-IFMA or the commission, there are three other bodies 
that have their tasks and function assigned by the DG’s decree. Those are the Chair of 
the Fisheries Managers of IFMA, the Secretariat, and the Supporting Team. Like the 
commission, the DG’s decree does not specify the tasks and the functions of other 
supporting bodies in each FMC-IFMA such as the scientific panel, the consultative 
panel, and the working groups. 
The Secretariat of the Fisheries Managers of IFMA is comprised of four 
directors (Echelon II) and one deputy director from the DGCF. Their role is to 
coordinate and to review the recommendations prepared by each FMC-IFMA. The 
Director General of Capture Fisheries as the chair of the Fisheries Managers in IFMA 
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is tasked to formulate these reviewed recommendations. Eventually, it is the minister of 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries who has the authority to authorize the recommendations 
for the Fisheries Management Plan (FMP) in each IFMA. 
Finally, the tasks and functions of the supporting team are to assist the 
implementation and evaluation of the fisheries management conducted by the FMC-
IFMA. There are eleven members of the supporting team, one for each FMC-IFMA.  
Limited description of the task and function of the commission generates 
vagueness and a wide-open space for interpretation. Regardless of its obscurity, this 
paper classifies the tasks of the commission into two main parts. First, the commission 
shall implement and evaluate the fisheries management in their jurisdiction. Second, the 
commission shall prepare the policy recommendation draft for the FMP in their area. 
An ambiguity emerges in regard to the first task of the commission due to the 
opposing nature of implementation versus evaluation of fisheries management. It is hard 
to imagine one institution can carry out, while at the same time evaluate the management 
measures. 
This ambiguity also generates several questions pertinent to the mandated task. 
First, to what extent is the commission given authority to perform management? 
Subsequently, what types of management measures can be carried out by the FMC-
IFMAs in their areas of jurisdiction? Is the commission given authority to enforce the 
existing limited entry regime for the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV), 
such as providing services for the Fishing Permit (FP) extension? Or does the 
commission merely act as the evaluator or the analyst reporting on the implementation 
 
 
 140 
of fisheries management based upon data provided by the working groups? Based on 
field observations conducted during this study, the latter option tends to be true. 
The second task, to prepare a draft policy recommendation, is also marked by 
vagueness. The decree does not specify in detail the definition and type of 
recommendation required. Does the draft exist in the form of the amended Fisheries 
Management Plan (FMP)? Or it is just merely a recommendation concerning more 
specific information such as the estimated Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) for a 
certain species or group of species in the commission’s area of jurisdiction? If the 
answer is the latter, then there will be an overlapping function between the FMC-IFMA 
and the already existing national commission for the Stock Assessment (the 
Komnaskajiskan), a recommending body for the minister responsible for the assessment 
of the stocks as stipulated in Article 7 (4) of Law 45/2009 concerning the Fisheries 
One thing is sure, the second task mandated for the commission is only the first 
stage of the decision-making process. As previously described, the draft policy 
recommendations prepared by the commission shall be reviewed by the Secretariat in 
the central government comprised of four directors from the DGCF-MMAF. 
Subsequently, the reviewed draft shall be formulated by the Director General of Capture 
Fisheries as the Chair of the Fisheries Managers before being submitted to the minister 
for approval. In summary, the decision-making process still features a long bureaucratic 
mechanism and almost exclusively involves government representatives. 
Drawing on the previous brief description, it can be assumed that the existence 
of the FMC-IFMA initially is an attempt to perform a bottom-up approach where the 
decision-making process is started from the lower level of administrations or regions. 
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Sen and Nielsen (1996) classified this approach as the advisory or the informative in 
their typology of co-management arrangements.  However, it is also necessary to 
consider the level of user participation in the decision-making process of the 
commission. This process is almost fully dominated by the government representatives. 
In light of this reality, it is hard to accept the classification (of co-management) 
mentioned previously. 
According to Jentoft (1989), the level of user involvement in the decision-
making process is one of four factors affecting the legitimacy of the regulatory scheme. 
In addition, full participation of affected individuals was one of eight principles for 
successful cooperative common-pool resources (CPR) management (Ostrom 1990). 
Lacking these two principles was the primary shortcoming of FMC-IFMA to classify it 
as a scheme of fisheries co-management. 
Although arguably it is too early to evaluate the performance of the commission, 
this paper argues that the function of the FMC-IFMA has been restricted to mere policy 
recommendation drafter. The commissions have very limited authority, or even have no 
authority at all, in the decision-making process. In this case, with an exemption to the 
maritime jurisdiction, the FMC-IFMA has a slightly similar function with the Atlantic 
States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC). Here, the ASMFC drafts 
recommendations regarding the conservation of marine living resources (including 
anadromous fish) of the Atlantic seaboard located in state’ jurisdiction (0-3 miles) to 
the governors and legislators of signatory states (ASMFC 2016). 
Furthermore, other stakeholders’ engagement, particularly the non-government 
representatives, has been marginalized (as only one person is included in the 
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commission) (Chapter VII.5). Therefore, although it can be regarded as a bottom-up 
approach in the co-management arrangement, this paper classifies the FMC-IFMA in 
between the Type A (Instructive) and the Type B (Consultative) fisheries co-
management in the typology presented by Sen and Nielsen (1996). 
Due to the highly limited representation of resource users, it is easily predicted 
that a minimum exchange of information will occur at the commission. Regardless the 
availability of data and information provided by the working groups in each FMC-
IFMA, the first-hand information from users is still regarded as the best available data 
in developing the policy recommendations. The fishing gear conflict between the Big 
Pelagic Purse Seine and the Tuna Longline, and the extensive use of Fish Aggregating 
Devices (FADs) in IFMA 572 is an example of the first-hand information garnered from 
the industry.  
Alternatively, this problem can be resolved by convening a regional public 
hearing. However, referring to field observations, commercial fishing associations have 
already been regarded as the voice of the industry. Therefore, most likely the regional 
public hearings will not be been convened anymore. Consequently, a minimum 
exchange of information will still exist. 
However, although it is very limited, the commissions still provide a small space 
for consulting over or disseminating to users the decision that will be taken by the 
government. In addition, the FMC-IFMA also has a potency to function as the 
communicating forum for the provinces in resolving the potential horizontal conflicts 
that may be caused by migrant fishers (Chapter VI.2). This is also the underlying reason 
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for categorizing the FMC-IFMA as the combination of Type A and Type B of the 
fisheries co-management typology. 
 
VII.5. Membership Apportionment 
In performing their tasks and functions, each FMC-IFMA is supported by one 
secretariat team and two panels; the scientific and the consultative panel (Fig.29). The 
Secretariat team is led by an executive coordinator coordinating three working groups 
(WG); WG for data and information, WG for fisheries management and conservation, 
and WG for control and compliance. Each WG comprises of the representatives from 
the central government (MMAF-RI, mostly from DGCF) and the concerned provincial 
governments (officials from the provincial fisheries agencies).  
 
Figure 29. The Institutional Structure of the FMC-IFMA 
Source: DGCF, 2017 
 
Initially, the executive coordinator position in each FMC-IFMA will be held by 
a professional having extensive experience in marine fisheries management. These 
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professionals will be hired by the MMAF-RI for a specific period. However, eventually, 
the decree assigns the head of the fishing port managed by MMAF-RI located in each 
FMA as the executive coordinator. 
Up to 2016, DGCF of the MMAF-RI managed 23 industrial-scale fishing ports. 
These ports are classified into the Oceanic Class (Type A) and the Archipelagic Class 
(Type B) fishing ports, the two highest categories in Indonesia’s fishing port 
classification. Therefore, intrinsically the executive coordinator in each FMC-IFMA is 
a central government representative. 
As the coordinator of three WGs, the executive coordinator is also a member of 
the commission. This is one of the reasons for commissioning the head of fishing ports, 
mostly echelon II or echelon III in the hierarchy of Indonesia’s bureaucracy, as the 
executive coordinator. S/he is expected to be able to smooth the coordination among the 
working group members representing two different level of administrations and other 
institutions. 
Other reasons are attributed to budget availability and administrative problems. 
So far, the DGCF only allocates relatively small budgets for the FMC-IFMA 
operationalization. Basically, this budget has been distributed to the concerned fishing 
ports and provincial fisheries agencies. However, in several cases, the misuse of budget 
still occurs where either the fishing ports or the provincial agencies use this budget for 
other purposes. 
Small budget allocations are also attributed to the scale of priority in Indonesian 
fisheries development. In recent years, most of the DGCF’s annual budget is allocated 
to infrastructure projects, such as fishing port constructions, the development of the 
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Management Information System (MIS), and of procurement fishing boats. This fund 
is insufficient for the newly established commissions to run their functions, even to 
convene meeting with designated commission members.  
In regard to recruitment of professional candidates, the Indonesian bureaucratic 
system is restricted to hire and to pay a non-government employee for a long-time 
period. Eventually, these problems relate to insufficient budget and administrative 
restrictions prevent professionals from filling executive coordinator positions. On the 
other hand, there is a strong demand from the minister to accelerate FMC-IFMA 
establishment. 
The membership of each Working Group (WG) varies between 9 and 18 
persons, depending on the type of WG and the number of constituent provinces. In total, 
members of WGs in each FMC-IFMA range between 32 and 52 persons. Most WG 
members representing the central government (MMAF-RI) are deputy directors from 
the DGCF, which have job descriptions relevant to the task and function of the 
concerned WGs. The deputy director for fishing vessels and the deputy director for 
fishing gear, for example, are commissioned in the WG for data and information. 
Meanwhile, the deputy director for commercial fishing licensing and fisherman affairs 
is commissioned in the WG for Control and Compliance in each FMC-IFMA. Lastly, 
the number of WG members representing provincial government is correlated to the 
number of constituent provinces in each FMC-IFMA. 
Table 19 summarizes the apportionment of FMC-IFMA membership. The 
Scientific Panel comprises scientists and researchers from four types of institutions: the 
MMAF-RI’s research center, universities, the EAFM learning center, and independent 
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fishery experts. There is no specific formula specifying the number of representatives 
from each research institution 
Referring to the DG decree and interviews conducted during data collection, 
these researchers were assigned in each FMC-IFMA based on their expertise. For 
instance, the small pelagic species researchers from MMAF Research Center are posted 
in FMA 712 (the Java Sea), while those having expertise on big pelagic species are 
assigned in FMA 572 (the Indian Ocean of western Sumatra) and FMA 573 (the Indian 
Ocean of southern Java). In addition, the scientific panel is also fulfilled by academia 
from universities located adjacent to the concerned FMC-IFMA. For instance, two of 
scientific panel member of FMC-IFMA 718 (the Arafura Sea, and the eastern Timor 
Sea) are faculty members of Papua University. 
 
Table 19. The Apportionment of the FMC-IFMA membership 
  
 
The DG Decree No.47/KEP-DJPT/2017 directly appoints the Scientific Panel 
members for each FMC-IFMA. The number varies between 3 and 15 persons. Some of 
Indonesia’s leading fishery researchers are commissioned to be on more than one 
scientific panel. A senior researcher from the MMAF-RI’s research center, for example, 
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is commissioned on two scientific panels of the adjacent IFMAs simultaneously, the 
572 and the 573. The decree also assigns a coordinator for each scientific panel that 
automatically becomes a member of the commission. Interestingly, few researchers 
interviewed have information on their appointment. In fact, it seems that they are 
confused about their task on the commission. 
The Consultative Panel comprising five types of representatives: the commercial 
fishing association, the MMAF-RI representative (Non-DGCF), the head of local 
communities/tribes, the fish processing association, and NGOs (Table 19). The decree 
does not clearly set the number of representatives for each stakeholder type and the 
required criteria to fulfill these positions. Yet the decree appoints a representative from 
the commercial fishing association as the Consultative Panel coordinator. For the 
purpose of the study, this paper assumes that each stakeholder type in the Consultative 
Panel is represented by one person. 
At the end of the field observation for this study, the Consultative Panel of each 
FMC-IFMA still had not been filled. In fact, two important commercial fishing 
associations, the Indonesia Purse Seine Association (HNPN) and the Indonesia Tuna 
Association (ASTUIN), had little knowledge concerning the establishment of the FMC-
IFMA or the existence of the Consultative Panel and the possibility for them to 
coordinate it. 
Regardless of the existence of the Working Groups and the Panels, basically the 
core of the FMC-IFMA is the commission (Fig. 29). The members of this commission 
can be classified into 3 types; the permanent member, the representatives of supporting 
bodies, and the representatives of the constituent provinces. The permanent member is 
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the Secretary of the Directorate General of Capture Fisheries (the Deputy Director 
General) that becomes a member of all FMC-IFMA. S/he is an echelon II official that 
is considered as the 2nd person in command in the DGCF. 
 
 
Figure 30. The Apportionment of the FMC-IFMA membership 
 
The representatives of supporting bodies consist of the Executive Coordinator, 
the Scientific Panel coordinator, and the Consultative Panel coordinator (the 
representative from the commercial fishing association). Meanwhile, the constituent 
provinces are represented by the head of marine affairs and the fisheries provincial 
agency (Fig. 29). Since the head of the provincial agency is categorized as the first 
echelon in the Indonesia bureaucracy hierarchy (higher than the Deputy Director 
General; the echelon II), one of them is appointed as the coordinator in each FMC-
IFMA. Due to the characteristics of the archipelagic State where one province becomes 
the constituent in two or more FMC-IFMA, a province may only coordinate one FMC-
IFMA. 
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Referring to the apportionment described above, the number of commission 
members in each IFMA varies between 7 and 15 persons (Table 20). Once again, the 
number is correlated to the number of constituent provinces. A special composition 
occurs in IFMA 712 covering the Java Sea where additional members representing the 
central government are commissioned. Those are four Deputy Director Generals 
representing other DGs (Agencies) under the MMAF-RI. Presumably, it is related to the 
complexity of fisheries problems in the Java Sea, which has the largest marine fisheries 
production and population of fishermen. 
Table 20. The number of FMC-IFMA personnel  
No. Types 571 572 573 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 Total 
1 
The 
Commission 
7 10 12 11 15 13 9 11 10 7 7 112 
2 
Scientific 
Panel 
3 7 15 3 3 10 8 4 8 5 3 69 
3 
Consultative 
Panel 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 44 
4 
Working 
Group 
32 41 48 45 47 52 38 40 41 32 32 448 
5 
Supporting 
Team 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 
Total 47 63 80 64 70 80 60 60 64 49 47 684 
 
The DG decree also assigns eleven DGCF staff as the supporting team. Each 
person is commissioned specifically in one FMC-IFMA. Their role, as previously 
described, is to assist with implementation and evaluation of fisheries management 
conducted by the FMC-IFMA. 
Due to his/her high workload, it is highly unlikely that the Deputy DG could 
fully perform his tasks and function as the permanent member in each FMC-IFMA. 
Therefore, this paper predicts that the supporting team members will be designees for 
the Deputy DG charged with performing his daily tasks and function in the commission. 
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Interestingly, 9 out of 11 members of the supporting team were previously sent to the 
US to pursue a higher education degree. However, by summer 2018, some of them had 
been posted or promoted in different positions in DGCF, not related with the FMC-
IFMA. 
 
Figure 31. Personnel Composition in each FMC-IFMA 
 
On the subject of membership apportionment, this paper also investigates the 
stakeholder composition in the commission. Following Okey (2003), this paper first 
classifies the stakeholders representing different interests into four categories; the 
central government, the provincial government, the industry (commercial fishing), and 
other interests. Subsequently, the number from each category is calculated and 
converted into a percentage. As predicted, stakeholders representing the provincial 
government’s interests dominated the commission, ranging from 43% (FMA 571) to 
69% (FMA 713). On average, the commission consists of 57% of members representing 
the provincial governments (Table 21).  
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Table 21. The Composition of FMC-IFMA members based on the Stakeholders Interests  
 
 
Although it has been differentiated between the central and the provincial 
government, essentially the commission is still highly dominated by government 
representatives. There is only one person representing the non-government interests on 
the commission; the commercial fishing association representative as the Consultative 
Panel coordinator. Therefore, it is highly unlikely for the commission to meet one of the 
requirements for performing fisheries co-management; equity. 
According to Hanna (1996), equity is one of the outcomes for evaluating 
fisheries-co-management performance. The extent that resources users and other 
stakeholders are represented is one of the elements for measuring equity outcomes. 
Unfortunately, although it can be considered as the simplest measurement, the FMC-
IFMA tentatively fails to meet this objective. Broader stakeholder participation has not 
been accommodated yet, particularly those representing the industry and other interests  
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In addition, it is also necessary to be alerted to the potential impacts caused by 
the domination of a specific stakeholders’ interests in a co-management forum. First, 
the failure to bring diverse points of view into the discussion and the decision-making 
process (Eagle et al. 2003). Second, the resulting policies may only benefit the dominant 
stakeholders (Dell’Apa et al. 2012). 
During the field observations, several interesting findings and perspectives were 
garnered from the short-interviews with industry representatives. Interestingly, several 
government representatives interviewed during the study were less aware of these 
collected findings. For instance, even some field officials in Nizam Zachman Oceanic 
Fishing Port (NZOFP) and in the headquarters of MMAF were surprised when informed 
about the dimensions and the price of Fish Aggregating Devices (FAD) used by Big 
Pelagic Purse Seine based in the Jakarta fishing port.  
Another example is attributed to the distinct point of view of the industry 
concerning transshipment at sea. While most of the government officials consider the 
transshipment prohibition as an effort to deter IUU fishing and to improve data 
collection, the industry views this mechanism not only to overcome the increased 
fishing operational costs but also for preserving the quality of fresh caught tuna. 
Diverse perspectives are absolutely required to resolve the escalating problems 
in Indonesian marine fisheries management. The potential social unrest ignited by the 
increased fishing fee tariff and fishing gear conflict is one of the potential latent 
problems. Other problems that may also evoke social unrest are the prohibition of 
certain types of fishing gear, fishing access limitation, and horizontal territorial conflicts 
ignited by migrant fishers. In addition, the downsized fishing vessels and poor data 
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collection still continuously disrupt the evaluation of the marine fisheries utilization. 
Eventually, it is also necessary to include the conservationists’ point of view regarding 
future management measures that shall be taken for ensuring sustainability. 
Unfortunately, due to very small representation from the other interests on the 
commission, this paper argues that the existing condition of the FMC-IFMA will not be 
able to contribute more in resolving the problems mentioned earlier. Without significant 
alteration of the membership apportionment, it is likely that only minor or even 
unimportant changes can result from the commission in the near future 
However, it also necessary to notice that the addition of FMC-IFMA members 
representing the industry must not decrease or eliminate the existing members, 
particularly those representing constituent provinces. Strengthening the previous 
finding (Chapter VII.3), an amendment and reinforcement of the existing legal base (the 
DG decree) are absolutely required to make this new concept, the marine fisheries 
federalism, works. 
 
VII.6. The Stakeholders Attitude on the establishment of FMC-IFMA 
The investigation of stakeholders’ attitudes regarding the establishment of the 
Fisheries Management Commission in Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (FMC-
IFMA) was conducted on four aspects; the familiarity level, the support level, the 
representativeness level, and the comparison level (Appendix 2 and 3). The first one 
measures the extent of stakeholders’ knowledge of or familiarity with this newly 
established regional institution. The second question investigates the support level, or 
the resistance level from stakeholders concerning the formation of FMC-IFMA. The 
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third question investigates the stakeholders’ attitudes towards the existing FMC-IFMA 
membership apportionment. The last one investigates stakeholders’ attitudes comparing 
the potential FMC-IFMA performance with the existing system. 
Similar to the analysis of the revocation of the municipality/regency authority 
(Chapter VI.3), the analysis in this chapter also excludes the skipper/crew 
representatives. Unwillingness to answer due to their unfamiliarity with the context of 
the questions asked and the respondents’ educational background are the underlying 
reasons for the exclusion. This unwillingness is also attributed to the nature of issues 
that, in their opinion, are beyond their knowledge and capacity. As described in Chapter 
VI.3, this situation is related to the skippers’/crews’ educational level. Moreover, they 
view this issue as the government’s internal problem that has no impact on their daily 
activities. Consequently, similar to the Chapter VI.3., the investigation of the 
stakeholders’ attitude on the establishment of FMC-IFMA was only conducted on 8 
types of the stakeholders. 
Like the previous two investigations, the Kruskal-Wallis test for four questions 
investigating the FMC-IFMA establishment rejects the null hypothesis (Table 22). This 
means that the collected samples are not from an identical population, and at least one 
group of stakeholders has a different mean for their answers (Table 22). Meanwhile, as 
ordinal data, the Central Tendency of the stakeholders’ responses is measured by their 
median (Table 23). 
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Table 22. The Kruskal-Wallis test for the collected samples on the FMC-IFMA establishment 
  
Q7 
Familiarity 
Level 
Q8 
Support 
Level 
Q9 
Representativeness 
Level 
Q10 
Comparison 
Level 
Chi-
Square 
41.366 46.556 29.057 40.947 
df 7 7 7 7 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Stakeholders 
 
Table 23. The Median of the collected samples on the FMC-IFMA establishment 
Stakeholders 
Q7 
Familiarity 
Level 
Q8 
Support 
Level 
Q9 
Representativeness 
Level 
Q10 
Comparison 
Level 
Central Govt. 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Fishing Port 3.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 
Provincial 
Govt. 
3.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 
Regency 
Govt. 
2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Crews         
Industry 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Association 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 
NGO 3.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 
Academia 
Research 
4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Total 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Notes: 
Likert 
Score 
Q7 
Familiarity Level 
Q8 
Support Level 
Q9 
Representativeness 
Level 
Q10 
Comparison 
Level 
1 Not at all Familiar Strongly Oppose Extremely Unlikely Much Worse 
2 Slightly Familiar Somewhat Oppose Unlikely Somewhat Worse 
3 Somewhat Familiar Neutral Neutral About the Same 
4 Moderately Familiar Somewhat Favor Likely Somewhat Better 
5 Extremely Familiar Strongly Favor Extremely Likely Much Better 
 
VII.6.1. Level of Familiarity 
For level of familiarity, five groups of stakeholders exhibited moderate positive 
attitudes (Table 23). Their median values are larger than 3 (somewhat familiar) on the 
5-point Likert type measurement. The exception occurs with the municipality/regency 
and the industry (fishing vessel owners and fishing company representatives). Their 
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median values indicate slight familiarity (or less) with the establishment of the FMC-
IFMA.  
The results also indicate that information regarding the formation of the FMC-
IFMA has not been disseminated optimally, particularly to the industry (vessel owners). 
This can be seen from the gap in the median value between the commercial fishing 
associations and the fishing vessel owners they represent. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that the associations invited to dissemination sessions did not spread the information 
regarding the FMC-IFMA to their members. 
Other types of stakeholders having a negative value (less than 3) on the 
familiarity level are the municipality/regency representatives. Most likely this was 
caused by their non-engagement in the FMC-IFMA. As previously explained (Chapter 
VII.5), this regional fisheries institution only involves representatives from the 
provincial level. 
In addition to the Central Tendency measurement of stakeholders’ attitudes, the 
boxplot portrays the distribution range of their collected responses (Figure 32). Similar 
to the Central Tendency, 5 groups of stakeholders have the same distribution range. The 
exception also occurs in the answers collected from the municipality/regency and the 
industry representatives. Their collected responses range between 1 and 2 on the Likert-
scale, considered as negative attitudes in terms of their familiarity with establishment 
of the FMC-IFMA.  
Meanwhile, the dispersed responses from 5 types of stakeholders ranged 
between 2 and 4 (Fig.32). This means that although their median values represent a 
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positive attitude (score higher than 3), there are parts of these groups still having little 
knowledge of the establishment of the FMC-IFMA. 
 
*Notes: 
Y-axis  = Likert Scale (1 to 5) 
X-axis  = Types of Respondents 
Number   = Outliers (marked by respondent number) 
Bold line in bar = Median 
 
Figure 32. Boxplot of the Familiarity Level for the FMC-IFMA establishment 
 
To support analysis of the central tendency (the median) and the range of the 
collected answers, it is also necessary to observe the composition of the collected 
responses from each type of stakeholder (Fig.33). This graph portrays the declining 
trend of positive attitudes (score 4 and 5) collected from the government representatives. 
Positive attitudes decline as distance from Jakarta increases. This situation supports the 
previous statement concerning the flawed dissemination of information on the FMC-
IFMA. 
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Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders 
1. Central Govt 4. Regency Govt 7. Association 
2. Fishing Port 5. Crews/Skippers 8. NGO 
3. Provincial Govt 6. Industry (Owners) 9. Academia Research 
Notes 
Scale Color Color Interpretation 
1  Blue Not at all Familiar 
2  Green Slightly Familiar 
3  Grey Somewhat Familiar 
4  Purple Moderately Familiar 
5  Yellow Extremely Familiar 
 
Figure 33. Sample Distribution of the Familiarity Level for the establishment of the FMC-IFMA 
 
Figure 33 also shows the magnitude of negative responses from the two types of 
stakeholders having the least knowledge of establishment of the FMC-IFMA. Here 82% 
of the answers from municipality/regency representatives have negative attitudes 
(scores 1 and 2). These values indicate no familiarity and slight familiarity with the 
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FMC-IFMA. The industry representatives occupy second place with 79% [having 
negative attitude].  
Interestingly, half of the collected answers (50%) from the commercial fishing 
associations represent positive attitudes (score 4 and 5). The value is more than two-
times of positive responses collected from the vessel owners that they are representing. 
This indicates their moderate to extreme familiarity with the existence of FMC-IFMA. 
Similar to the findings derived from the Central Tendency (Table 23) and the boxplot 
(Fig.32), apparently dissemination of information stops at the association level. This 
also indicates institutional failure of commercial fishing associations to communicate 
with their members. Therefore, in the future, it will be necessary to directly invite vessel 
owners to dissemination fora to inform them of new regulations or policies pertinent to 
their business. 
 
VII.6.2. Level of Support 
 Interestingly, regardless of their level of familiarity, the Central Tendency for 
the level of support indicates positive attitudes (Table 23). Except for the industry 
representatives, the median of answers from all stakeholders indicates a moderate to a 
strong support (score 4 and 5) for the FMC-FMA formation. Strong support (score 5) 
comes from the fishing ports, provincial governments, and NGO representatives. 
Meanwhile, the central government along with the municipality/regency, commercial 
fishing association, and academia representatives display moderate support (score 4). 
The industry (vessel owners and fishing company representatives) is the only 
stakeholder having a neutral attitude (score 3). 
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Unlike level of familiarity, stakeholders’ level of support is more narrowly 
concentrated on the Likert-scale spectrum (Fig.34). The central government, the fishing 
ports, provincial governments, and the commercial fishing associations have identical 
distribution ranges for their answers. However, both the fishing ports and the provincial 
government representatives have higher ‘mean’ (score 5); represented by the bolder line. 
These results are identical with their Central Tendency (Median).  
 
 
*Notes: 
Y-axis  = Likert Scale (1 to 5) 
X-axis  = Types of Respondents 
Number   = Outliers (marked by respondent number) 
Bold line in bar = Median 
 
Figure 34. Boxplot of the Support Level for the establishment of the FMC-IFMA 
 
The strong support from these 2 types of stakeholders is attributed to their direct 
involvement in the FMC-IFMA. As described in the discussion of membership 
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apportionment (Chapter VII.5), the provincial government representatives and the head 
of the fishing port are the core members of the relevant commission. Most importantly, 
the head of the fishing port acts as the executive coordinator in each FMC-IFMA. 
The most concentrated distribution of answers occurs with the NGOs 
representatives. This indicates the accumulation of strong support from NGOs regarding 
the formation of the commission. Once again, this strengthens the previous result 
derived from their median value.  In contrast, the most dispersed answers occur with the 
municipality/regency representatives. Their answers range from a neutral attitude (score 
3) to a strong positive attitude, or strong support (score 5). Most likely this result was 
correlated with their lower familiarity and their non-involvement in the commission. 
The institution (FMC-IFMA *ed) endorses the more integrated 
(Indonesia *ed) marine fisheries governance. 
(Anonymous, 43 years old, International NGO) 
 
Although rather complicated, the FMC-IFMA provides us the 
opportunity to re-design the FKPPS (the communicating forum 
*ed), and to ‘control’ the provinces. 
(Anonymous, 44 years old, Sundanese, Deputy Director for 
Fisheries Management in IEEZ, DGCF-MMAF) 
 
 
 
 162 
 
Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders 
1. Central Govt 4. Regency Govt 7. Association 
2. Fishing Port 5. Crews/Skippers 8. NGO 
3. Provincial Govt 6. Industry (Owners) 9. Academia Research 
Notes 
Scale Color Color Interpretation 
1  Blue Strongly Oppose 
2  Green Somewhat Oppose 
3  Grey Neutral 
4  Purple Somewhat Favor 
5  Yellow Strongly Favor 
Figure 35. Sample Distribution of the Support Level for the FMC-IFMA establishment 
 
The composition of the responses (Fig.35) strengthens two previous findings 
derived from the median value and the distribution range analysis. Here NGOs have the 
highest level of positive attitudes with 95%, consisting of 75% strong support (score 5) 
and 20% moderate support (score 4). Surprisingly, the commercial fishing associations 
have the second highest level of positive responses. However, moderate support (score 
4) dominates (58%) over strong support (33%).  
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Meanwhile, as predicted, another high level of strong support is reflected in the 
responses from the fishing ports and the provincial government representatives. Their 
strong support percentages (Score 5) are 56% and 55% respectively. These values 
outnumber the strong support responses from their counterparts working in the HQ of 
MMAF. Once again, it is argued that this result is caused by their direct involvement in 
the commission. In contrast, neutral responses dominate (62%) the answers from 
industry representatives, indicating a significant difference from the associations 
representing them. 
 
VII.6.3. Level of Representativeness 
 This section investigates the stakeholders’ attitudes regarding the 
representativeness of the FMC-IFMA membership apportionment. The question is 
asking whether the membership apportionment has represented Indonesian marine 
fisheries stakeholders. The Central Tendency (the median) values are almost identical 
(Table 23). Once again, except for the industry (vessel owners) representatives, all 
stakeholders have identical median value (score 4). This means that most of them 
thought that the existing membership apportionment does indeed represent the marine 
fisheries stakeholders in Indonesia. 
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*Notes: 
Y-axis  = Likert Scale (1 to 5) 
X-axis  = Types of Respondents 
Number   = Outliers (marked by respondent number) 
Bold line in bar = Median 
 
Figure 36. Boxplot of the Likelihood Level for the FMC-IFMA membership apportionment 
 
Although the boxplot shows a slightly wider distribution range, the ‘mean’ of 
the answers reflects identical values (Fig.36). Except for the industry representatives, 
the mean values from the stakeholders’ responses are 4 (the bold line located at the 
center of each bar). Similar to the Central Tendency analysis, this means that most of 
the stakeholders assume that the existing membership apportionment does represent 
them. 
The municipality/regency, industry, and academia have more concentrated 
responses compared to the other types of stakeholders. However, their mean values (the 
bold line) are different. Both the municipality/regency and academia have moderately 
 
 
 165 
positive attitudes on FMC-IFMA membership apportionment, leaving the industry as 
the only stakeholder having a neutral attitude, 
 
Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders 
1. Central Govt 4. Regency Govt 7. Association 
2. Fishing Port 5. Crews/Skippers 8. NGO 
3. Provincial Govt 6. Industry (Owners) 9. Academia Research 
Notes 
Scale Color Color Interpretation 
1  Blue Extremely Unlikely  
2  Green Unlikely  
3  Grey Neutral 
4  Purple Likely  
5  Yellow Extremely Likely  
 
Figure 37. Sample Distribution of the Likelihood Level for the FMC-IFMA membership 
apportionment 
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Similar to the results from the investigation of the level of support, the 
composition of the responses (Fig.37) strengthens two previous findings derived from 
the median value and the distribution range.  This time the NGOs share their position as 
the stakeholder having the highest positive attitudes (accumulation of score 4 and 5) 
with the provincial governments. Their levels of positive attitudes are identical; 75%. 
However, the highest composition for the strongest positive attitudes (score 5) are 
collected from the fishing port representatives. Nearly half of them (47 %) assume that 
the existing FMC-IFMA membership apportionment is extremely likely to represent the 
Indonesian marine fisheries stakeholders. Not surprisingly, this value is followed by the 
provincial government representatives. Most likely, both of them are satisfied enough 
with the existing commission membership apportionment. 
The smallest positive attitude is expressed by the industry representatives. A 
neutral attitude dominates (57%) their responses. Two hypotheses emerge regarding this 
result. First, the industry does not really care about the formation of the new regional 
institution. As with the skippers and the crews, the vessel owners consider this issue as 
an internal governmental affair. Thus, they selected the neutral choice on the Likert-
scale as a reflection of their ignorance, or their disinterest. Second, the industry actually 
is not satisfied with the existing apportionment as they are only represented by one 
person in each commission. However, as typical Indonesians, they keep their 
disagreement silent. Referring to their gestures ‘recorded’ during the short interviews, 
and with the addition from the author’s personal experience, apparently the first 
possibility tends to be true.  
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VII.6.4. Level of Comparison 
 This section investigates the stakeholders’ views comparing the future 
performance of the FMC-IFMA with the previous system. The term ‘the previous 
system’ refers to the status quo situation in which marine fisheries governance runs as 
usual without the existence of the regional fisheries institution. Here, the most positive 
attitude is represented by the belief that the existence of FMC-IFMA will create much 
better marine fisheries governance. In contrast, an assessment of a much worse 
condition constitutes the most negative attitude. 
 The median values of the responses from each stakeholder type are identical 
with the previous investigation assessing the representativeness level of the FMC-IFMA 
membership apportionment (Table 23). Except for the industry representatives having 
a neutral attitude (score 3), the other types of stakeholders have identical median values 
(score 4). This means that they believe FMC-IFMA will generate slightly better 
conditions than the previous system. This also indicates an optimistic outlook for the 
future performance of FMC-IFMA. In contrast, the consistency of the industry 
representatives’ attitudes strengthens the previous argument concerning their disinterest 
on the ‘government’s internal affair’ (Chapter VII.6.3). 
 Compared to the previous investigations, the distribution ranges of the responses 
are narrower. The respondents’ answers are more concentrated in a specific portion of 
the Likert-scale spectrum. In fact, the answers from the provincial governments and 
academia representatives are accumulating in one point; the score of 4 (Fig.38). 
Meanwhile, the responses from the central government, the fishing ports, and the NGOs 
range between scores 4 and 5. All of them have an identical ‘mean’ value (score 4).  
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Identical mean values also occur for the municipality/regency and the 
commercial fishing associations. However, the distribution of their answers ranges 
between 3 and 4, (the same as with the industry). A distinction occurs in the mean value 
as the industry maintains a neutral attitude (score 3).  
The repeating median value and distribution range from the industry 
representatives provide stronger evidence to strengthen the previous argument; 
essentially the industry (the vessel owners) have little or no attention focused on the 
FMC-IFMA. In this case, the industry believes that the commission will have no impact 
for Indonesian marine fisheries governance. For them, the situation will remain the 
same. Most likely this result is attributable to the low level of effort by the DGCF-
MMAF to disseminate information concerning the formation of the FMC-IFMA. 
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*Notes: 
Y-axis  = Likert Scale (1 to 5) 
X-axis  = Types of Respondents 
Number   = Outliers (marked by respondent number) 
Bold line in bar = Median 
 
Figure 38. Boxplot of the Comparison Level for the FMC-IFMA existence 
 
In summary, all stakeholders except the industry indicate an optimistic attitude 
concerning the potential performance of the FMC-IFMA. Five of them exhibit a sum of 
positive attitude scores exceeding 80% of their responses (Fig.39). These are the central 
government, the fishing ports, the provincial governments, the NGOs and academia. 
Not surprisingly, these are the types of stakeholders represented in the commission 
membership.  
FMC-IFMA will improve data collection, provide better 
monitoring system. Moreover, it will also function as the 
‘watching’ forum where the provinces will keep an eye on each 
other in regard to the fishing allocation. 
(Anonymous, 41 years old, Sundanese, Assistant Deputy 
Director for fishing licensing services, MMAF) 
 
The commission (FMC-IFMA *ed) will make the provinces to 
race in improving their data.  
(Anonymous, 43 years old, Javanese, Head of Fishing Port 
Deputy for Port Development, Nizam Zachman Oceanic 
Fishing Port, Jakarta) 
 
In contrast, among the governmental stakeholders, the municipality/regency has 
the lowest positive attitude. Most likely this was caused by their exclusion from the 
FMC-IFMA. However, the sum of their positive attitudes still greatly exceeds the 
negative scores. The range is almost similar to composition of the answers from the 
commercial fishing associations.  
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Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders Group Stakeholders 
1. Central Govt 4. Regency Govt 7. Association 
2. Fishing Port 5. Crews/Skippers 8. NGO 
3. Provincial 
Govt 
6. Industry (Owners) 9. Academia Research 
Notes 
Scale Color Color Interpretation 
1  Blue Much Worse  
2  Green Somewhat Worse  
3  Grey About the Same  
4  Purple Somewhat Better  
5  Yellow Much Better  
 
Figure 39. Sample Distribution of the Comparison Level for the FMC-IFMA existence 
 
Figure 39 also portrays the dominance of neutral responses from the industry 
representatives; 59% of the total answers. This means that more than half of the industry 
representatives believe that the situation will remain the same regardless of the existence 
of the FMC-IFMA. Furthermore, this result, once again, strengthens the argument that 
the industry is paying little or no attention to the establishment of the FMC-IFMA. As 
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previously mentioned, this paper argues that this situation was caused by poor 
dissemination of information to the industry that should have been performed by the 
DGCF-MMAF. 
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CHAPTER VIII  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
VIII.1. Conclusions 
VIII.1.1. Increased Fishing Fee Tariff 
The analysis of the policy impacts and the investigations of the stakeholders’ 
attitudes produced several interesting findings. First, as easily predicted, the escalated 
fishing fee tariff generates a positive impact on the national revenues from the fisheries 
sector. Not only does it increase the national revenue, it also successfully liberates 
Indonesia from her dependency on (ex)-foreign fishing vessels and the more destructive 
fishing gears that previously had been the primary contributors to the State income. 
 Interestingly, the number of registered fishing vessels also increases. This result 
is in contrast to the classic hypothesis positing a negative correlation between an 
increased fishing fee tariff and the number of registered fishing vessels; the fishery 
bioeconomic model (Gordon 1954, Schaefer 1957). However, it is crucial to underscore 
that this result is mostly caused by other circumstances and other policies enforced over 
the same period of time: the increasing price of the landed catch and the enforcement of 
re-registration of previously downsized vessels. 
 Another interesting finding related to the new fishing fee tariff authorization 
occurs in the composition of the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV). 
Although experiencing the highest percentage increase in the fishing fee (741.33 -
767.49%), the number of registered Squid Jigging vessels increases; doubling in two 
respective years (2016 and 2017). Once again, this result was also affected by other 
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factors: the declining catch of the tuna longline fleet and the operational characteristics 
of the relevant fishing gear. 
 In regard to the contribution of the fishing fee component of fishing operational 
costs (FOC), this paper concludes that it represents a relatively small portion compared 
to the primary variable cost-- fuel expenditures. The expenditure for the fishing fee 
ranges between 3.1% and 9.2%. The percentage of total FOC represented by the fishing 
fee component is highest for Big Pelagic Purse Seine (BPPS) targeting skipjack 
(Katsuwonus sp) and operating in IFMA 571 and 572, ranging from 8.1% to 9.2%. 
 Although experiencing a smaller increase in the fishing fee compared to the 
increase for squid jigging, tuna longline should be considered as the most negatively 
affected fishing gear. As the type of fishing gear having the largest FOC, a four-fold 
increase (437.4%) generates more impact than the one experienced by squid jigging. 
This situation is worsened due to the doubling of the average FOC occurring between 
2014 and 2018. 
 Predicted results also emerge from the investigation of the stakeholders’ 
attitudes. Among nine types stakeholders questioned, the respondents representing the 
vessel owners and the skippers consistently convey their negative attitudes (Score 1 and 
2 in the Likert-Scale) for three investigated aspects; the level of agreement, the level of 
acceptability, and the level of support. The analysis also indicates the positive 
correlation among the investigated attitudes. Those having strong positive attitude on 
the level of agreement strongly accept and support the policy. 
 Three reasons underlying the positive attitudes towards the increased fishing fee 
tariff are the positive impact on the national fisheries revenues, the time period for the 
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old tariff stagnancy, and the awareness of preserving publicly-owned resources. In 
addition, the proponents of the increased tariff also believe that the escalated fishing fee 
still can be covered by the industry and is relatively small compared to the other variable 
costs of a fishing operation. 
 The analysis also discovered weakening positive attitudes among government 
representatives, correlated to an increasing distance from the center of administration; 
Jakarta. Most likely it was caused by the reduced fiscal impact for the concerned 
regions. In addition, the work location also slightly affects the attitude of the 
government stakeholders. Regardless of their status as central government employees, 
the fishing port officials interacting daily with the industry have more concern and 
empathy concerning the increased fishing fee than their counterparts working in the 
headquarters of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF). 
 
VIII.1.2. Municipality/Regency Authority Revocation 
 This paper summarizes six emerging problems which were considered as the 
reasons for revoking the municipality/regency authority and maritime jurisdiction. 
These encompass poor quality of data collection, weak law enforcement, rent-seeking 
behavior, the horizontal conflict caused by migrant fishers, the long and complicated 
bureaucracy, and economic inefficiency. Unfortunately, the last one, economic 
inefficiency, still exists as the direct impact resulting from the authorization of the Law 
No.23 of 2014. As fishing licensing services for the 5-10 GT boats are transferred to the 
provincial governments, it generates additional costs both for the industry and the 
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government, particularly in the less developed regions of the eastern part of Indonesia 
where online services have not worked optimally 
 The transfer of authority also evokes another potential problem. The provinces 
will be overwhelmed trying to manage their expanded maritime jurisdiction not to 
mention the added fishing fleet. Generally, the potential number of managed fishing 
boats (5-30 GT) is doubling. However, a much larger impact will be experienced by the 
more populated provinces. For instance, the number of additional fishing boats in the 
West Java province increases by 77 times over the previous fleet. 
 The third impact consists of job reassignments for the municipality/regency 
officials previously dealing with fisheries management. To cope with this situation, 
most of the municipality/regency fisheries agencies have been restructuring their 
institution and re-posting their staff. While some provincial agencies have not yet 
adjusted, many municipalities and regencies have discontinued their services to 
fishermen. Consequently, this situation caused temporary confusion among the 
neglected fishers in some regions.  
 The last direct impact is the irrelevancy of the distribution formula for national 
fisheries revenues stipulated by Article 14 d of the Law No.33 of 2004. Referring to the 
fishing ground locations of the charged fishing vessels and the revocation of the 
municipality/regency maritime jurisdiction, the sharing revenues should have been 
allocated only to two levels of administration; the central and the provincial 
governments. Another aspect to this impact is the insufficient funding of the provincial 
governments in managing the additional boats transferred from their municipalities and 
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regencies. Further explanation regarding this issue, including a proposed proportional 
distribution, will be discussed in the recommendation section (Chapter VIII.2). 
 Similar to the increased fishing fee tariff, the predicted results also occurred in 
the investigation of the stakeholders’ attitudes towards the revocation of the 
municipality/regency authority. As the most negatively affected stakeholder, the 
municipality/regency representatives were the only group of respondents who 
consistently conveyed their negative attitudes on the three aspects investigated. In 
contrast, although regarded as the most benefited stakeholder, the provincial 
representatives have a dispersed and divided attitude resulting in a neutral score (3) on 
the Likert-Scale.  
 This paper argues that the negative attitudes conveyed by nearly half of the 
provincial representatives were caused by their awareness concerning the job 
reassignments, mostly without the extra budget support. In other words, half of the 
provincial respondents expressed a pessimistic outlook: the provinces being 
overwhelmed by their expanded authority and maritime jurisdiction. 
In addition to the positive correlation between the three aspects examined, where 
the median values were almost identical, the investigation also discovered the slightly 
declining negative attitudes of the municipality/regency representatives. Regardless of 
their strong disagreement and their strong unacceptability, eventually the 
municipality/regency representatives’ attitudes were slightly softening in their level of 
support, or resistance. Most likely this was caused by the binding power of the 
authorizing regulation; the third highest rank in the Indonesia law hierarchy  
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VIII.1.3. Establishment of the Fisheries Management Commission in Indonesian 
Fisheries Management Area 
 
 Theoretically the FMC-IFMA has met three favorable conditions (Pinkerton 
1989) for performing fisheries co-management. Despite its weak binding power, a long-
term legally formalized arrangement exists in the form of the DG decree assigning the 
task, the function, and the membership apportionment of the commission. The 
appointment of academia and NGO representatives in the commission panels indicates 
partial external support. Subsequently, the domination of the government 
representatives both from the central and provincial administrations affirms the 
existence of experienced bureaucrats as the third favorable condition.  
However, it is also necessary to summarize several shortcomings of the FMC-
IFMA as currently implemented. First, direct fishermen engagement is highly limited. 
Only one representative is incorporated into the core commission; the commercial 
fishing association acting as the consultative panel coordinator. Unfortunately, as of the 
end of data collection for this study, the consultative panel in each FMC-IFMA had not 
yet been formed.  
According to Jentoft (1989), the level of user involvement in the decision-
making process is one of the factors affecting the legitimacy of a regulatory scheme. In 
addition, it is also one of the principles for successful common-property resources 
(CPR) management (Ostrom 1990). Moreover, the investigation of stakeholder attitudes 
indicated an institutional failure where commercial fishing associations as official 
representatives of vessel owners failed to disseminate the information to their members. 
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Second, as previously mentioned, the legal base authorizing formation of the 
commission is not strong enough to bind the commission members, particularly the 
provincial officials dominating the core of the commission in each FMC-IFMA.  
Third, the vague description of the task and function of the commission led to 
wide-open interpretation. As a result, this paper presumes that the FMC-IFMA merely 
acts as the evaluator or the analyst of the fisheries management performance in their 
jurisdiction.  
In addition, the task assigned to the commission is only the first stage of the 
decision-making process. Therefore, tentatively the commission’s existence fails to 
reduce the long and complicated bureaucratic process as one of the classical problems 
in Indonesian marine fisheries governance. Consequently, it is hard to expect that in the 
foreseeable future the commission will work effectively in resolving escalated fisheries 
issues. 
Referring to the commission’s job descriptions and the engagement level of the 
involved stakeholders, particularly the industry representative, this paper classifies the 
FMC-IFMA on a spectrum located in between the Type A (Instructive) and Type B 
(Consultative) of Sen and Nielsen’s (1996) fisheries co-management typology. Thus, 
the government representatives tend to dominate the co-management activities. 
Therefore, although initially intended to feature a bottom-up approach, the commission 
fails to meet the objective mandated by the Presidential Regulation concerning the 
Middle-Term National Development Plan for the 2015-2019 period. The failure is 
attributed to a lack of broad stakeholder participation, particularly by the industry. 
 
 
 179 
The study also found problems that impeded the operationalization of the 
commission. In addition to the weak authorizing law, budget constraints also hamper 
the commission’s performance. These insufficient operating budgets are attributed to 
the priority placed on fisheries development focused on infrastructure projects such as 
fishing port construction, the Management Information System (MIS) development, and 
fishing boat procurement. Furthermore, the poor dissemination of information also 
inhibits the operationalization of the commission’ panels. 
Despite diverse familiarity levels, the establishment of the FMC-IFMA 
essentially results in positive stakeholder attitudes. Except for the industry 
representatives, all types of stakeholders indicated their positive attitudes at the support 
level, the representative level, and the comparison level. On average, the stakeholders 
exhibit moderate support (Score 4) for the FMC-IFMA formation. Subsequently, they 
also indicate that the existing membership apportionment scheme represents them. 
Finally, the responses indicate optimistic assessments of the potential future 
performance of the FMC-IFMA. In this case, they believe that the FMC-IFMA has the 
potential to improve the quality of data collection due to the involvement of the 
provincial governments in the commission. 
The industry representatives were the only stakeholder group conveying a 
neutral attitude (score 3). Two hypotheses were developed from the repeating median 
values and the distribution range of the responses from the industry representatives. 
First, the industry is not really concerned with the FMC-IFMA formation. Second, they 
are disappointed with the very limited representation in the apportionment of the 
commission membership. Referring to their expressions garnered during the field data 
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collection, this paper argues that the first hypothesis as the primary reason. Most likely 
this resulted from the flawed dissemination of information performed by the DGCF as 
the responsible agency for the FMC-IFMA operationalization. 
 
VIII.2. Recommendations 
 Following the conclusions described above, this paper offers several 
recommendations. These recommendations were developed by combining the results of 
the policy analyses conducted. First, drawing from the positive trend of the national 
fisheries revenues resulting from the increased fishing fee tariff and the expanded 
authority and maritime jurisdiction of the provincial governments, this paper 
recommends amending of the distribution formula for the Revenue Sharing Fund (RSF). 
Particularly the formula assigning the sharing mechanism to the local governments; 
article 14 d of Law No.33 of 2004.   
The amended formula should apply the derivation basis leading to a proportional 
distribution of the RSF. The exploitation level estimated from the number of permitted 
Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (NRFV) in each Fisheries Management Area 
(FMA) can be set as the benchmark for this proportional distribution. Subsequently, the 
sharing fund allocated to each FMA should also be distributed proportionally to the 
constituent provinces based on their registered managed fishing boats (10-30). This 
proposed formula is expected to encourage the provinces to improve the commercial 
fishing licensing data in their maritime jurisdiction.  
This study also argues that the municipality/regency shall be excluded from the 
proposed funding formula. The argument is made based on recognition of the source of 
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the potential sharing fund, and the absence of municipality/regency authority and 
maritime jurisdiction as a result of the recent reforms. More thorough and focused study 
is required to assess the possibility of implementing the proposed formula, specifically 
comparing the potential fiscal benefits with the existing formula. 
Second, in regard to the weak binding power of the existing regulation 
authorizing the FMC-IFMA formation, this paper recommends reinforcement of the 
legal base. This action should be executed immediately. It is unnecessary to wait until 
the existing commissions are fully operational. In the short term, the establishment and 
the membership apportionment of the FMC-IFMA should be mandated by the 
ministerial decree. Subsequently, it should also be incorporated into a potential 
amendment of the national law concerning fisheries. The political year of 2019 provides 
an appropriate moment for amending the law. Referring to the formation of the US 
Regional Fishery Management Council (RFMC) system, a sturdy legal base is 
absolutely required to make the regional institutions perform properly.  
The last recommendation concerns the FMC-IFMA membership apportionment. 
This paper recommends more diversified commission members, particularly by adding 
more representatives from the industry. The highly restricted engagement from the 
industry representative not only leads to a failure in bringing diverse points of view into 
the discussion and the decision-making process (Eagle et al. 2003) but is also most 
likely to benefit the dominant stakeholder (Dell’Apa et al. 2012). In this case, the 
dominant point of view in FMC-IFMA discussions will be easily predictable. Contrary 
to Eagle et al. (2003) and Dell’Apa et al. (2012), the discussion may only endorse 
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government interests. The results garnered during the field observations, including 
attendance at several national meetings, support these two arguments. 
This paper proposes at least two commercial fishing associations should be 
seated on each commission based on the type of dominant fishing gear operating in the 
concerned area. Not only would this empower the resource users, but this 
recommendation also has the potential to balance the point of view at the FMC-IFMA. 
For instance, both the Indonesia Tuna Association (ASTUIN and ATLI) and the 
Indonesia Purse Seine Association (HNPN) should be represented on the commission 
in FMC-IFMA 571 and 572, where their members share the fishing grounds. The more 
balanced and diverse points of view that can be brought into the discussion for resolving 
potential conflicts, and to debate the future management measures, the better the entire 
system will function. Indonesia should start to involve non-governmental stakeholders 
in governing one of her natural resources, and the FMC-IFMA provides this 
opportunity. 
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Appendix 1. Location of the Study 
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Appendix 2. The Questionnaires (Bahasa Indonesia version) 
 
  
Survey Persepsi Pemangku Kepentingan (Stakeholders) 
Penjelasan Singkat 
Tujuan dari survey ini adalah untuk mengidentifikasi persepsi para pemangku 
kepentingan (stakeholders) terhadap pelaksanaan Federalisasi Pengelolaan Perikanan 
Tangkap sebagai salah satu bentuk pengelolaan bersama (co-management) sumberdaya 
ikan di Indonesia.  
Survey ini terdiri dari pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang berkaitan dengan Sikap 
(Attitude) yang akan diambil atau dipilih oleh para pemangku kepentingan 
(stakeholders) terhadap dampak kebijakan yang dihasilkan dari pemberlakuan 3 
regulasi baru yang ditetapkan pada periode 2014-2015.  
Dampak kebijakan tersebut adalah: 
1) Kenaikan Pungutan Perikanan (PPP dan PHP) yang sangat signifikan,  
2) Penghapusan/pencabutan kewenangan pemerintah kabupaten/kota dalam 
pengelolaan perikanan di wilayah perairan 0-4 mil laut, dan  
3) Pembentukan Komisi Pengelolaan Perikanan (KPP) di masing-masing 
Wilayah Pengelolaan Perikanan Negara Republik Indonesia (WPP-NRI). 
 
Instruksi 
Mohon untuk menjawab setiap pertanyaan di lembar kuisioner dengan memilih 
(menconteng) salah satu kotak pilihan jawaban yang tersedia di bawah masing-masing 
pertanyaan yang diajukan. Diperkirakan survey ini akan berlangsung selama 15-30 
menit. Kami sangat mengapresiasi kesediaan dan kerjasama bapak/ibu sekalian atas 
partisipasinya di kuisioner ini. 
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Pertimbangan Etika 
Kuisioner ini hanya diberikan kepada responden dewasa yang berusia lebih dari 
18 tahun. Kuisioner ini Tidak membedakan responden berdasarkan jenis kelamin 
(gender), kesukuan/ras/etnik, agama, status kehamilan, bahasa, tingkat pendidikan, 
dan/atau status finansial. Sangat kecil kemungkinan bahwa setiap responden akan 
mengalami gangguan fisik, psikologis, sosial, hukum, dan atau ekonomi sebagai 
dampak dan akibat dari partisipasi di kuisioner ini. 
Selama survey berlangsung, responden disarankan untuk memahami hak yang 
diberikan kepadanya. Sangat disarankan agar setiap responden untuk mengajukan 
pertanyaan lebih lanjut dan lebih mendalam terkait pelaksanaan penelitian ini. 
Penelitian saya sangat menghargai keamanan dan kenyamanan (privacy) para 
responden. Jawaban para responden di kuisioner ini bersifat rahasia (confidential). 
Transkrip dari kuisioner ini akan dijaga sepenuhnya oleh saya selaku peneliti, dan hanya 
saya selaku peneliti yang mempunyai akses terhadap transkrip data kuisioner ini. 
Data yang dikumpulkan akan disimpan di dalam basis data (data base) di sebuah 
folder khusus dengan kata sandi (password) rahasia yang hanya diketahui oleh saya 
selaku peneliti. Folder tersebut akan disimpan di dalam hard drive and external hard 
disk yang berada di Ruang 115 Coastal Institute, the University of Rhode Island (URI) 
di negara bagian Rhode Island, Amerika Serikat. 
 
Informasi Responden 
Institusi :  
Nama  : 
(Silahkan dipilih berdasarkan tabel klasifikasi di bawah ini) 
 
No. Jenis Pemangku Kepentingan  
(Types of Stakeholder) 
Conteng (√) 
kolom di 
bawah ini 
1. PNS di Kantor Pusat Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan 
Republik Indonesia (KKP-RI), Jakarta 
 
2. PNS KKP-RI yang ditugaskan di luar kantor pusat (Contoh: 
Kepala dan atau pegawai pelabuhan perikanan UPT Pusat) 
 
3. PNS dari Pemerintah Propinsi  
4. PNS dari Pemerintah Kabupaten/Kota  
5. Nakhoda dan atau ABK Kapal Ikan  
6. Pemilik Kapal Perikanan dan atau perwakilan perusahaan 
penangkapan ikan 
 
7. Asosiasi Perikanan/Himpunan Nelayan/Kelompok Usaha 
Bersama (KUB) Perikanan Tangkap 
 
8. LSM  
9. Akademisi  
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I. Pertanyaan-pertanyaan terkait dampak kebijakan nomor 1 (Kenaikan 
Pungutan Perikanan (PPP/PHP) yang sangat signifikan) = 3 pertanyaan. 
1. Peraturan Pemerintah (PP) Nomor 75 tahun 2015 tentang Jenis dan Tarif atas 
Jenis Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak (PNBP) yang berlaku pada Kementerian 
Kelautan dan Perikanan menyebabkan kenaikan Pungutan Perikanan (PPP dan 
PHP) yang sangat signifikan.  
Apakah anda setuju atas kenaikan tarif Pungutan Perikanan ini? 
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Agreement) 
 Tidak 
Setuju  
 Sedikit 
Tidak 
Setuju 
 Antara 
Setuju 
dan 
Tidak 
Setuju 
 Agak Setuju   Setuju 
Mengapa? 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Sejauh mana anda dapat menerima (akseptabilitas) kenaikan tarif pungutan 
perikanan (PPP dan PHP) tersebut? 
  (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Acceptability) 
 Tidak 
dapat 
menerima  
 Agak tidak 
dapat 
menerima 
 Netral  Agak 
Menerima 
 Dapat 
menerima 
Mengapa? 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Bagaimana sikap anda terhadap kenaikan pungutan perikanan (PPP dan 
PHP)? 
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Support/Opposition) 
 Sangat 
Menentang 
Kenaikan 
Pungutan 
Perikanan 
 Agak 
Menentang 
Kenaikan 
Pungutan 
Perikanan 
 Netral  Agak 
mendukung 
Kenaikan 
Pungutan 
Perikanan 
 
 Sangat 
mendukung 
Kenaikan 
Pungutan 
Perikanan 
Mengapa? 
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II. Pertanyaan-pertanyaan terkait dampak kebijakan nomor 2 
(Penghapusan/pencabutan kewenangan pemerintah kabupaten/kota dalam 
pengelolaan perikananan di wilayah perairan 0-4 mil laut) = 3 
pertanyaan. 
 
1. Undang-undang (UU) Nomor 23 tahun 2014 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah 
telah memperluas kewenangan Pemerintah Propinsi dalam mengelola 
perikanan tangkap (dari 4-12 nm menjadi 0-12 nm). Pada saat yang 
bersamaan, Undang-undang ini juga mencabut/menghapus kewenangan 
pemerintah kabupaten/kota di perairan 0-4 nm. 
Apakah anda setuju terhadap pencabutan/penghapusan kewenangan 
pemerintah kabupaten/kota dalam pengelolaan perikanan di wilayah perairan 
0-4 nm seperti yang telah ditetapkan oleh UU tersebut? 
  (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Agreement) 
 Tidak 
Setuju  
 Sedikit 
Tidak 
Setuju 
 Antara 
Setuju 
dan Tidak 
Setuju 
 Agak Setuju   Setuju 
Mengapa? 
 
 
2. Sejauh mana anda dapat menerima (akseptabilitas) pencabutan/penghapusan 
kewenangan pemerintah kabupaten/kota dalam pengelolaan perikanan di 
wilayah perairan 0-4 nm? 
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Acceptability) 
 Tidak 
dapat 
menerima  
 Agak 
tidak 
dapat 
menerima 
 Netral  Agak 
Menerima 
 Dapat 
diterima 
 
Mengapa? 
 
 
 
3. Bagaimana sikap anda terhadap pencabutan/penghapusan kewenangan 
pemerintah kabupaten/kota dalam pengelolaan perikanan di wilayah perairan 
0-4 nm? 
  (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Support/Opposition) 
 Sangat 
Menentang  
 Agak 
Menentang  
 Netral  Agak 
mendukung  
 Sangat 
mendukung  
Mengapa? 
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III. Pertanyaan-pertanyaan terkait dampak kebijakan nomor 3 (Pembentukan 
Komisi Pengelolaan Perikananan (KPP) di masing-masing Wilayah 
Pengelolaan Perikanan Negara Republik Indonesia (WPP-NRI)) = 4 
pertanyaan. 
1. Indonesia berdasarkan Kep Dirjen PT No.47/KEP-DJPT/2017 (Juni 2017) 
telah mendirikan Komisi Pengelolaan Perikanan (KPP) di setiap Wilayah 
Pengelolaan Perikanan Negara Republik Indonesia (WPP-NRI). KPP akan 
melaksanakan dan mengevaluasi Pengelolaan Perikanan di masing-masing 
WPP-NRI. Salah satu tugas yang dimandatkan ke KPP adalah penyiapan 
bahan Rencana Pengelolaan Perikanan (RPP). KPP terdiri dari perwakilan 
pemangku kepentingan (stakeholders) seperti tercantum pada tabel 1. 
Pembentukan KPP dianggap sebagai salah satu upaya untuk meningkatkan 
partisipasi para pemangku kepentingan (stakeholders) dalam mengelola 
sumberdaya perikanan laut di wilayah perairan 12-200 nm. 
Sejauh mana anda mengetahui tentang Komisi Pengelolaan Perikanan 
(KPP)? 
  (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Familiarity) 
Tidak 
tahu 
sama 
sekali  
Sedikit 
Mengetahui 
Agak 
Mengetahui 
Cukup 
Mengetahui 
Sangat 
Mengetahui 
 
Table 1. Komposisi Keanggotaan Komisi Pengelolaan Perikanan (KPP) di WPP-
NRI 
 
2. Bagaimana sikap anda terhadap pembentukan Komisi Pengelolaan Perikanan 
(KPP) di WPP-NRI? 
  (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Support/Opposition 
Sangat 
Menentang  
Agak 
Menentang  
Netral Agak 
mendukung  
Sangat 
mendukung  
Mengapa? 
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3. Apakah komposisi Komisi Pengelolaan Perikanan (KPP) di WPP-NRI (lihat 
tabel 1) sudah mewakili kepentingan beragam pemangku kepentingan 
(stakeholders) perikanan tangkap Indonesia? 
  (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Likelihood) 
 Sangat 
Tidak 
Mewakili 
 Tidak 
Mewakili 
 Netral  Agak 
mewakili 
 Sangat 
Mewakili 
 
Mengapa? 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 
Bagaimana keyakinan/kepercayaan saudara/i terkait pembentukan Komisi 
Pengelolaan Perikanan (KPP) di WPP-NRI jika dibandingkan dengan sistem 
yang ada saat ini? 
  (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Comparison of two 
products) 
 Lebih 
Buruk  
 Agak Buruk  Sama 
Saja 
 Sedikit 
Lebih 
Baik 
 
 Jauh lebih 
Baik 
 
Mengapa? 
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 Data Demografi Responden: 
1. Usia: 
 
2. Jenis Kelamin: 
 Pria  Wanita 
 
3. Suku: 
 
 
 
4. Pendidikan Akhir: 
 
 SD  SMP  SMA  D3/D4  S1 
 
  S2  S3    
 
 Biografi Peneliti 
http://web.uri.edu/maf/highlight/fery-sutyawan/ 
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Appendix 3. The Questionnaires (English version) 
 
Stakeholders’ Perception Survey 
Brief Description 
The purpose of this survey is to investigate the stakeholders’ perception toward 
the implementation of Federalism in Indonesia Marine Fisheries Governance as one 
forms of fisheries co-management. The survey consists of questions related to 
stakeholders’ attitudes toward the policy impacts generated by the enactment of 3 new 
policies in the 2014-2015 period. 
The policy impacts are: 
1) The significant increase of fishing fee,  
2) The elimination of Regency/Municipality's authority over fisheries management 
in 0-4 nm, and  
3) The establishment of Fisheries Management Commission (FMC) in each 
Indonesia Fisheries Management Area (IFMA).  
 
Instruction 
Please answer the questions from the survey sheet by ticking off one of the boxes 
below each question. The survey will take approximately 15-30 minutes to be 
completed. Thank you very much in advance for your attention and kind cooperation. 
Ethical Consideration 
My research will not survey individuals under the age of 18. Participants will 
not be excluded based on gender, race/ethnicity, religion, pregnancy status, language, 
education, or financial status. It is highly unlikely that respondents will experience 
physical, psychological, social, legal, or economic harm as a result of participating in 
this research project. 
During the survey, the respondents will be advised to ask questions for further 
information about the process and nature of the survey. 
My research shall respect the potential participant's right to privacy. Their 
recorded responses to the questionnaires are confidential.  The interview question 
transcripts will remain at all times with the interviewer. Only the researchers will have 
access to the data.  The collected data will be entered into a database that will be kept 
in a folder on a password protected hard drive or external hard disk that will be stored 
in Room 115 of the Coastal Institute, the University of Rhode Island-USA. 
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Respondent information 
Name  : 
Institution : 
(Please chose one of the stakeholders’ types) 
No. Types of Stakeholder Choose (Thick 
the Box below) 
1. National Officers in HQ of MMAF-RI  
2. National Officers outside the HQ 
(Heads of Fishing Ports or Fishing Ports’ officer) 
 
3. Provincial Fisheries Agencies Officer  
4. Regency/Municipal Fisheries Agencies Officer  
5. Fishing Vessel’ Skipper or Crew  
6. Fishing Vessels’ Owner or Fishing Companies’ 
Representative 
 
7. Fishermen Association  
8. Environmental NGO  
9. Academicians  
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I. Questions related to the Policy Impact No.1 (The significant increase of fishing fee) 
= 3 questions. 
1. Government Regulation No.75 of 2015 concerning the Non-Tax State 
Income (NTSI) from the Fishery Sector has increased significantly the 
fishing fees charged to the Nationally Registered Fishing Vessels (>30 GT) 
that operating in IFMA (12-200 nm).  
Do you agree about the increase of fishing fees generated by the 
Government Regulation No.75 of 2015? 
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Agreement) 
 
Disagree  Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
Agree 
2. To what extent is your acceptability in regard to the increase of fishing fees 
generated by the Government Regulation No.75 of 2015? 
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Acceptability) 
 
Unaccept
able 
Slightly 
Unacceptab
le 
Neutral  Slightly 
Acceptable 
    Acceptable 
 
 
3. What is your response in regard to the increased fishing fees? 
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Support/Opposition) 
 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
Neutral Somewhat 
Favor 
 
Strongly 
Favor 
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II. Questions related to the Policy Impact No.2 (The elimination of 
regency/municipality’s authority over fisheries management in 0-4 nm) = 3 questions. 
1. Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning the Local Governance expands the 
authority of provincial governments in managing the commercial fisheries, 
from 4-12 nautical miles (nm) to 0-12 nm, while, at the same time, it 
eliminates the authority of the regency and municipal government in 0-4 nm 
(GOI 2014). Do you agree about the elimination of Regency/Municipality’s 
authority over commercial fisheries management in 0-4 nm as mandated by 
the Law? 
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Agreement) 
 
Disagree  Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
Agree 
2. To what extent is your acceptability in regard to the elimination of 
Regency/Municipality’s authority over fisheries management in 0-4 nm? 
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Acceptability) 
 
Unaccept
able 
Slightly 
Unaccepta
ble 
Neutral  Slightly 
Acceptable 
Acceptable 
 
 
  
3. What is your response in regard to the elimination of Regency/Municipality’s 
authority over fisheries management in 0-4 nm? 
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Support/Opposition) 
 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
Neutral Somewhat 
Favor 
 
Strongly 
Favor 
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III. Questions related to the Policy Impact No.3 (The establishment of the Fisheries 
Management Commission (FMC) in each Indonesia Fisheries Management Area 
(IFMA)) = 5 questions. 
1. Indonesia has just established (June 2017) the Fisheries Management 
Commission (FMC) in each Indonesia Fisheries Management Area 
(IFMA). These FMCs will be responsible for implementing and 
evaluating marine fisheries management in each IFMA. One of the tasks 
mandated to the commission is to prepare the material for developing the 
Fisheries Management Plans (FMP). The commission consists of 
stakeholders’ representatives (Table 1). The establishment of the 
commission is considered as one of the efforts to encourage stakeholders’ 
participation in managing the Indonesia marine fisheries resources 
located in 12-200 nm.  
To what extent do you know about IFMC? 
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Familiarity) 
 
Not at all 
familiar  
Slightly 
familiar 
Somewhat 
familiar 
Moderate
ly 
Familiar 
Extremely 
Familiar 
 
 
Table 1. The Apportionment of the Fisheries Management Commission (FMC) in 
each IFMA 
 
 
2. What is your response in regard to the establishment of Fisheries 
Management Commission (FMC) in each Indonesia Fisheries 
Management Area (IFMA)? 
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Support/Opposition 
 
Strongly 
Oppose 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
Neutral Somewhat 
Favor 
Strongly 
Favor 
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3. Does the existing composition of FMC-IFMA membership (Table 1) 
represent the interests of various stakeholders of Indonesia marine 
fisheries? 
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Level of 
Likelihood) 
 
 Extremely 
unlikely 
 unlikely  Neutral  Likely  Extremely 
Likely 
 
 
4. 
What is your belief in regard to the establishment of IFMC in each IFMA 
compared with the existing system of marine fisheries governance? 
 (Likert-Type Scale Response Anchors (Vagias, Wade M. 2006) = Comparison of 
two products) 
 
 Much Worse   Somewhat 
Worse 
 About 
the same 
 Somewhat 
Better 
 
 Much 
Better 
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 Respondent’s Information: 
1. Age: 
 
2. Sex: 
 Male  Female 
 
3. Ethnicity: 
 
4. Education: 
 
 Elementa
ry School 
 Junior 
High 
School 
 High 
School 
 Diploma  Bachelor/ 
Undergrad 
 
  Master’s 
Degree 
 Doctorate’s Degree    
 
Researcher biography (http://web.uri.edu/maf/highlight/fery-sutyawan/) 
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Appendix 4. List of Key Informants for In-Depth Interview 
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Appendix 5. Fishing Fee Rate/Tariff Escalation 
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Appendix 6. Descriptive Statistic Analyzing the Percentage (%) of Fishing Fee on 
the Total Fishing Operational Costs 
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Appendix 7. The Kruskal-Wallis Test Summary 
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Appendix 8. Statistics of Registered Fishing Fleet by Province (2016) 
 
 
  
< 5 5-10 10-20 20-30 30-50 50-100 100 -200 200-300 300-500 Sum > 5GT Total
Total   115 814   35 988   9 790   6 481    805   2 008    847    11 -   55 930   171 744
  Sumatera   48 268   11 483   1 886   1 688    133    352    92    6 -   15 640   63 908
  Aceh   5 862   2 049    423    397 - -    3 - -   2 872   8 734
  Sumatera Utara   14 972   3 618    541    858    33    212    65    6 -   5 333   20 305
  Sumatera Barat    771    521    293    147    1    1 - - -    963   1 734
  Riau   4 660    625    399    75    2    17    4 - -   1 122   5 782
  Kepulauan Riau   10 000   1 232    72    157    88    108    20 - -   1 677   11 677
  Jambi   2 275    224    9 - - - - - -    233   2 508
  Sumatera Selatan   1 320   1 101    7    1    8    8 - - -   1 125   2 445
  Kepulauan Bangka Belitung   5 663    545    12 - -    1 - - -    558   6 221
  Bengkulu    580    100    35    25    1    5 - - -    166    746
  Lampung   2 165   1 468    95    28 - - - - -   1 591   3 756
  J    a    w   a   7 110   8 694   3 743   2 059    419   1 276    527    3 -   16 721   23 831
  Banten    992   2 149   1 061    827    3    20    2 - -   4 062   5 054
  DKI  Jakarta -    42    29    11    197    625    360    3 -   1 267   1 267
  Jawa Barat   1 562   4 913    51    12    94    146    1 - -   5 217   6 779
  Jawa Tengah    456    368   1 528    424    84    435    157 - -   2 996   3 452
  DI  Yogyakarta -    6    38    6    3 - - - -    53    53
  Jawa Timur   4 100   1 216   1 036    779    38    50    7 - -   3 126   7 226
  Bali  -  Nusatenggara   7 690   3 880    997    813    61    200    220    1 -   6 172   13 862
  Bali    83    236    65    620    61    200    220    1 -   1 403   1 486
  Nusa Tenggara Barat   3 140   1 031    319    21 - - - - -   1 371   4 511
  Nusa Tenggara Timur   4 467   2 613    613    172 - - - - -   3 398   7 865
  Kalimantan   27 121   4 244   1 138    90    12    55    2 - -   5 541   32 662
  Kalimantan Barat   3 419   1 252    233    60    8    55    2 - -   1 610   5 029
  Kalimantan Tengah   1 769    234    101    6 - - - - -    341   2 110
  Kalimantan Selatan   6 080    504    245    15    3 - - - -    767   6 847
  Kalimantan Timur   14 569   1 751    538    6    1 - - - -   2 296   16 865
  Kalimantan Utara   1 284    503    21    3 - - - - -    527   1 811
  Sulawesi   20 774   5 624    842   1 062    131    85    4    1 -   7 749   28 523
  Sulawesi Utara    6 - - -    73    70    4    1 -    148    154
  Gorontalo    74    100    28    38    23 - - - -    189    263
  Sulawesi Tengah   1 070    294    69    28 - - - - -    391   1 461
  Sulawesi Selatan   10 143   3 892    439    282 -    1 - - -   4 614   14 757
  Sulawesi Barat   3 917    536    47    26 - - - - -    609   4 526
  Sulawesi Tenggara   5 564    802    259    688    35    14 - - -   1 798   7 362
  Maluku - Papua   4 851   2 063   1 184    769    49    40    2 - -   4 107   8 958
  Maluku   4 077   1 239    517    312    6    2    2 - -   2 078   6 155
  Maluku Utara    561    511    370    328    23    1 - - -   1 233   1 794
  Papua -    58    51    34    17    11 - - -    171    171
  Papua Barat    213    255    246    95    3    26 - - -    625    838
Province
Fishing Boat Reange Size (in GT)
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.1) 
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.2) 
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.3) 
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.4) 
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.5) 
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.6) 
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.7) 
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No. 8) 
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.9) 
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Appendix 9 Pairwise Test (Question No.10) 
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